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EXPRESSIVE HARMS, "BIZARRE 
DISTRICTS," AND VOTING RIGHTS: 
EVALUATING ELECTION-DISTRICT 
APPEARANCES AFTER SHAW 
v. RENOt 
Richard H. Pildes* 
and 
Richard G. Niemi** 
With technical assistance provided by Kimball Brace and Doug Chapin 
Voting-rights controversies today arise from two alternative con-
ceptions of representative government colliding like tectonic plates. 
On one side is the long-standing Anglo-American commitment to or-
ganizing political representation around geography. As embodied in 
election districts, physical territory is the basis on which we ascribe 
linked identities to citizens and on which we forge ties between repre-
sentatives and constituents. On the other side is the increasing power 
of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA),1 which organizes political 
representation around the concept of interest. The Act prohibits the 
dilution of minority voting power and thereby necessarily ascribes 
linked identities to citizens on the basis of group political interests. 
Whenever these two plates of territory and interest collide, surface dis-
turbances in voting-rights policy erupt. 
Shaw v. Reno 2 is the most recent manifestation of these opposing 
forces. In Shaw, a deeply fractured Supreme Court addressed the con-
flict between territory and interest by concluding that, for purposes of 
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Washington, D.C. and, more opecifically, the efforts of Kimball Brace, Doug Chapin, and Jeff 
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Aleinikoff, Steven Croley, Bernard Grofman, Sam Issacharoff, Larry Kramer, Jeffrey Lehman, 
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We were also fortunate to have exceptionally skillful research assistance from Jeffrey Costello 
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1. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971, 1973 to 
1973bb-1 (1988)). 
2. 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993). 
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the Fourteenth Amendment, the geography of election districts "is 
one area in which appearances do matter."3 Against the pressure of 
interest-oriented alternatives that the Voting Rights Act exerts, the 
decision reaffirms the continuing centrality of physical territory to le-
gitimate political representation. In line with this reaffirmation, the 
Court endorsed a new kind of equal protection challenge to legislative 
redistricting. This new, geography-based challenge might be called a 
district appearance claim. 
As the Court defined this claim, "a reapportionment scheme [may 
be] so irrational on its face that it can be understood only as an effort 
to segregate voters ... because of their race .... "4 In this passage, 
"on its face" is to be read literally: only election-district configura-
tions that convey a dramatic visual impression of this sort implicate 
the principles of Shaw. The specific holding of Shaw is that the 
Constitution permits such an election district only when sufficiently 
justified under the exacting standards of strict scrutiny.5 
No other decision from any court has held that, in some circum-
stances, a district might violate the U.S. Constitution when its shape 
becomes too "bizarre."6 When physical geography is stretched too 
thin, when it is twisted, turned, and tortured - all in the apparent 
pursuit of fair and effective minority representation - at some point, 
too much becomes too much. That appears to be the judicial impulse 
that accounts for Shaw: in the conflict of territory and interest, the 
Constitution requires policymakers somehow to hold the line and ac-
commodate both. 
But judicial impulses are one thing, legal doctrine another. That 
most people, judges included, recoil instinctively from willfully mis-
shapen districts is understandable enough. Yet defining the values and 
purposes that might translate this impulse into an articulate, justifiable 
set of legal principles is no easy task. Leading academic experts in 
redistricting have long argued that this impulse reflects untutored in-
tuition, an instinctive response that careful analysis reveals to be un-
warranted. 7 Shaw translates this impulse into constitutional doctrine 
3. 113 S. Ct. at 2827. 
4. 113 S. Ct. at 2832. 
5. See 113 S. Ct. at 2832. 
6. This constraint is found in numerous state constitutions and statutes, although it is not 
judicially enforced with a great deal of frequency. See infra text accompanying notes 146-52 
(discussing state compactness requirements and their enforcement). 
7. See, e.g .. BRUCE E. CAIN, THE REAPPORTIONMENT PUZZLE (1984); ROBERT G. DIXON, 
JR., DEMOCRATIC REPRESENTATION: REAPPORTIONMENT IN LAW AND POLITICS (1968); 
Bernard Grofman, Criteria for Districting: A Social Science Perspective, 33 UCLA L. REV. 77 
(1985) [hereinafter Grofman, Criteria for Districting]; Bernard Grofman, Would Vince Lombardi 
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but does little to explain or justify the principles that might lie behind 
it. Moreover, the judicial impulse that too much is too much will de-
generate into either a manipulable tool or a meaningless gesture unless 
transformed into legal principles that courts and redistricting bodies 
can apply with at least some consistency and certainty. Yet, beyond 
casting doubt on "highly irregular" districts, Shaw provides no criteria 
to guide reapportionment bodies or courts in judging when this line 
has been crossed. As Justice White, writing for four dissenters, said: 
"[H]ow [the Court] intends to manage this standard, I do not know."8 
Working out the theory and implications of Shaw is particularly 
urgent because the decision is significant for voting-rights law in not 
one, but two, ways. Shaw directly addresses only constitutional con-
straints that will now function at the outer boundaries of the district-
ing process. At the core of that process, however, the conflict between 
territory and interest must be resolved in nearly every context in 
which the Voting Rights Act applies. The Act imposes a duty to avoid 
minority-vote dilution, but the scope of that duty depends, in part, 
upon how much the claims of interest can take precedence over those 
of territory. Thus, Shaw will not only constrain the districting process 
constitutionally but, through its radiating effects on statutory interpre-
tation, may reshape the districting process at its core. 
This article attempts to define the constitutional principles that 
characterize Shaw and to suggest how those principles might be ap-
plied in a consistent, meaningful way. Part I, in which we argue that 
Shaw must be understood to rest on a distinctive conception of the 
kinds of harms against which the Constitution protects, is the theoreti-
cal heart of the article. We call these expressive harms, as opposed to 
more familiar, material harms. In Part II, we briefly survey the his-
tory of previous, largely unsuccessful, efforts in other legal contexts to 
give principled content to these kinds of harms in redistricting. Parts 
III and IV then provide an alternative for evaluating district "appear-
ance" by developing a quantitative approach for measuring district 
shapes that is most consistent with the theory of Shaw. These Parts 
are the empirical and social-scientific heart of the article. We apply 
our quantitative approach to congressional districts throughout the 
country, enabling meaningful comparisons between the congressional 
district at issue in Shaw and other districts. We also compare the 
shapes of congressional districts historically to test whether the district 
in Shaw is a distinctly recent phenomenon. In doing so, we identify 
Have Been Right If He Had Said: "When It Comes to Redistricting, Race Isn't Everything, It's 
the Only Thing"?, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1237 (1993) [hereinafter Grofman, Vince Lombardi]. 
8. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2842 (White, J., dissenting). 
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the kind of districts most constitutionally vulnerable after Shaw. In 
Part V, we describe the further questions that lower courts must an-
swer in deciding whether particular vulnerable districts ultimately fail 
the constitutional standard outlined in Shaw. 
Shaw will undoubtedly be a controversial and confusing decision. 
We write not to praise Shaw, nor to bury it, but to seek to understand 
it on its own terms. What follows is an effort to tease out the princi-
ples underlying Shaw and to suggest one approach to implementing its 
seemingly intractable mandate. 
I. DECIPHERING THE HOLDING OF SHAW 
Shaw is challenging intellectually precisely because it is so puzzling 
legally. Untangling its reasoning requires considerable effort. We be-
gin with the Voting Rights Act, which provides the backdrop against 
which the facts in Shaw arise. 
A. Background of the Voting Rights Act 
The VRA not only permits, but requires policymakers, in certain 
specific circumstances, to be race conscious when they draw electoral 
district lines.9 In 1982, Congress amended section 2 of the Act to clar-
ify that discriminatory intent was not a necessary element of a minor-
ity-vote dilution claim; proof of discriminatory result is now 
sufficient.1° Four years later, in Thornburg v. Gingles, 11 the Court fo-
cused the standard for proving such results around three factors that 
conjoin social conditions and voting structures. First, the minority 
community12 must be "sufficiently large and geographically compact" 
to constitute a minority-dominated election district. 13 Second, the mi-
9. Section 2, for example, explicitly speaks in racially conscious terms: "The extent to which 
members of a protected class have been elected to office ... is one circumstance which may be 
considered" in assessing a dilution claim. 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) (1988). There is no reason to 
assume, of course, that redistricters were not race conscious before the VRA. 
10. 42 u.s.c. § 1973 (1982). 
11. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
12. The Act protects racial groups and, since 1975, language-minority groups, 42 U.S.C. 
§§ 1973(a), 1973b(t)(2) (1988) (defined as Asian Americans, American Indians, Alaskan natives, 
and persons of Spanish heritage in 42 U.S.C. § 1973/(c)(3) (1988)). 
13. 478 U.S. at 50-51. A major question the Court continues to leave open is whether plain-
tiffs can bring claims seeking "influence districts" - that is, districts in which the plaintiffs' 
group is not large enough to control election outcomes in a district, but large enough so that an 
alternative to the current system would give it significant enough influence, in conjunction with 
supportive coalition members, to control outcomes. See Voinovich v. Quilter, 113 S. Ct. 1149, 
1155 (1993) (assuming, without deciding, viability of such claims); Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 
1075, 1084 n.5 (1993) (leaving question open); Gingles, 478 U.S. at 46-47 n.12 (leaving question 
open); see also Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 870 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (three-judge 
court; per curiam) ("The creation of a stronger 'influence' district, however, is a modest plus 
from the Act's standpoint."). For discussion of influence-district claims, see BERNARD 
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nority community must be "politically cohesive"14 - that is, it must 
demonstrate common voting preferences for candidates.15 Finally, the 
majority must be engaged in racially polarized voting behavior that 
over time "usually" defeats the preferred candidates of the minority 
community.16 When these conditions are met, the combination of the 
existing voting structure and the political dynamics of race can be said 
to cause minority-vote dilution. 17 The remedy for such a violation re-
quires the governmental unit to create an alternative voting structure 
that will enable fair and effective minority representation. 
The Court, however, specifically designed the three Gingles criteria 
to define vote dilution only in the context of one particular type of 
electoral structure: multimember or at-large electoral districts. As in 
Gingles, most VRA litigation at the time challenged such districts. 18 
These electoral structures, then common throughout the country, 19 
dated from tum-of-the-century Progressive era reforms. In these re-
forms, northern Progressives and southern Redeemers sought to un-
dermine community-based politics - portrayed as the province of 
corrupt local bosses - and instead to concentrate power in more cen-
tralized, "expertly" administered political bodies.20 In many places, 
the specific aim of these reforms was to diminish the political influence 
of freed blacks.21 In these Gingles-era challenges to multimember 
GROFMAN ET AL., MINORITY REPRESENTATION AND THE QUEST FOR VOTING EQUALITY 117-
18 (1992); J. Morgan Kousser, Beyond Gingles: Influence Districts and the Pragmatic Tradition 
in Voting Rights Law, 27 U.S.F. L. REV. 551 (1993); Allan J. Lichtman & J. Gerald Hebert, A 
General Theory of Vote Dilution, 6 LA RAZA L.J. 1 (1993). 
14. 478 U.S. at 51. 
15. 478 U.S. at 56. 
16. 478 U.S. at 50-51. The best study of the emergence and content of the racial-polarization 
requirement is Samuel Issacharoff, Polarized Voting and the Political Process: The Transforma-
tion of Voting Rights Jurisprudence, 90 MICH. L. REV. 1833 (1992). 
17. More precisely, Gingles holds that vote dilution is shown only if, "under the totality of 
the circumstances," the challenged electoral mechanisms "result in unequal access to the electo-
ral process." 478 U.S. at 46. 
18. When multiple candidates are elected from a single jurisdiction, a cohesive minority pop-
ulation might constitute a significant fraction of the district and yet elect no members. That is, 
the majority population would always outvote them. See Lani Guinier, The Triumph of Token-
ism, 89 MICH. L. REV. 1077, 1094 (1991); Issacharoff, supra note 16, at 1839-40. 
19. Cf. Richard G. Niemi et al., The Impact of Multimember Districts on Party Representa-
tion in U.S. State Legislatures, 10 LEGJS. STUD. Q. 441, 443-46 (1985). 
20. See generally SAMUEL P. HAYS, The Politics of Reform in Municipal Government in the 
Progressive Era, in AMERICAN POLITICAL HISTORY AS SOCIAL ANALYSIS 205, 215-16 (1980). 
21. See J. Morgan Kousser, The Undermining of the First Reconstruction: Lessons for the 
Second, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION 27 (Chandler Davidson ed., 1984); J. Morgan Kousser, 
The Voting Rights Act and the Two Reconstructions, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING 
144 (Bernard Grofman & Chandler Davidson eds., 1992) [hereinafter Kousser, The Voting 
Rights Act] ("The third means of accomplishing the counterrevolution [against Reconstruction], 
structural discrimination, involved such tactics as gerrymandering, annexations, the substitution 
of at-large for single-member-district elections ... and the adoption of nonstatutory white 
primaries."). 
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election units, plaintiffs typically sought a remedy that would divide 
the unit into several single-member ones, including an appropriate 
number of minority-dominated districts. 
Since Gingles, however, a second type of challenge has emerged 
and become central. This newer challenge was the catalyst for the 
North Carolina districting scheme at issue in Shaw. As states in many 
parts of the country dismantled multimember districts, the focus of 
litigation began to shift toward the precise design of single-member 
districts. These cases are winding through the courts; as yet only a 
few reported decisions address VRA challenges to single-member dis-
trict plans.22 Indeed, not until this Term did the Supreme Court defin-
itively hold that the Gingles criteria also control VRA challenges to 
single-member district plans.23 Though Gingles now clearly applies, 
the precise way in which courts must adapt its criteria for single-mem-
ber districts raises a battery of complex questions. As challenges to 
single-member districts come to dominate VRA litigation in the 1990s, 
the need for judicial resolution of these questions has become increas-
ingly urgent. 24 
In applying Gingles to single-member districts, the most concep-
tually difficult issues for courts arise from the requirement that a mi-
nority group be "sufficiently large and geographically compact. "25 At 
22. See GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 13, at 109 ("Indeed, since Gingles was decided in 1986, 
as of mid-1991 only a handful of Section 2 cases involving challenges to single-member districts 
had been decided, and only four of these had been reviewed at the appellate level.") (citations 
omitted). 
23. Growe v. Emison, 113 S. Ct. 1075, 1084 (1993). In a major VRA decision, a three-judge 
district court had anticipated this holding while recognizing that courts could not directly apply 
Gingles to single-member districts without modification. See Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196 
(E.D. Ark. 1989), ajfd., 489 U.S. 1019 (1991): 
Thornburg and Smith cannot be automatically applied to the single-member context. .•• But 
the basic principle is the same. If lines are drawn that limit the number of majority-black 
single-member districts, and reasonably compact and contiguous majority-black districts 
could have been drawn, and if racial cohesiveness in voting is so great that, as a practical 
matter, black voters' preferences for black candidates are frustrated by this system of appor-
tionment, the outlines of a Section 2 theory are made out. 
730 F. Supp. at 205. 
24. As one example, this Term the Court will address challenges to the redistricting of 
Florida's single-member house and senate districts. 62 U.S.L.W. 3261 (Oct. 12, 1993) (summa-
rizing the dispute in Johnson v. De Grandy, No. 92-519, prob. juris. noted, 113 S. Ct. 1249 
(1993)). A principal issue in that case is precisely how Gingles should be applied to single-mem-
ber districts. The State of Florida argues that proofofthe Gingles preconditions is necessary, but 
not sufficient, in single-member district challenges. As the reply brief notes: "[P]roof of the 
Gingles preconditions simply does not make out a prima fade case of vote dilution in the single-
member context. The Gingles preconditions are plainly relevant in the single-member context 
because they establish causation, but they cannot play the same role they do in multimember 
district cases." Reply Brief for Appellant at 3, Johnson v. De Grandy, No. 92-519, prob. juris. 
noted, 113 S. Ct. 1249 (1993). 
25. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50 (1986); see also GROFMAN ET AL., supra note 13, 
at 115-16 ("[T]wo of the Gingles prongs can probably be applied with little or no modifica-
tion .... The first prong, however, is more difficult to modify in a suitable way."), 
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this point the tension between territory and interest becomes most 
acute. In the multimember context, the conflict is more diminished 
because the existing district boundary lines define the limited geo-
graphic territory within which to locate replacement single-member 
districts. One must still define compactness, but within a relatively 
small, predefined physical territory. In contrast, in challenges to ex-
isting single-member districting plans for congressional or state legis-
lative seats, the only fixed boundary lines are those of the state itself. 
Within those boundaries, an unlimited number of districting plans and 
individual district shapes are possible. Defining "geographically com-
pact" in this context is more necessary and more difficult. 
Such was the legal context in which North Carolina undertook the 
redrawing of its congressional districts in the wake of the 1990 Census. 
As a result of this census, the state was entitled to one additional U.S. 
congressional seat, bringing its delegation up to twelve. The effort to 
carve the state into twelve districts generated a mix of partisan and 
racial considerations increasingly common to redistricting. In North 
Carolina, the General Assembly controls redistricting, with the 
Governor having no veto power26 or other entitlement to participate. 
During the redistricting of the 1990s, Democrats controlled both 
houses of the General Assembly, while the Governor was Republi-
can,27 and partisan interests had unusually free rein. In addition, in 
part as a direct result of Gingles itself, the power of the black legisla-
tive coalition in the General Assembly had grown. 28 
North Carolina's voting-age population is presently seventy-eight 
percent white and twenty percent black.29 But the state's black popu-
lation is relatively dispersed, with black residents a majority in only 
five of the state's one hundred counties. Because numerous counties in 
North Carolina have a history of discrimination with respect to vot-
ing, the VRA requires that the state submit any change in its voting 
practices or structures to the Attorney General for federal 
preclearance. This process is the section 5 preclearance review. 30 
26. Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 394 (W.D.N.C.) (three-judge court), ajfd., 113 S. Ct. 30 
(1992). 
27. 809 F. Supp. at 394. 
28. Compare Gingles, 478 U.S. at 40, noting that no more than four percent of North Caro-
lina's legislators were black in 1982 with JOINT CENTER FOR POL. & ECON. STUD., BLACK 
ELECTED OFFICIALS: A NATIONAL ROSTER, 1991, at xxiii tbl. 3 (20th ed. 1992), finding that 
the number of black North Carolina state legislators as of January, 1991 was 19, which is 11 % of 
170, the total number of legislators. 478 U.S. at 40. 
29. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2820 (1993). 
30. Section 5 of the VRA prohibits the implementation of any changes affecting voting in 
certain jurisdictions that the Act covers without the approval of the Attorney General or a spe-
cial three-judge federal district court in the District of Columbia. To receive preclearance, a 
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The state's initial redistricting plan included one "convoluted"31 
district with a black majority; the unusual shape was necessary to pro-
tect the political base of white Democrat incumbents in adjoining dis-
tricts. 32 When the state submitted this plan to the Justice 
Department, the Attorney General entered a formal objection and re-
fused clearance. He offered several reasons for doing so, including the 
state's failure to create a second majority-black district "in the south 
central to southeastern part of the state," where creating such a dis-
trict appeared feasible. 33 The Attorney General also commented that 
several alternative districting plans had been submitted to the Justice 
Department - at least one of which had been presented to the North 
Carolina General Assembly - that included a second majority-minor-
ity district in the southern part of the state. Noting that the state had 
been aware of the minority community's "significant interest" in creat-
ing a second majority-minority district, the Attorney General con-
cluded that the state's failure to do so in its initial redistricting plan 
rested on what appeared to be "'pretextual reasons.' "34 
Rather than challenge this finding judicially, the North Carolina 
General Assembly adopted a new redistricting plan. This plan in-
cluded a second majority-black district, with a total population of 
56.63% black and a voting-age population of 53.34% black.35 The 
new district, however, was not in the south-central to southeastern 
part of the state. Instead, the state created a 160-mile long district, 
covered jurisdiction must establish that its proposed change does not have the purpose or effect 
of "denying or abridging the right to vote on account of race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(c) 
(1982). Most jurisdictions prefer to seek preclearance from the Attorney General rather than a 
declaratory judgment in the special district court. See Drew S. Days III, Section 5 and the Role 
of the Justice Department, in CONTROVERSIES IN MINORITY VOTING, supra note 21, at 52, 53 
n.2 (citing Justice Department statistics). For an extensive academic study of the § 5 process, see 
Hiroshi Motomura, Preclearance Under Section Five of the Voting Rights Act, 61 N.C. L. REV. 
189 (1983). 
31. Cf. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Republican National Committee in Support of Appellants 
at 9, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (No. 92-357). 
32. Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392, 394 (W.D.N.C.) (three-judge court) ("In order to protect 
white Democratic congressmen at the expense of Republicans, the General Assembly had to 
make [the majority-black] district very contorted."), ajfd .. 113 S. Ct. 30 (1992). 
33. Brief for the Federal Appellees at lOa app. B, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (No. 
92-357)). 
[T]he proposed configuration of the district boundary lines in the south-central to southeast-
ern part of the state appear[s] to minimize minority voting strength given the significant 
minority population in this area of the state. In general, it appears that the state chose not 
to give effect to black and Native American voting strength in this area, even though it 
seems that boundary lines that were no more irregular than found elsewhere in the proposed 
plan could have been drawn to recognize such minority concentration in this part of the 
state. 
Id. 
34. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2820 (citing Brief for Federal Appellees at lOa-1 la app. B). 
35. Brieffor Federal Appellees at 15a-16a app. D. 
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winding through ten counties, often in a corridor no wider than 
Interstate Highway 85, which links the urban areas of Durham, 
Greensboro, Winston-Salem, and Charlotte.36 This area became Con-
gressional District 12 (District 12 or CD12), the focus of Shaw. The 
record suggests that the General Assembly drew the district this way 
to minimize the risk to incumbent congressmen from the creation of a 
second majority-black district. 37 On resubmission, the Attorney Gen-
eral precleared the new redistricting plan.38 Figure l, on the next 
page, provides a map of District 12. 
Two significant consequences followed once the plan went into ef-
fect. First, in the 1992 congressional elections, North Carolina elected 
its first black representatives since Reconstruction. They were elected 
from the two majority-black districts in the plan, including District 
12. Second, editorial writers feasted on District 12. In a label that 
was frequently repeated, the Wall Street Journal tagged it "political 
pomography."39 The Raleigh News and Observer complained that it 
"plays hell with common sense and community."40 In another edito-
rial it argued: "The maps ... don't make any sense to people who 
36. Indeed, 80% of the district's residents live in cities with populations of 20,000 or more. 
In contrast, the other majority-black district, District 1, is predominantly rural. More than 80% 
of the residents in that district live outside cities with populations of 20,000 or more. Brief for 
Federal Appellees at 5 n.2. 
37. See Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2841-42 n.10 (White, J., dissenting); see also text accompanying 
notes 116-32. 
38. As long as states comply with their obligation to avoid minority-vote dilution, they gen-
erally retain policymaking discretion to draw their districts in accordance with their own assess-
ment of state policy. States have no duty to "follow" the Attorney General's recommendations 
for the design of districts; in fact, the Attorney General does not make such recommendations. 
Although the Attorney General must determine that a majority-minority district is gt-nerally 
feasible to deny preclearance under § 5, this geographic determination is general and does not 
define any specific district design or location. See Drew S. Days, III & Lani Guinier, Enforce-
ment of Section 5 of the Voting Rights Act, in MINORITY VOTE DILUTION, supra note 21, at 167, 
171 ("[T]he department objective has not been to dictate any particular result."). 
The Justice Department has consistently maintained that the VRA does not require ex-
tremely contorted and convoluted districts. As Drew Days, now Solicitor General, and Lani 
Guinier wrote in 1984, faced with a "set of facts in which it can be shown that no fairly drawn 
redistricting plan will result in minority control of one district because of dispersed minority 
residential patterns," the Justice Department's "response would not be to demand that the juris-
diction adopt a crazy-quilt, gerrymandered districting plan to ensure proportional minority rep-
resentation." Id. At the same time, the § 5 preclearance review is limited to determining 
whether minority-vote dilution is taking place. If it is not, the Justice Department does not 
believe it has the authority to reject a plan merely because it employs contorted districts. See, 
e.g., Letter from John R. Dunne, Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, U.S. 
Department of Justice (Nov. 18, 1991) {preclearing Texas congressional redistricting plan at is-
sue in Terrazas v. Slagle, 789 F. Supp. 828 (W.D. Tex. 1991), affd., 112 S. Ct. 3019 (1992)), 
quoted in Brief Amicus Curiae of the Republican National Committee in Support of Appellants 
at 9-10 n.6, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (No. 92-357); see also John R. Dunne, Remarks 
of John R. Dunne, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1127 (1993). 
39. Political Pornography-fl WALL ST. J., Feb. 4, 1992, at Al4. 
40. 1-85 No Route to Congress, RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Jan. 13, 1992, at AS. 
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FIGURE 1: NORTH CAROLINA - CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 12 
© Election Data Services, Inc. 
have any sense. "41 Even some leading defenders of the VRA, clearly 
taken aback by the shape of District 12, suggested that it might violate 
the Constitution. 42 
B. The Holding in Shaw: Vote-Dilution and 
District-Appearance Claims 
In Shaw, the Court concluded that District 12 did indeed raise se-
rous enough constitutional concerns as to require justification under 
the exacting standards of strict scrutiny. To do so, the Court endorsed 
a distinction between two radically different kinds of voting-rights 
claims, each of which the Equal Protection Clause now recognizes.43 
The first is a traditional "vote-dilution" claim. To establish such a 
claim under the Fourteenth Amendment, plaintiffs must prove the fa-
41. Reading the "Inkblot," RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Jan. 21, 1992, at AS. 
42. See Grofman, Vince Lombardi, supra note 7, at 1261 (leading expert witness in voting· 
rights cases describing his own affidavit in which he characterized North Carolina District 12 as 
a "crazy-quilt" lacking "rational state purpose"). 
43. A third kind of voting-rights claim, which was the first to arise historically, is a less 
frequent litigation subject today. This is the claim of a direct and outright deprivation of the 
individual right to vote, as in cases that challenged poll taxes and literary tests. See, e.g., Guinn 
v. United States, 238 U.S. 347 (1915). 
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miliar requirements of discriminatory purpose and effect. Most im-
portant for our purposes, the relevant discriminatory effects must 
involve actual, material harm to the voting strength of an identifiable 
(and constitutionally protected) group. In the context of race, the 
Equal Protection Clause is violated only when an election structure 
"affects the political strength"44 of a racial group by unduly diminish-
ing its influence on the political process. This material injury - dimi-
nution of relative group political power - is the sine qua non of a 
vote-dilution claim. 
Before Shaw, this claim might have been thought to exhaust the 
constitutional guarantees securing the voting rights of protected 
groups. Vote dilution was not merely one "type" of claim; it defined 
the very meaning of constitutionally protected voting rights and the 
nature of voting-related harms under the Constitution. Shaw now rec-
ognizes a distinct type of claim. This new claim entails a distinct con-
ception of constitutional harms as well as a distinct, implicit theory of 
political representation. 
We call this claim a district appearance claim. As we will ex-
plain, 45 the kind of injury it validates involves what we call expressive, 
rather than material, harms. The theory of voting rights it endorses 
centers on the perceived legitimacy of structures of political represen-
tation, rather than on the distribution of actual political power be-
tween racial or political groups. Vote-dilution and district-appearance 
claims share no common conceptual elements. They recognize dis-
tinct kinds of injuries, implicate different constitutional values, and re-
flect differing conceptions of the relationship between law and politics. 
These two claims cannot be assimilated into a single, unitary approach 
to the Fourteenth Amendment.46 
44. City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55, 83 (1980) (Stevens, J., concurring). 
45. See infra text accompanying notes 90-96. 
46. At several points, the Court directly signals its awareness that it is defining two distinct 
types of claims. The clearest example arises in the Court's discussion of United Jewish Orgs., 
Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977) [hereinafter UJO], the leading equal protection vote-dilution 
precedent. 
In that case, New York, in response to Voting Rights Act violations, had adopted a 1974 
reapportionment plan that redesigned state senate and assembly districts in Kings County. The 
new plan did not change the number of districts with nonwhite majorities, but the new districts 
redistributed minority voters in ways likely to enhance the effectiveness of their voting power. 
One result, however, was that the 30,000-member Hasidic Jewish community in Williamsburgh, 
which the previous plan had located entirely in one assembly and one senate district, was frag-
mented into two assembly and senate districts. On behalf of these voters, plaintiffs brought a 
complaint charging New York with violating the Constitution by deliberately revising its reap-
portionment plan along racial lines. 
Writing for the plurality, Justice White rejected this claim on the ground that states can 
engage in race-conscious districting as long as they do not unfairly dilute the voting power of any 
racial group. See 430 U.S. at 165 ("[f]here was no fencing out of the white population from 
participation in the political processes of the county, and the plan did not minimize or unfairly 
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1. Explaining District-Appearance Claims 
To begin to understand Shaw, one must first note that vote dilution 
is not involved in the case. The plaintiffs could not prove - and the 
Court acknowledged that they did not allege - vote dilution. 47 This 
conclusion is understandable, for no racial group in North Carolina 
could plausibly claim any material deprivation of its relative voting 
strength. Certainly white residents, who constitute seventy-six percent 
of the population in North Carolina48 and approximately seventy-
eight percent of its voting-age population, 49 could not claim impermis-
sible dilution of their voting power. Under the statewide redistricting 
plan, white voters still constituted a majority in ten, or eighty-three 
percent, of the twelve congressional districts. so With effective control 
of more than a proportionate share of seats, white voters in North 
Carolina could not prove, and did not try to prove, that the redistrict-
ing plan diluted their relative voting power in intent or effect. 
Second, Shaw does not express constitutional concern with the 
shape of election districts per se. The Court is clear that, no matter 
how bizarre or contorted, district appearances standing alone do not 
implicate the U.S. Constitution.51 Colorful references to the shape of 
District 12 do permeate the opinion: "highly irregular,"52 "tortured 
[and] dramatically irregular,"53 "bizarre,"54 and "irrational on its 
face. " 55 Nevertheless, it is the conjunction of these features with race-
cancel out white voting strength."). Treating the Hasidic Jewish community as part of the white 
community for constitutional purposes, the plurality noted that the county's population was 
65% white and that the new reapportionment plan left white majorities in control of 70% of the 
assembly and senate districts in the county. In the absence of vote dilution, the intentional use of 
race was not discriminatory and hence not a constitutional violation. 430 U.S. at 166 ("[A]s long 
as whites in Kings County, as a group, were provided with fair representation, we cannot con· 
elude that there was a cognizable discrimination against whites or an abridgment of their right to 
vote on grounds of race."). 
Shaw distinguishes UJO by categorizing it as a vote-dilution case and by recognizing an alto· 
gether different kind of claim: "UJO's framework simply does not apply where, as here, a reap· 
portionment plan is alleged to be so irrational on its face that it immediately offends principles of 
racial equality." Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2829 (1993). Unlike UJO, here the allegation is 
"that the plan, on its face, was so highly irregular that it rationally could be understood only as 
an effort to segregate voters by race." 113 S. Ct. at 2829. Hence, even in the absence of vote 
dilution, Shaw holds that the deliberate use of race can constitute unconstitutional discrimination 
with respect to voting rights. 
47. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2824. 
48. Brief for Appellants at 62, Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) (No. 92-357). 
49. Brief for Federal Appellees at 16a app., Shaw (No. 92-357). 
50. 113 S. Ct. at 2838 (White, J., dissenting). 
51. 113 S. Ct. at 2826-27. 
52. 113 S. Ct. at 2826, 2829. 
53. 113 S. Ct. at 2820, 2827. 
54. 113 S. Ct. at 2818, 2825-26, 2831, 2843, 2845, 2848. 
55. 113 S. Ct. at 2818, 2829, 2832, 2842. 
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conscious districting that the Court condemned, not oddly shaped dis-
tricts per se. Any other result would revolutionize the districting pro-
cess because it would suddenly subordinate discretionary state policy 
choices to a general constitutional imperative concerning district 
shapes. Far from suggesting a principle of such broad sweep, the deci-
sion explicitly reaffirms that the Constitution does not impose on state 
reapportionment bodies any general requirement of compactness or 
contiguity.56 
Third, Shaw also does not appear to condemn race-conscious dis-
tricting per se. 57 This point is more ambiguous, both because much 
more hinges on this holding and because the opinion refrains from 
endorsing it explicitly. Moreover, when this question is confronted 
directly, the majority in Shaw might well divide over this question. 
Justice Kennedy, for example, has gone out of his way to reserve judg-
ment on the constitutionality of section 2 of the Act.58 Nonetheless, 
we believe Shaw is best read as an exceptional doctrine for aberrational 
contexts rather than as a prelude to a sweeping constitutional condem-
nation of race-conscious redistricting. In their contribution to this 
symposium, Professors Alex Aleinikoff and Samuel Issacharoff ad-
dress this question in detail and reach the same conclusion. 59 We, 
however, can only briefly justify this view here. 
First, if race-conscious districting per se were the constitutional 
problem, it is difficult to rationalize the architecture of the decision. 
The keystone in Shaw is the "highly irregular" shape of District 12. 
The negative pregnant, then, is that "regular" districts designed for 
race-conscious reasons do not raise similar constitutional concerns. 
Second, the Court's analysis builds on major precedents establishing 
that intentional race-conscious districting is not inherently unconstitu-
tional. The Court finds constraints that apply in Shaw within these 
precedents or concludes that these cases address a distinct kind of 
claim and hence do not apply; it does not, however, call these deci-
56. 113 S. Ct. at 2827. 
57. Our use of the term condemn is meant to focus on the ultimate question of whether ~ 
race-conscious intent invalidates such districts under the Constitution. Analytically, there are 
two stages to such an inquiry: whether Shaw requires strict scrutiny for such districts, and, if so, 
what kinds of justifications might suffice. Whichever way these formal questions are resolved, we 
believe Shaw does not stand for, or portend a sweeping proscription on, intentional race-con-
scious districting that does not involve actual vote dilution. 
58. See, e.g., Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2376 (1991) (Kennedy, J., dissenting) (writ-
ing separately solely to reserve question of the constitutionality of § 2). 
59. See T. Alexander Aleinikoff & Samuel Issacharoff, Race and Redistricting: Drawing Con-
stitutional Lines After Shaw v. Reno, 92 MICH. L. REV. 588, 644 (1993) ("The Court's focus on a 
district's shape rather than the State's use of a racial classification will make the tum toward 
Bakke in the voting-rights field possible."). 
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sions into question. 60 Third, at several points, the Court suggests that 
race-conscious redistricting is neither problematic nor a trigger for 
strict judicial scrutiny. 61 In addition, compliance with the VRA and 
Gingles necessarily requires race-conscious districting; Shaw does not 
suggest, at least directly, that the Court was questioning the restruc-
turing of the political process that has resulted from reliance on the 
VRA and Gingles. At least to the extent race consciousness arises in 
connection with VRA compliance, Shaw appears to accept it. 
The Court's decision in Voinovich v. Quilter, 62 also decided last 
Term, further supports the conclusion that Shaw is not a broad attack 
on race-conscious districting per se. 63 In Quilter, the Republican-
dominated Ohio apportionment board had redistricted the Ohio legis-
lature and, in the process, intentionally created several minority-domi-
nated election districts. Plaintiffs claimed that these districts illegally 
60. The most significant example is the Court's discussion of the plurality opinion in United 
Jewish Orgs., Inc. v. Carey, 430 U.S. 144 (1977). The UJO plurality held that "neither the 
Fourteenth nor the Fifteenth Amendment mandates any per se rule against using racial factors in 
districting and apportionment," 430 U.S. at 161; that "the permissible use of racial criteria is not 
confined to eliminating the effects of past discriminatory districting or apportionment," 430 U.S. 
at 161; that "a reapportionment cannot violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendment merely 
because a State uses specific numerical quotas in establishing a certain number of black majority 
districts," 460 U.S. at 162; and that, in the absence of vote dilution, the deliberate use of race to 
enhance underrepresented minority groups casts "no racial slur or stigma with respect to whites 
or any other race .... " 430 U.S. at 165. Shaw does not directly take issue with any of these 
principles, distance itself from them, or suggest UJO is no longer authoritative. Instead, Shaw 
concludes that UJO reached a certain holding, conditioned on particular principles, and Shaw 
then applies these conditions to evaluate the North Carolina districting plan. Thus, the Court 
quotes a passage in which the UJO plurality had held that a state, employing sound districting 
principles, might deliberately draw districts in a race-conscious way for the purpose of ensuring 
fair minority representation. Shaw simply concludes that North Carolina appeared not to have 
adhered to sound districting principles. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2832. For further discussion of the 
Court's treatment of UJO, see supra note 46. 
61. For example, the Court states: 
[R]edistricting differs from other kinds of state decisionmaking in that the legislature always 
is aware of race when it draws district lines, just as it is aware of age, economic status, 
religious and political persuasion, and a variety of other demographic factors. That sort of 
race consciousness does not lead inevitably to impermissible race discrimination. 
113 S. Ct. at 2826 (emphasis added). The Court also affirms that "[t]he States certainly have a 
very strong interest in complying with federal antidiscrimination laws that are constitutionally 
valid as interpreted and as applied." 113 S. Ct. at 2830. 
The Court does, however, obscure its position a bit in other passages that explicitly reserve 
judgment on one aspect of race-conscious districting: the intentional creation of majority-minor· 
ity districts. 113 S. Ct. at 2828 ("Thus, we express no view as to whether 'the intentional crea-
tion of majority-minority districts, without more' always gives rise to an equal protection 
claim.") (quoting 113 S. Ct. at 2839 (White, J., dissenting)). One might read the Court's reser· 
vation of this question as casting doubt on this practice, even for reasonably compact districts. 
Any such reading, however, would be inconsistent with much else in the opinion as well as a 
direct attack on Gingles. That there is some ambiguity here might well reflect the divisions 
within the Shaw majority on these questions. 
62. I 13 S. Ct. 1149 (1993). 
63. It should be disclosed that Professor Pildes was a legal consultant to the court-appointed 
special master in Quilter. 
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"packed" minority voters into a handful of districts, thereby diluting 
their potential power in other districts. The three-judge federal trial 
court agreed; it held that the VRA permits the intentional creation of 
minority-dominated districts only when such districts are necessary to 
remedy what would otherwise be a violation of the VRA. 64 
Quilter thus presented an inversion of the routine voting-rights 
case. Rather than claiming that Ohio had been insufficiently attentive 
to race, the plaintiffs argued that the state had been too attentive. The 
state had created too many minority districts that were too "safe" -
presumably to pursue an underlying partisan agenda of enhancing 
Republican influence in other districts. Thus, the plaintiffs argued 
that race-conscious districting over and above what the VRA requires 
violates the Act and the Constitution. 
The Supreme Court unanimously rejected this argument. In doing 
so, the Court directly contradicted the three-judge court's view that 
the VRA establishes both a floor and a ceiling on race-conscious dis-
tricting. 65 As the Court held, "federal courts may not order the crea-
tion of majority-minority districts unless necessary to remedy a 
violation of federal law. But that does not mean that the State's pow-
ers are similarly limited. Quite the opposite is true .... " 66 The VRA 
therefore does not limit state redistricters only to remedial uses of 
race. As long as no illegal vote dilution occurs, states do not violate 
the Act, no matter how race conscious they might be in designing elec-
tion districts. 67 Under the VRA, states need not first confess or prove 
past discrimination in election practices to justify their race-conscious 
creation of districts - indeed, they need not justify these districts to 
federal courts at all. 
If this were all there were to Quilter, the meaning of Shaw would 
be clear: in the absence of vote dilution, race-conscious districting, in 
and of itself, would pose no legal problems. Only when carried to 
particular kinds of extremes, as in Shaw, would distinctive constitu-
tional issues arise. But Quilter is not quite this transparent. The 
Court expressly reserved the question of whether race-conscious redis-
tricting per se might violate the Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amend-
ments. 68 Conceivably, then, the Court could hold that, while Ohio's 
64. 113 S. Ct. at 1153. 
65. 113 S. Ct. at 1156. 
66. 113 S. Ct. at 1156 (citations omitted). 
67. In Quilter, the district court had found no racially polarized voting in the relevant areas 
of Ohio. In the absence of polarized voting, the Court recognized that black and white voters are 
essentially fungible; race-conscious districting cannot have a dilutive effect when voting patterns 
are not structured along racial lines. 113 S. Ct. at 1158. 
68. 113 S. Ct. at 1157-59. 
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redistricting efforts do not violate the VRA, they do violate the 
Constitution. 
Yet, while legally possible, this result seems unlikely. The sitting 
Ohio legislature is now composed through the electoral scheme Quilter 
upholds. If the Court believed there were serious constitutional ques-
tions with the fundamental structure of this scheme, the Court had 
numerous means to avoid permitting an unconstitutionally composed 
legislature to assume power. Indeed, the parties expressly asked the 
Court to decide the broad Fifteenth Amendment issue, but the Court 
found extremely narrow grounds on which to resolve that claim. 69 
The Court could have asked the parties to address or reargue the 
Fourteenth Amendment issue. We view the Court's reservation of the 
constitutional issues as expressing the caution and tentativeness that 
characterizes the current Court's approach to race, as well as the divi-
sions within the Court itself. But we take the tenor of Quilter as fur-
ther evidence that a majority of the Court is not prepared to find a 
general ban on race-conscious districting in the Constitution. 
Thus, Shaw does not appear to erect a general constitutional bar-
rier to intentionally race-conscious districting that has no dilutive ef-
fect. To be sure, many more subtle questions remain regarding the 
precise circumstances under which redistricting bodies and courts may 
take race into account - remedially or affirmatively - when design-
ing districts. We address these more nuanced questions in Part V. 
But, at this stage, the important point is that Shaw does not appear to 
rest on any general principle condemning race-conscious districting. 
Although many initial reactions have neglected this side of Shaw, 70 it 
is one of the decision's most significant aspects. Given that several 
members of the current Court are resistant to state departures from 
the color-blindness ideal in other contexts71 and that Justices Marshall 
and Brennan have retired, one might have thought the Court would 
69. Thus, the Court held that the district court had been clearly erroneous in finding a race· 
conscious intent behind the districting plan and then stated, "we express no view on the relation· 
ship between the Fifteenth Amendment and race-conscious redistricting." 113 S. Ct. at 1159. 
70. As might be expected, the immediate reaction in the popular press tended to portray the 
decision in Shaw as a broad attack on race consciousness in districting, indeed on the fundamen· 
tal principles of the Voting Rights Act itself. See, e.g., Max Boot, Supreme Court Rules that 
"Bizarre" Districts May Be Gerrymanders, CHRISTIAN Sci. MONITOR, June 30, 1993, at 7 (Shaw 
"throws into doubt the way the Justice Department has been enforcing the 1965 Voting Rights 
Act, designed to guarantee minorities political representation."); Linda Greenhouse, The 
Supreme Court: Reapportionment; Court Questions Districts Drawn To Aid Minorities, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 29, 1993, at Al ("A sharply divided Supreme Court ruled today that designing 
legislative districts to increase black representation can violate the constitutional rights of white 
voters."); Dick Lehr, Court Casts Doubts over Race-Based Redistricting, BOSTON GLOBE, June 
29, 1993, at 1 ("The US Supreme Court ... ruled yesterday that congressional districts designed 
to give minorities a voting majority may be unconstitutional .... "). 
71. See, e.g., Metro Broadcasting Inc. v. FCC, 497 U.S. 547, 602-31 (1991) (O'Connor, J., 
December 1993) Election-District Appearances 499 
revisit the constitutionality of the race-conscious districting process 
that forms the core of the VRA. After Shaw, however, five Justices do 
not appear to be prepared to do so. 
Instead, only those irregular districts that convey one particular 
impression - or that are chosen on the grounds of one particular set 
of reasons or motivations - implicate Shaw. The districting plan 
must be "so extremely irregular on its face that it rationally can be 
viewed only as an effort to segregate the races for purposes of vot-
ing"; 72 it must be "so bizarre on its face that it is 'unexplainable on 
grounds other than race.' " 73 Rather than standing for any simple 
prohibition of "racial gerrymandering," Shaw distinguishes two types 
of "racial gerrymanders." Some districts - highly irregular ones -
trigger the extreme demands of strict scrutiny; others raise no special 
constitutional problem. In dissent, Justice White perfectly captured, 
we believe, the decision's internal logic: Shaw holds that "race-con-
scious redistricting that 'segregates' by drawing oddly shaped lines is 
qualitatively different from race-conscious redistricting that affects 
groups in some other way.''74 
Justice White means this description to be an ironic commentary 
on Shaw's analysis, the exposure of a "logic" the mere expression of 
which immediately indicts itself as incoherent. Those who must work 
with Shaw, however, will have to find the principles the Court in-
tended to drive this logic. What precisely about these particular kinds 
of election districts poses unique constitutional problems? What dis-
tinct injury do such districts cause? 
2. Justifying District-Appearance Claims: The Relevance 
of Value Pluralism 
Policymaking processes can be constitutionally flawed in at least 
three different ways. They might reflect an unconstitutional purpose 
or, equivalently, take a constitutionally impermissible factor into ac-
count. This danger is addressed through constitutional doctrines fo-
cused on the search for legislative motivation and purpose. Second, 
policymaking might take only legitimate factors into account but give 
too little weight to constitutional rights or too much weight to insub-
stantial governmental justifications for regulation. Balancing tests re-
dissenting); 497 U.S. at 631-38 (Kennedy, J., dissenting); City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 
488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
72. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2824 (1993). 
73. 113 S. Ct. at 2825 (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Hous. Dev. 
Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)). 
74. 113 S. Ct. at 2838 (White, J., dissenting). 
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fleet concern for the effects of these kinds of policy; such tests typically 
evaluate whether the governmental justifications for regulation are suf-
ficiently appropriate and significant to justify the degree to which a 
policy restrains a right. Because the first set of doctrines focuses on 
purposes, while the second focuses on effects, these might be thought 
to exhaust the basic modes through which constitutional law can ap-
praise governmental action. Yet there is a third, less familiar type of 
constitutional problem that policies might raise; in some ways this 
problem shares concern for both purposes and effects, but it arguably 
has a distinct logic of its own. 
One might call this the problem of value reductionism in public 
policy. The concern is not that policymakers have taken illegitimate 
factors into account, nor is it precisely that a policy's effects on rights 
are too restrictive or not sufficiently justified. Instead, the constitu-
tional problem is better described as the apparent corruption of a deci-
sionmaking process. More broadly, it is the apparent corruption of 
the public institutions that make their decisions in such a way. When 
decisions reflect value reductionism, policymakers have transformed a 
decision process that ought to involve multiple values - as a matter of 
constitutional law - and reduced it to a one-dimensional problem. 
They have permitted one value to subordinate all other relevant val-
ues. As a result, the decisionmaking process appears tainted because it 
has become compromised through unconstitutional oversimplification. 
Interestingly, the concern for public perceptions ultimately seems cen-
tral to constitutional doctrines that resist value-reductionist public 
policy. The focus of these doctrines is not impermissible purposes, for 
they need not be present, nor whether the effect of policy is too great 
an intrusion on individual rights, but rather whether the process of 
decisionmaking itself is constitutionally legitimate. 
Shaw is best understood, we believe, as an opinion condemning 
value reductionism. In the Court's view, the process of designing elec-
tion districts violates the Constitution not when race-conscious lines 
are drawn, but when race consciousness dominates the process too ex-
tensively. Traditionally, redistricting seeks to realize a plurality of val-
ues: to ensure effective representation for communities of interest, to 
reflect the political boundaries of existing jurisdictions, and to provide 
a district whose geography facilitates efficient campaigning and tolera-
bly close connections between officeholders and citizens.75 The inten-
75. Redistricting is, of course, among the most intensely partisan of all policymaking, and 
those who control the process typically pursue the more directly partisan values of trying to 
maximize their party's influence. In addition, redistricters, including nonpartisan bodies, also 
frequently try to protect incumbent officeholders. When the redistricting is partisan, one party's 
incumbents may receive differential protection. 
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tional use of race in this process, in conjunction with continuing 
respect for these other values, does not pose a constitutional problem. 
Under Shaw, race is not an impermissible factor that corrupts the dis-
tricting process - as long as it is one among many factors that policy-
makers use. 
When race becomes the single dominant value to which the pro-
cess subordinates all others, however, it triggers Shaw. For the Court, 
what distinguishes "bizarre" race-conscious districts is the signal they 
send out that, to government officials, race has become paramount and 
dwarfed all other, traditionally relevant criteria. This view is the foun-
dation of the qualitative distinction central to Shaw: at a certain point, 
the use of race can amount to value reductionism that creates the so-
cial impression that one legitimate value has come to dominate all 
others. 
In resisting the use of race in this specific way, Shaw requires that 
redistricting continue to be understood - and, perhaps more impor-
tantly, perceived76 - as implicating multiple values. Public officials 
must maintain this commitment to value pluralism, even when they 
legitimately and intentionally take race into account. 
What precisely are the relevant public understandings concerning 
democratic institutions that "bizarre" race-conscious districts might 
violate? Critically, we might say Shaw elevates trivial concerns for 
"pretty" districts over substantive values of effective minority repre-
sentation. There are no "naturally shaped" districts, so why should 
there suddenly be constitutional obstacles at the extremes of the dis-
tricting process? 
One answer might be that the values extreme districts inappropri-
ately compromise are those of political community and political ac-
countability. A principal aim of territorial districting is to facilitate 
the representation and interests of political communities. Compact 
districting is at best a proxy for this goal, but to abandon compactness 
completely might be thought to denigrate the importance of political 
community as a public value. In addition, because compact districting 
is thought, at least traditionally, to enhance political ties between rep-
resentatives and constituents, abandoning compactness might be 
thought to undermine the value of representation. 77 
76. See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text. 
77. For one of the most extensive case law discussions of the values compact districting 
serves, see Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 863 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (three-judge court; 
per curiam): 
The objections to bizarre-looking reapportionment maps are not aesthetic (except for those 
who prefer Mondrian to Pollock). They are based on a recognition that representative de-
mocracy cannot be achieved merely by assuring population equality across districts. To be 
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But this answer seems strained in the context of Shaw. If the ques-
tion is whether the oddly shaped District 12 undermines a sense of 
political connectedness, unduly burdens those running for office, or 
weakens representative-constituent ties, we might think state political 
institutions are best positioned to answer it. Framed in these terms, 
the Court's concern might seem paternalistic. Moreover, given that 
District 12 resulted in the election of one of two of North Carolina's 
first black congressional representatives since Reconstruction, con-
cerns for political community and identifiable representation might 
seem misplaced. 
Perhaps a better answer would start with the view that, in the 
Court's eyes, oddly shaped race-conscious districts compromise the 
values of political integrity and legitimacy. While there may be no 
"natural district shapes," baseline expectations emerge from developed 
customs and practices. Social understandings, including those con-
cerning the legitimacy of political institutions, are formed with refer-
ence to these developed practices. Except in revolutionary moments, 
political legitimacy is, in part, a matter of compliance with the internal 
standards of these developed practices. When political bodies devise 
extremely contorted districting schemes, the violation of these stan-
dards suggests politicians are engaged in manipulation of public insti-
tutions for their own ends. 
When race is added, the mix becomes more combustible and, in 
the Court's view, the Constitution enters the picture. The concern 
seems to be that extreme distortions in the (socially constructed) na-
ture of territorial districting, which result from race dominating all 
other districting values, pose the kind of threat to political legitimacy 
that the Constitution recognizes. Democratic theory might accommo-
date either proportional representation or territorial districting. But, 
as Professors Daniel Polsby and Robert Popper's contribution to this 
symposium suggests, trying to force the kinds of concerns a propor-
tional-representation system addresses into a territorial system eventu-
ally stretches the latter to the breaking point. 78 Short of opting for an 
interest-based system of representation, public understandings about 
an effective representative, a legislator must represent a district that has a reasonable homo· 
geneity of needs and interests; otherwise the policies he supports will not represent the pref· 
erences of most of his constituents. There is some although of course not a complete 
correlation between geographical propinquity and community of interests, and therefore 
compactness and contiguity are desirable features in a redistricting plan. Compactness and 
contiguity also reduce travel time and costs, and therefore make it easier for candidates for 
the legislature to campaign for office and once elected to maintain close and continuing 
contact with the people they represent. 
78. Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, Ugly: An Inquiry into the Problem of Racial 
Gerrymandering Under the Voting Rights Act, 92 MICH. L. REV. 652, 670-71, 676-78 (1993). 
This can be viewed as one of the central themes of Lani Guinier's scholarship. See, e.g. Lani 
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political legitimacy will reflect the nature of territorial districting, as 
that form is understood. On this view, the failure to respect value 
pluralism in territorial redistricting compromises the integrity and le-
gitimacy of the resulting institutions. 
This account of Shaw's principles will no doubt leave the decision 
controversial. In today's culture, we often cannot talk about "the" 
political legitimacy of institutions, for legitimacy is frequently differen-
tial - institutions legitimate from some groups' perspectives might 
not be from others'. If the "highly irregular" District 12 was actually 
necessary to ensure a second representative of the black community in 
North Carolina, that community might well view the districting plan 
that included District 12 as more legitimate than alternatives. Polit-
ical legitimacy is also a nebulous concept, into which it is all too easy 
to read one's own views. Nonetheless, the legitimacy of representative 
institutions at least seems the kind of question that is properly the 
concern of the Court - this concern is, after all, at the foundation of 
the reapportionment revolution itself. 79 Shaw requires respect for 
value pluralism as a means, it seems, of ensuring that constitutional 
concerns for political legitimacy are not ignored or undermined in the 
process of enhancing minority representation. 
Understood in this way, Justice O'Connor's opinion in Shaw reso-
nates with Justice Powell's opinion in Regents of the University of 
California v. Bakke. so The preference-quota distinction similarly per-
mits noninvidious uses of race, as long as policymakers do not allow 
race to become - or appear to be - paramount to all other relevant 
values. When Bakke was decided, some praised this approach as "an 
act of judicial statesmanship" and "a very civilized ruling."81 Others 
asserted that the preference-quota distinction was at best symbolic and 
at worst hypocritical - a distinction that reflected no principled theo-
retical line and that had no functional significance for the way in 
which academic institutions actually would make admissions deci-
Guinier, Groups, Representation, and Race-Conscious Districting: A Case of the Emperor's 
Clothes, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1589 (1993). 
79. Gordon E. Baker coined the term reapportionment revolution. GORDON E. BAKER, THE 
REAPPORTIONMENT REVOLUTION: REPRESENTATION, POLITICAL POWER, AND THE 
SUPREME COURT (1966). 
80. 438 U.S. 265 (1978). 
81. See Jerold K. Footlick et al., The Landmark Bakke Ruling, NEWSWEEK, July 10, 1978, 
at 19, 20, 25 (quoting Alan Dershowitz as stating that Bakke was "an act of judicial statesman-
ship"; A.E. (Dick) Howard as terming Bakke "a 'Solomonic' compromise"; Benno Schmidt, Jr., 
as calling the decision "just about right"; and Charles Alan Wright terming Bakke "a very civi-
lized ruling"); Bakke Wins, Quotas Lose, TIME, July 10, 1978, at 8, 9 (quoting Paul Freund as 
believing the fuzziness of the decision was "a good thing"). 
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sions. 82 Whatever the merits of these views, the distinction has had 
enough enduring power so that, fifteen years later, it remains an im-
portant element in public discourse about race. Virtually no public 
official endorses racial quotas, even when advocating the preferential 
use of race. Perhaps Bakke is the sole cause of this way of structuring 
public discourse; but, if the legal distinction had indeed failed to cap-
ture something powerful among public perceptions, at least in some 
quarters, perhaps it would not have had such a long life. 83 
Methodologically, one can view both Shaw and Bakke as rejecting 
a categorical, rule-oriented form of legal decision for a more contextu-
alized, standard-based approach. 84 Neither decision establishes a cate-
gorical rule prohibiting intentional race consciousness. The relevant 
questions are ones of degree: race can be used, but how much weight 
it is given in relation to other values remains subject to searching judi-
cial inquiry. This contextual approach to constitutional adjudication 
that links Shaw and Bakke - this commitment to viewing the Four-
teenth Amendment as standing against value reductionism - can be 
understood as an effort to seize and defend a legal middle ground be-
tween logically coherent alternatives. At one pole is the principle of 
color blindness. At the other is the principle of the preferential use of 
race to enhance the political or economic position of previously disad-
vantaged minorities. Each alternative rests on its own moral, sociolog-
ical, and ideological convictions, and many people believe law and 
policy must come to one clear choice between those alternatives. Yet 
Shaw, like Bakke, opts for neither option; rather, it sustains the ten-
sion between the two. The principle of Shaw is that districters may 
intentionally take race into account, but only up to the point at which 
they subordinate all other relevant values to it. Geography and inter-
est are both permissible grounds for constructing election districts, as 
82. Cj RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 223-39 (1977). See generally 
Vincent Blasi, Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have a Theory?, 67 CAL. L. REV. 21 
(1979) (developing arguments against the distinction). 
83. Despite the rhetoric of public officials, some recent polling data suggest that individuals 
may not find a significant distinction between preferences and quotas. At the time of the legisla-
tive debates over the Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, 1075-76 
(1991) (codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-16 (Supp. III 1991)), one poll reported that 88% 
of whites were opposed to "racial preferences," even in the absence of "rigid quotas." Tom 
Kenworthy & Thomas B. Edsall, Whites See Jobs on Line in Debate: Some Chicagoans Fear 
Reverse Bias, WASH. POST, June 4, 1991, at Al. Public opinion polls on affirmative action, 
however, are notoriously sensitive to the precise phrasing of questions and the context in which 
they are posed. 
84. See, e.g., Frederick Schauer, The Rules of Jurisprudence: A Reply, 14 HARV. J.L. & Pun. 
POLY. 839 (1991); Kathleen M. Sullivan, Foreword: The Justices of Rules and Standards, 106 
HARV. L. REV. 22 (1992). 
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long as the districting process is not reduced to a single-dimensional 
process in which interest appears to dominate overwhelmingly. 
In considering whether the Court is right to be concerned about 
value reductionism in public policy, 85 in Shaw or elsewhere, it might 
be helpful to recall the analysis of complex value choices that 
Professors Guido Calabresi and Philip Bobbitt offer in Tragic 
Choices. 86 In their analysis, societies that endorse a plurality of values, 
all of them fundamental, must necessarily confront situations of 
profound value conflict. Faced with such a conflict, society may sim-
ply choose to adopt policies that endorse one value over the others at 
stake. This approach, however, entails rejecting decisively some val-
ues that are, and ought to be, considered fundamental. As an alterna-
tive, therefore, societies might seek institutions and methods of 
reaching decisions that preserve the social and political understand-
ings through which they recognize all the values in conflict as funda-
mental and enduring. One possibility is that public decisions can cycle 
between preferences for the different values at stake. Alternatively, 
policymakers might accommodate certain values up to a point, but 
stop short of following them to their logical conclusion, as a way of 
signaling respect for countervailing values. 87 
From a certain perspective, these decisions will look inconsistent, 
or unprincipled, or like compromises having little logical foundation. 
Indeed, more formal or analytic evaluations of policymaking often 
generate just such criticisms. 88 But this kind of fuzzy logic in the pub-
lic sphere may be a healthy means through which societies embracing 
85. Even if this concern is appropriate in evaluating policy for some purposes, whether 
courts should interpret particular provisions of the Constitution to embody such concerns is a 
distinct question. The analysis of that question requires close attention to the text, history, pur-
poses, and prior interpretations of particular provisions - a task this article does not undertake. 
86. GUIDO CALABRESI & PHILIP BOBBIIT, TRAGIC CHOICES (1978). 
87. Calabresi and Bobbitt term these a "strategy of successive moves," id. at 195, but the 
language of strategy might suggest a greater role for conscious intent and choice than is war-
ranted. In healthy societies, the effect of the complex mix of public institutions and actors in-
volved in policymaking may be to mediate these fundamental value conflicts through producing 
outcomes that oscillate between the relevant values, even when no particular actor intends such a 
result and when institutions are not specifically designed to produce this pattern of outcomes. 
88. For example, Arrow's Theorem reveals that, in theory, public decisionmaking processes 
cannot be designed in ways that are fair and that preclude the possibility that decisions will cycle 
among various options (at least under conditions of significant social conflict). Based on this 
discovery, some scholars indict collective decisionmaking institutions for being unable to guaran-
tee consistent policy outcomes. In contrast, one of us has argued that this kind of cycling might 
be a healthy means of sustaining the tension between fundamental values, rather than a weakness 
of democratic institutions. See Richard H. Pildes & Elizabeth S. Anderson, Slinging Arrows at 
Democracy: Social Choice Theory, Value Pluralism, and Democratic Politics, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 
2121, 2171-75 (1990). As Calabresi and Bobbitt put it, "a society may limit the destructive 
impact of tragic choices by choosing to mix approaches over time." CALABRESJ & BOBBJIT, 
supra note 86, at 196. 
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pluralistic values of fundamental significance address tragic choices -
they sustain the tension between conflicting values, rather than al-
lowing circumstances to force them finally to endorse one fundamental 
value over another. By avoiding value-reductionist approaches when 
such values clash, public decisions can help, in the words of Calabresi 
and Bobbitt, "preserve the moral foundations of social 
collaboration. " 89 
If Shaw is to be justified, we believe the justification must proceed 
along these lines. On any other terms, Shaw's effort to distinguish 
race-conscious districting that produces bizarrely shaped districts 
from that which produces more familiar districts is difficult to compre-
hend. As the dissenters persuasively argue, one does not involve a 
more invidious use of race than the other, nor does one differ meaning-
fully from the other in its effect on individuals' voting rights. Carrying 
legal analysis to its logical extreme, however, may not be the most 
important task of the Supreme Court - at least as judges such as 
Justices O'Connor and Powell understand the functions of the Court 
and, perhaps, of law itself. Shaw rests on the view that, in certain 
areas, the Court's role in construing the Constitution should be to re-
quire policymakers to accommodate and sustain the tension between 
conflicting values, rather than to permit one important value to 
subordinate all others. 
3. Expressive Harms as Constitutional Injuries 
To appreciate this interpretation of Shaw, however, is not yet to 
grasp the precise harm that the Shaw Court believes this value reduc-
tionism causes. Allan Bakke could allege the harm of being denied the 
right to compete on equal terms for medical school admission - an 
alleged harm that is concrete, individualized, and material. But, be-
cause no North Carolina voters had their voting power diluted, one 
cannot say a similar injury occurred. Even a districting process that 
involves the kind of value reductionism we have described does not 
result in tangible, individualized harm, the kind of harm traditionally 
considered necessary to create standing.90 To understand and apply 
Shaw, then, we must link the Court's evident concern with value re-
ductionism to a different conception of harm. 
One can only understand Shaw, we believe, in terms of a view that 
what we call expressive harms are constitutionally cognizable. An ex-
pressive harm is one that results from the ideas or attitudes expressed 
89. Id. at 18. 
90. See infra note 105 and accompanying text (discussing "irreducible minimum" in the 
standing context). 
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through a governmental action, rather than from the more tangible or 
material consequences the action brings about. On this view, the 
meaning of a governmental action is just as important as what that 
action does. Public policies can violate the Constitution not only be-
cause they bring about concrete costs, but because the very meaning 
they convey demonstrates inappropriate respect for relevant public 
values. On this unusual conception of constitutional harm, when a 
governmental action expresses disrespect for such values, it can violate 
the Constitution. 
Concern for expressive harms focuses on the interpretive dimen-
sion of public action. This is the dimension along which such injuries 
lie, for expressive harms are violations of public understandings and 
norms. In the language of Robert Cover, "[w]e inhabit a nomos - a 
normative universe."91 Judicial validation of expressive harms reflects 
concern for the way in which public action can cause injury precisely 
by distorting or undermining this nomos. The harm is not concrete to 
particular individuals, singled out for distinct burdens. The harm in-
stead lies in the disruption to constitutionally underwritten public un-
derstandings about the appropriate structure of values in some arena 
of public action. 
Expressive harms are therefore, in general, social rather than indi-
vldual. Their primary effect is not as much the tangible burdens they 
impose on particular individuals, but the way in which they under-
mine collective understandings. Governmental action might be 
thought to implicate these understandings in two ways. When govern-
ment acts, it must interpret relevant collective understandings insofar 
as they constrain or guide policymakers. But public action and collec-
tive understandings exert a mutually reciprocal influence. Govern-
ment action does not merely reflect such understandings; it also shapes 
and reconstitutes them. Governmental actions can express - and 
therefore perhaps sustain - a reaffirmation or a rejection of these 
norms. A concern for expressive harms under the Constitution is a 
concern for precisely these less material, less individualized effects of 
state action. 
If courts grant expressive harms constitutional recognition, they 
must then engage in exquisitely difficult acts of interpretation. For the 
material to be interpreted is not a legal text, but the expressive signifi-
cance or social meaning that a particular governmental action has in 
the specific historical, political, and social context in which it takes 
91. Robert M. Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term - Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 
97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 4 (1983). 
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place. The quest is not for the intent or purpose behind legislation, at 
least as those concepts have traditionally been understood; the issue is 
not what policymakers might subjectively have had in mind or de-
sired. What matters is the social message their action conveys or, less 
positivistically, the message courts perceive the action to convey. This 
approach requires courts to attribute a likely social meaning to the 
action, rather than to discover the subjective intent behind it.92 Such 
exercises of judicial judgment are fraught with complexity and un-
likely to yield determinate, single right answers. But courts have not 
found these potential problems to be reason enough to abandon all 
judicial concern for expressive harms. 
This analysis might sound unfamiliar and obscure. Shaw, how-
ever, becomes intelligible only if one recognizes that it rests on just this 
concern for expressive harms. Shaw validates such harms as constitu-
tionally cognizable, along with more familiar, concrete, material inju-
ries. Indeed, close attention to the language of Justice O'Connor's 
opinion reveals a constant struggle to articulate exactly these sorts of 
expressive harms. Thus, the opinion is laden with references to the 
social perceptions, the messages, and the governmental reinforcement 
of values that the Court believes North Carolina's districting scheme 
conveys.93 There is simply no way to make sense of these references, 
which give the opinion its character and are central to its holding, 
92. Actual intent, to the extent knowable, might be relevant evidence, but it is not the ulti-
mate question at issue. 
93. Among the passages in which the Court emphasizes social perceptions, the messages the 
districting plan conveys, and the way in which the plan is likely to affect collective understand-
ings are the following: 
(1) "The message that such districting sends to elected representatives is equally 
pernicious." 
(2) "When a district obviously is created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests 
of one racial group, elected officials are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is 
to represent only the members of that group, rather than their constituency as a whole." 
(3) "(The plan is] so highly irregular that, on its face, it rationally cannot be understood as 
anything other than an effort to 'segregat[e] ... voters' on the basis of race." 
Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2826, 2826-27 (1993) (quoting Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 
341 (1960)). 
Note also the frequent references to "reinforcing perceptions," or "reinforcing beliefs," as in the 
following: 
(4) "[The plan] reinforces racial stereotypes and threatens to undermine our system of rep-
resentative democracy by signaling to elected officials that they represent a particular racial 
group rather than their constituency as a whole." 
113 S. Ct. at 2828. 
Similarly, notice the Court's use of the language of "offense," which is commonly associated with 
expressive concerns: 
(5) "(The] reapportionment plan is alleged to be so irrational on its face that it immediately 
offends principles of racial equality." 
113 S. Ct. at 2829. 
These passages and others, central to the opinion, are most convincingly explained only by recog-
nizing that it is expressive harms that concern the Court in Shaw. 
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without recognizing that the decision is grounded in concern for ex-
pressive harms. This conception of constitutionally cognizable harms 
explains why the Court is adamant that "reapportionment is one area 
in which appearances do matter."94 If they do, it must be because, 
even apart from any concrete harm to individual voters, such appear-
ances themselves express a value structure that offends constitutional 
principles. 
Shaw therefore rests on the principle that, when government ap-
pears to use race in the redistricting context in a way that subordinates 
all other relevant values, the state has impermissibly endorsed too 
dominant a role for race. 95 The constitutional harm must lie in this 
endorsement itself: the very expression of this kind of value reduction-
ism becomes the constitutional violation. The justification for this re-
sult might rest on the intrinsic ground that the endorsement is wrong, 
in and of itself; alternatively, the justification might rest on the instru-
mental ground that this state endorsement threatens to reshape social 
perceptions along similar lines. 
In either case, Shaw depends crucially on judicial recognition of 
expressive harms under the Fourteenth Amendment.96 This concep-
94. 113 S. Ct. at 2827. 
95. Vincent Blasi suggests that a similar, expressively oriented rationale provides the best 
explanation for Justice Powell's opinion in Bakke, although Blasi focuses primarily on the instru-
mental, rather than the intrinsic, justifications for such a rationale. Blasi, supra note 82, at 59 
("Perhaps Powell is saying that appearances are what matter most because the critical value is 
the longrun diminution of racial prejudice throughout the society and, depending on how they 
are perceived by the public, different race-conscious programs may have quite different effects on 
the racial attitudes of the populace."). Blasi then criticizes such an approach to constitutional 
doctrine on the familiar grounds that purported social perceptions are too uncertain a basis for 
constitutional doctrine. Id. at 60. In addition, he argues that responding to these perceptions by 
purporting to distinguish between race-as-one-factor and race-as-a-dominant-factor entails public 
hypocrisy, which Blasi views as "inevitably ... corrupting." Id. 
96. A similar idea underlies Charles Lawrence's revisionist account of Brown v. Board of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954), an account that Lawrence then uses to argue for the constitutionality 
of regulating racist speech. See Charles R. Lawrence Ill, If He Hollers Let Him Go: Regulating 
Racist Speech on Campus, 1990 DUKE L.J. 431. Lawrence argues that school segregation was 
unconstitutional precisely because of its expressive dimension or its cultural meaning. "Brown 
held that segregated schools were unconstitutional primarily because of the message segregation 
conveys - the message that black children are an untouchable caste, unfit to be educated with 
white children." Id. at 439. In Lawrence's view, Brown therefore stands for the principle that 
"the systematic group defamation of segregation be disestablished," id. at 441, and that "Brown 
is a case about group defamation." Id. at 463. To reach this conclusion, he argues that the "non-
speech elements [of school segregation were] by-products of the main message rather than the 
message simply a by-product of unlawful conduct." Id. at 441. 
This emphasis on cultural meanings as legally cognizable harms captures an important and 
neglected aspect of Brown and constitutional doctrine more generally. At the same time, Brown 
might exemplify this point less sharply than other examples. In Brown, the Court accepted lower 
court findings that " 'tangible' factors" were equal between the white and black schools at issue 
but relied on inequalities in "intangible considerations." 347 U.S. at 492-93. Moreover, the 
Court cannot have been unaware of the process by which states scrambled to bring particular 
black schools up to equivalent standards as they became subject to litigation. Brown might well 
be justified as a means of ensuring, without the need for case-by-case litigation, that state re-
510 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 92:483 
tion of constitutional harm is intriguing and undoubtedly controver-
sial. To describe and evaluate it in detail would require considerable 
space. For present purposes, we merely note three brief features of 
this conception. 
a. Legal recognition of expressive harms. Though this conception 
of harm might at first appear unfamiliar and vague, it is implicitly 
recognized in many areas of law and public policy. The general dis-
tinction between intentional and accidental harms is the most routine 
example. In torts and criminal law, an intentional and a negligent 
battery might cause the same quantum of physical injury. Yet com-
mon and criminal law understandably treat the former as far more 
serious. Even if they cause the same objective level of physical injury, 
the law considers these to be two distinct actions; the distinction rests 
in the different attitude that an intentional harm expresses toward so-
cial norms of individual integrity. Conceivably, the more serious sanc-
tions for intentional harms might be justified as necessary to create 
optimal deterrence of such actions. But, even apart from incentive-
altering calculations, the attitudes expressed through conduct inten-
tionally designed to injure pose a greater challenge to the normative 
structure underlying social order. The greater challenge such conduct 
expresses requires a commensurately greater response in the legal 
sanctions applied - independent of deterrence rationales for greater 
sanctions. Intentional harms are morally more offensive than acciden-
tal ones, and the law reflects this difference in moral evaluation. 
For a more interesting and complex example of the difference be-
tween expressive and consequential conceptions of harm, consider sen-
tence enhancements for bias-motivated crimes, at issue last Term in 
Wisconsin v. Mitchell 97 From a consequentialist perspective, we 
sources for education would not be discriminatorily allocated. See GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 503 (2d ed. 1991) (asking whether pre-Brown doctrine, "by requiring the 
courts to evaluate the level of 'equality' in thousands of segregated school systems throughout the 
country, [might] have produced an even more serious judicial intrusion on the political branches 
than Brown"). 
As a more elemental illustration, consider instead segregation in public accommodations, 
such as movie theaters. In this case there can be little claim of comparatively disadvantageous 
allocation of material benefits between white and black viewers; both groups see the identical 
movie, albeit from different physical locations. Even if we imagine a situation in which the seat· 
ing locations did not reflect a social hierarchy (as they do when whites sit in front, blacks in the 
back or the balcony), such a state-mandated seating distribution along racial lines would surely 
violate the Constitution. In these contexts, the only reason that the seating segregation is illegal 
and immoral must be because of its expressive significance or, in Lawrence's words, its cultural 
meaning. 
Lawrence goes on to argue that, if the only reason for regulating conduct is its expressive 
dimension, then the expression itself can be directly regulated. This is a far more controversial 
step. For Lawrence's response to criticisms that this move fails to respect the basic First 
Amendment distinction between conduct and speech, see Lawrence, supra, at 440-44. 
97. 113 S. Ct. 2194 (1993). 
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might argue that greater penalties are required to provide greater de-
terrence. Perhaps these crimes are more common, or perhaps they are 
more likely to incite retaliatory responses. But, on an expressivist 
logic, we might argue greater penalties are required because a differ-
ent, and more threatening, social meaning attaches to the assault. 
From this perspective, beating up a black man because he is black is a 
different action, with a different social meaning, than an ordinary as-
sault. The difference between these two forms of justification - con-
sequential and expressive - reflects and shapes collective 
understandings of why we adopt such measures. In addition, some 
might believe the constitutionality of such measures, under the First 
Amendment, depends on whether they are justified on one or the other 
type of logic. The most important point, though, is that much con-
duct, like hate crimes, has both an expressive and a consequential di-
mension; action reveals certain attitudes as well as causing more 
tangible injuries. 
This point can be generalized. Actions of all sorts - public and 
private, collective and individual - express certain values as well as 
bring about certain consequences.98 Actions both "do" something and 
"mean" something; at the same time that they bring about certain con-
sequences, they also express some set of values and normative atti-
tudes. Although we do not ordinarily articulate legal harms in these 
ways, law and policy often, if implicitly, respond to this meaning-mak-
ing or expressive dimension of actions. 
In trying to find the right language to capture this legal concern for 
expressive harms, we might say that intentional and accidental batter-
ies, or hate crimes and ordinary assaults, are two different actions. Or 
we might say they are the same action in their material dimension, but 
distinct in their expressive dimension. Nothing of substance, however, 
ought to turn on the formal way in which we classify the relationship 
between an action and its meaning. For action, meaning, and aim are 
mutually defining, both in social fact and, often, in law and policy. 
b. Expressive harms in other areas of constitutional doctrine. Sec-
ond, the Court has recognized constitutionally cognizable expressive 
harms in other doctrinal areas, though without using these specific 
terms. The most striking example is the emergence in recent years of 
98. Of course, expressive and consequential effects are both effects or outcomes of policies. 
Part of what an action means is what it does. But it is helpful to observe the difference between 
these two dimensions of action. The labels are consistent with their usage in contemporary phi-
losophy, but the semantic question of what labels are most helpful to capture the difference is not 
important. Whether we talk about the expressive dimensions of an action, its social meaning, or 
its symbolic significance, the crucial point is that actions both express values and attitudes as well 
as bring out more material consequences. 
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the "endorsement test" under the Establishment Clause.99 The idea 
that the First Amendment bans state "endorsement" of religion rests, 
like Shaw, on a concern for social perceptions; on the perceived mean-
ing of government policies; and on the view that the Constitution 
reaches not just material harms, but expressive ones. The explicit lan-
guage with which courts have framed the "endorsement test" is 
grounded on the same concerns as those central to Shaw. Thus, Jus-
tice O'Connor has argued that the problem with a state endorsement 
of religion, for example, is that it "sends a message to nonadherents 
that they are outsiders, not full members of the political community, 
and an accompanying message to adherents that they are insiders 
•••• " 100 In her analysis, the "endorsement test" invalidates govern-
ment practices that create a perception that the government is endors-
ing or disapproving of religion. 101 These concerns for social 
perceptions, messages, and governmental endorsements of values are 
central whenever expressive harms are at issue. 
That Justice O'Connor is both the author of Shaw and the origina-
tor of the "endorsement test" lends credence to the view that one can-
not understand Shaw except in terms of concern for expressive values 
in the area of race and redistricting. To be sure, some commentators 
have embraced the Establishment Clause "endorsement test" with en-
thusiasm, 102 while others have found it vague, empty, or unadminis-
trable. 103 Any effort to recognize expressive harms through 
constitutional doctrine must address these kinds of concerns. Despite 
99. This test first emerged in Justice O'Connor's concurrence in Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 
668 (1984). Justice O'Conl)or developed it in subsequent separate opinions, and Supreme Court 
majority opinions have invoked the "no endorsement" idea with approval. See, e.g., Edwards v. 
Aguillard, 482 U.S. 578, 585-86 (1987). For a history of the development of this test in an article 
otherwise critical of it, see Steven D. Smith, Symbols, Perceptions, and Doctrinal Illusions: 
Establishment Neutrality and the "No Endorsement" Test, 86 MICH. L. REV. 266, 268-76 (1987). 
100. Lynch, 465 U.S. at 688 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (emphasis added). 
101. 465 U.S. at 688-93 (O'Connor, J., concurring). In Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38 
(1985), Justice O'Connor elaborated on two questions that are difficult for all constitutional doc-
trines focused on expressive harms: how courts might determine "the" social perception of a 
policy, and from what perspective courts ought to make this interpretive judgment when, as is 
often likely, no unitary perception exists. 472 U.S. at 73-76 (O'Connor, J., concurring). Thus, 
she argued that the relevant perceptions are those of an "objective observer" familiar with the 
text, legislative history, and implementation of the law in question, as well as the values recog-
nized in the religion clauses of the Constitution. 472 U.S. at 76, 83 (O'Connor, J., concurring); 
see also Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints 
v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 346-49 (1987) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (elaborating upon the "objec-
tive observer" perspective); Estate of Thorton v. Caldor, Inc., 472 U.S. 703, 711-12 (1985) 
(O'Connor, J., concurring) (same). 
102. For an exhaustive summary of favorable commentary on the "endorsement test," see 
Smith, supra note 99, at 274 n.45. 
103. See, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Religious Freedom at a Crossroads, 59 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 115, 147-57 (1992); Smith, supra note 99. 
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these problems, however, judicial concern for expressive harms is de-
monstrably a pervasive and long-enduring feature of constitutional 
doctrine and disagreements.104 
c. Standing and expressive harms. In much of constitutional law, 
both substantive and procedural doctrines require that harms be indi-
viduated before they become judicially actionable. 105 Indeed, the cur-
rent Court has reinvigorated these requirements in recent years, 
requiring th~t plaintiffs distinguish their claims from "a generally 
available grievance about government - claiming only harm to [their] 
and every citizen's interest in proper application of the Constitution 
and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly and tangibly benefits 
[them] than it does the public at large."106 As a result, the Court has 
rejected claims that "abstract stigmatic injuries" can be judicially 
cognizable.107 
Yet, when courts recognize expressive harms, this traditional re-
quirement of individualized harm comes under considerable pressure. 
Expressive harms focus on social perceptions, pyblic understandings, 
and messages; they involve the government's symbolic endorsement of 
certain values in ways not obviously tied to any discrete, individual-
ized harm. A significant tension, therefore, exists between recognition 
104. For an effort to show that much constitutional doctrine and disagreement turns on 
whether one understands substantive constitutional provisions as recognizing expressive harms, 
in addition to more material ones, see Richard H. Pildes, Competing Conceptions of Value in 
Constitutional Law: Expressive and Consequential Harms (Dec. 1, 1992) (unpublished manu-
script, on file with author). 
105. The law of standing is a notable example of this type of procedural doctrine. The Court 
recently restated the "irreducible minimum" that is required for standing under Article III: 
[A) party seeking to invoke a federal court's jurisdiction must demonstrate three things: (1) 
"injury in fact," by which we mean an invasion of a legally protected interest that is "(a) 
concrete and particularized, and (b) actual or imminent, not conjectural or hypothetical," 
(2) a causal relationship between the injury and the challenged conduct, by which we mean 
that the injury "fairly can be traced to the challenged action of the defendant," and has not 
resulted "from the independent action of some third party not before the court," and (3) a 
likelihood that the injury will be redressed by a favorable decision, by which we mean that 
the "prospect of obtaining relief from the injury as a result of a favorable ruling" is not "too 
speculative." 
Northeastern Fla. Chapter of the Associated Gen. Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 113 S. Ct. 
2297, 2301-02 (1993) (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992); 
Simon v. Eastern Ky. Welfare Rights Org., 426 U.S. 26, 41-42 (1976); Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 
737, 752 (1984), respectively); see Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen 
Suits, "Injuries," and Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163 (1992) (discussing modem standing 
jurisprudence); see also Harold J. Krent & Ethan G. Shenkman, Of Citizen Suits and Citizen 
Sunstein, 91 MICH. L. REV. 1793 (1993) (responding to Sunstein's analysis of standing). 
106. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2143 (1992). 
107. See, e.g., Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 755 (1984) (rejecting the idea that stigmatic 
harm to a racially defined group gives an individual member of that group standing); see also 
Antonin Scalia, The Doctrine of Standing as an Essential Element of the Separation of Powers, 17 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 881, 881-82 (1983) ("[C)ourts need to accord greater weight than they have 
in recent times to the traditional requirement that the plaintiff's alleged injury be a particularized 
one, which sets him apart from the citizenry at large."). 
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of expressive harms and traditional requirements of individualized 
wrongs. 108 
In Shaw, the Court avoided confronting the tension between these 
traditional requirements and its conception of expressive harm. Given 
the "special harms" 109 Shaw recognizes, perhaps any voter in North 
Carolina - not just those in District 12 and not just those who are 
white - can legitimately claim to suffer these harms and hence to 
have standing. In other contexts involving race-conscious policy, 
blacks do not have legal standing to challenge policies that purport-
edly benefit them as a group; the fact that some blacks might view an 
affirmative action policy, for example, as stigmatizing or as essentializ-
ing black identity is not the kind of harm that grounds legal standing. 
Only those disadvantaged in more material and particularized ways 
suffer the kind of injury necessary for judicial assessment of their 
claims. Hence, the plaintiffs in affirmative action cases are white indi-
viduals or white-owned businesses. Yet the very theory on which 
Shaw was litigated and decided appears to embrace a much broader 
conception of legal injury. The complaint, for example, refused to 
state the race of the plaintiffs and refused to allege the concrete and 
particularized injury of vote dilution. Instead, the plaintiffs pleaded a 
right to participate in a color-blind electoral process. 110 If this is the 
right at stake, all North Carolina voters might be thought to be in-
jured in the same way and to the same extent. 
To bring this claim closer to traditionally recognized ones of indi-
vidualized harm, the district court rewrote the complaint by taking 
108. For example, in the electoral context, the more traditional conception of standing re-
cently led to dismissal of the constitutional challenge to the seating of Alcee Hastings as repre-
sentative of Florida's 23d congressional district. Waggoner v. Hastings, 816 F. Supp. 716 (S.D. 
Fla. 1993). Hastings, a federal district judge who had been impeached, convicted, and removed 
from office, was subsequently elected to Congress. A plaintiff challenged his seating on the 
ground that the Constitution's impeachment provisions disqualified Hastings from holding any 
office under the United States. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3, cl. 7 reads: 
Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, 
and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United 
States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, 
Judgment and Punishment, according to Law. 
The plaintiff, however, was registered to vote not in the 23d district, but in an adjoining one. He 
nonetheless asserted a generalized interest in having only constitutionally qualified officials repre-
senting Florida. Although the court found "an appeal to the logic of the plaintiff's argument 
about an interest of a citizen in having lawfully qualified representatives," the court dismissed the 
complaint for lack of standing. 816 F. Supp. at 718. The standing holding appears to be an 
alternative holding because the court also went on to find the claim nonjusticiable on other 
grounds. 816 F. Supp. at 720. This result reflects not only the traditional requirement of con-
crete and particularized injury, but the narrowness with which courts have conceptualized legal 
injury in the electoral context. 
109. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2828 (1993). 
110. 113 S. Ct. at 2824. 
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judicial notice that the plaintiffs were white voters. 111 The Supreme 
Court then reinterpreted the plaintiffs' legal theory before endorsing it: 
the claim became a challenge to "legislation so extremely irregular on 
its face that it can rationally only be viewed as an effort to segregate 
the races for purposes of voting, without regard for traditional district-
ing principles and without sufficiently compelling justification."112 
Even so, if the way the legislation is "viewed" is the harm, any North 
Carolina voter might be similarly positioned and hence equally enti-
tled to standing. 
Justice Souter indirectly pressed this issue by arguing that, absent 
vote dilution, race-conscious districting involves no constitutional 
harm. 113 The Court's response revealed just how nonindividualized is 
the expressive harm central to Shaw: 
As we have explained, however, reapportionment legislation that cannot 
be understood as anything other than an effort to classify and separate 
voters by race injures voters in other ways. It reinforces racial stereo-
types and threatens to undermine our system of representative democ-
racy by signaling to elected officials that they represent a particular 
racial group rather than their constituency as a whole. Justice Souter 
does not adequately explain why these harms are not cognizable under 
the Fourteenth Amendment. 114 
The Court, however, does not adequately explain why these harms 
are not generalized ones, the kinds of harms for which generalized 
standing to sue would be appropriate. Indeed, although the concep-
tions of cognizable harm and standing are directly linked - and 
standing is both a jurisdictional question and, in part, a constitutional 
one - the Court leaves issues of standing unaddressed. 115 The point 
111. 113 S. Ct. at 2822. 
112. 113 S. Ct. at 2824. 
113. 113 S. Ct. at 2847 (Souter, J., dissenting). 
114. 113 S. Ct. at 2828 (citations omitted). 
115. The closest the Court comes to resolving the tension between traditional standing prin-
ciples and the expressive harms Shaw recognizes is when the Court intimates that the voters in a 
particular "bizarre" district experience these harms distinctly: "When a district obviously is 
created solely to effectuate the perceived common interests of one racial group, elected officials 
are more likely to believe that their primary obligation is to represent only the members of that 
group, rather than their constituency as a whole." 113 S. Ct. at 2827. The notion here appears 
to be that seemingly single-valued redistricting runs the danger of constructing an inappropriate, 
or antiliberal, conception of the relationship between representation and community in a particu-
lar district. In many other passages, however, the Court describes the harms in ways that are not 
district specific. See, e.g., 113 S. Ct. at 2830 ("Nothing in the [Court's precedents] precludes 
white voters (or voters of any other race) from bringing the analytically distinct claim that a 
reapportionment plan rationally cannot be understood as anything other than an effort to segre-
gate citizens into separate voting districts on the basis of race without sufficient justification.") 
(emphasis added). Even on the narrowest reading, passages like these seem to imply a standing 
principle broad enough at least to permit any voter in a "bizarre" district to sue. Nevertheless, 
the question remains whether this kind of geographic standing limitation is consistent with the 
logic of the expressive harms the Court recognizes. 
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here is that tension exists between the underlying but implicit theory 
of Shaw and established legal principles, such as those reflected in 
standing doctrine. There may be principled ways of resolving this ten-
sion, but the Court does not confront the conflict or acknowledge it. 
4. Social Perceptions Versus the ''Actual Facts" 
Thus far, we have assumed that the North Carolina General 
Assembly's purpose in designing District 12 was to create a second 
majority-black district in the state. On this view, the aim of creating a 
minority district was "the" cause of the "bizarre" district shape. 116 
The social perception of this "fact" seems, at bottom, to be the founda-
tion on which the decision rests. 117 
The central concern of Shaw is this social perception. Seen in this 
way, Shaw offers a story about the corruption of politics by race con-
sciousness, at least when the latter is carried to extremes. On this 
view, politicians use civil rights policy, through the pressure the VRA 
puts on the redistricting process, to manipulate and distort political 
institutions - or, more precisely, the VRA is being used in ways that 
create the social perception that this manipulation is taking place. 
When the facts are examined from another vantage point, how-
ever, Shaw might expose a quite different story. As in many redistrict-
ing battles, with their boiling cauldrons of partisan, personal, interest-
group, fair representation, and other motivations, reconstructing the 
reasons behind North Carolina's actions at each stage is no easy task. 
The record suggests both a "stronger" and a "weaker" view of the 
actual facts, and, on either account, Shaw is yet more complex. 
a. The strong view of the facts. Recall that the Attorney General 
objected to North Carolina's initial redistricting plan on the ground 
that the VRA required creation of a second minority district, which he 
suggested could be in the southeastern part of the state. The "strong" 
interpretation of the facts takes this assessment as correct and assumes 
that such a district, reasonably compact, could indeed have been cre-
ated. The Court appeared to assume this view, although it did not 
address the question directly, and the lower court made no formal 
finding to this effect. 118 Yet, if this is the assumption on which Shaw is 
116. We do not explore in detail more subtle causation questions, such as whether the imper-
missible cause with which Shaw is concerned must be merely a contributing cause, the dominant 
cause, or the exclusive cause for a particular district's design. For further discussion, see infra 
text accompanying notes 251-52. 
117. Citizens exposed to the plan will find it "so irrational on its face that it immediately 
offends principles of racial equality." 113 S. Ct. at 2829. 
118. There is no way to prove that this assumption underlies the Court's approach to the 
case, for the Court made no formal finding or statement to this effect, but the atmosphere of the 
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decided, what Shaw would reveal is not the manipulation of politics by 
race, but the manipulation of race by politics. 
On this strong reading of the facts, North Carolina could have 
complied by drawing a reasonably compact minority-dominated dis-
trict, but it made a deliberate choice not to do so. Yet, on this view, 
the reasons behind the design of District 12 would have nothing to do 
with race - and everything to do with protecting incumbent congress-
men and seeking partisan political advantage. Faced with a range of 
choices for creating a second minority district, including a reasonably 
compact one, the General Assembly made the choice it did for its own 
reasons. As several Justices appear to have assumed, those reasons 
were incumbent protection and partisan advantage. 119 On this as-
sumption, however, political reasons, not concerns involving race, 
would be the cause or purpose behind the design of District 12. 
At this point, notice that the case would then actually present a 
conflict between social perceptions and political realities. To restate, 
the actual reason District 12 appears "bizarre" is that it was designed 
to protect incumbents and enhance Democratic control of the state's 
congressional delegation.120 Once the Justice Department's objection 
was lodged, North Carolina was obliged to create a second majority-
minority district; but the final shape and location of that district traces 
to political, not racial, factors. Analytically, we might say two govern-
mental decisions are involved. The first, from the Justice Department, 
was that North Carolina had to create a second majority-minority dis-
trict (Decision A); the second, from the North Carolina General As-
sembly, was where to locate this district (Decision B). Race was a 
motivating or dominant factor for Decision A, but not Decision B. 
opinion strongly suggests that the Court believed North Carolina had defiantly rejected the 
Justice Department's suggestion in order to pursue state political agendas. For example, the 
Court referred twice to the fact that "the Attorney General suggested that North Carolina could 
have created a reasonably compact second majority-minority district in the south-central to 
southeastern part of the State," 113 S. Ct. at 2832, including in the very last paragraph of the 
opinion, when the Court is recapping the most important elements of the case to define the 
decision's basic principles. 113 S. Ct. at 2820, 2832. In addition, one of the dissenting opinions 
explicitly rests on the assumption that the state could have drawn a reasonably compact minor-
ity-dominated district, most likely in the southeastern part of the state, as the Attorney General 
had suggested. See 113 S. Ct. at 2841 n.10 (White, J., dissenting). Thus, the "strong" version of 
the facts most likely informed the Court's internal discussions and the Justices' individual 
deliberations. 
119. See supra note 118. 
120. See supra note 118. In other litigation, plaintiffs did allege that North Carolina's rejec-
tion of a majority-black district in the southern region of the state in favor of District 12 was the 
result of political gerrymandering motivated by the desire to protect Democratic incumbents. A 
three-judge court dismissed that suit, Pope v. Blue, 809 F. Supp. 392 (W.D.N.C. 1992), and the 
Supreme Court summarily affirmed. Pope v. Blue, 113 S. Ct. 30 (1992). 
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From the set of possible majority-minority districts, North Carolina 
selected District 12 on political, not racial, grounds. 
If this "strong" version of the facts is true, two important points 
follow. First, the North Carolina districting story would reveal the 
way in which politicians have come to use civil rights and the VRA as 
a screen; while going to Machiavellian lengths to protect their seats 
and pursue their partisan agendas, politicians claim "the Voting 
Rights Act made me do it." This is self-interest masquerading as race 
consciousness. Political actors thus encourage social perceptions that 
government has been captured by extremism in the name of race. The 
backlash, which should be directed at self-interested politicians, in-
stead focuses on the Voting Rights Act, the Justice Department, and 
race-conscious policymaking. Whether intended this way or not, 
Shaw might thus be seen as a blow against the cynical manipulation of 
the VRA. 
The second point is related. If the design of District 12 reflects 
political purposes, any potential equal protection violation would 
therefore have to reside in the earlier decision - that of the Justice 
Department to require a second majority-minority district. In legal 
terms, however, finding such a violation at the first stage of this pro-
cess would be difficult, at least if the routine application of the VRA 
remains constitutional, as the opinion suggests it does. For the use of 
race in Decision A is routine, ra(her than extreme. Indeed, the deci-
sion appears to be a typical application of the VRA; the Attorney 
General found a violation in the failure to create a second majority-
minority district where - applying the Justice Department's tradi-
tional criteria, which take geographic compactness into account -
such a district could be created. Yet nothing in that decision violates 
the Fourteenth Amendment under the reasoning of Shaw; it is not a 
decision to ignore all traditionally relevant districting criteria in the 
name of race. 
To see this more clearly, suppose North Carolina had created a 
relatively compact second district. By definition, this would not trig-
ger the special "district appearance" claim recognized in Shaw. This 
means that, on Shaw's own reasoning, Decision A, which does employ 
race, does not violate the Constitution. But if Decision B reflects par-
tisan and incumbency purposes, it too does not involve the use of race 
at all. Thus, Decision B cannot violate the Constitution either. 
What does all this establish? That if constitutional principles must 
assess state action on the basis of "the actual facts," and if we accept 
the "strong" version of those facts - as the Court appears to do -
Shaw is difficult to explain or rationalize coherently. From that, we 
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might conclude that Shaw is simply wrong. Alternatively, we might 
conclude that the seemingly noncontroversial first premise is wrong: 
perhaps the mistake is in assuming that constitutional principles must 
be applied to "the actual facts." Yet what could the alternative possi-
bly be? The best answer would have to be that constitutional princi-
ples can properly apply to the social perceptions the facts generate, 
rather than be confined to the actual facts themselves. 
This extraordinary conception of constitutional adjudication 
would have to underlie Shaw if the Court is assuming the "strong" 
version of the facts. Shaw would then rest on social perceptions in a 
much deeper way than our initial description suggests. That is, when 
the Court says, "we believe that reapportionment is one area in which 
appearances do matter,"121 that belief would have to be operating at 
two levels. For it is the appearance - not the fact - that a district's 
appearance reflects value reductionism in the name of race that lies 
behind Shaw. 
If District 12 were indeed drawn for incumbency and partisan rea-
sons, Shaw would ultimately involve a conflict between social percep-
tions and the actual facts of politically self-interested districting. Once 
the Court assumed this kind of conflict, which it appears to have done, 
the Court had three options. First, it might have rejected the equal 
protection claim in an opinion that exposed the politically self-inter-
ested manipulation of race. For those who believe the Court can play 
a significant educative role, this might have been the preferred course: 
let the citizens of North Carolina know that their politicians, not the 
VRA, are to blame. 
Second, the Court might have focused only on the actual facts, 
rather than attempt to assess the social perceptions they created. If no 
constitutional principle prohibits bizarrely shaped districts when 
designed for the purpose of protecting incumbents, then no constitu-
tional violation would exist. 122 Many will believe this to have been the 
better course. After all, legal principles that turn on social percep-
tions, rather than "the actual facts," will not make judicial decision-
making any more consistent or predictable. 
The third option would be to apply constitutional principles in a 
way that gives social perceptions priority over the actual facts. To the 
extent the Court's opinion assumes the "strong" version of the facts, 
121. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827. 
122. On remand or in future applications of Shaw, a crucial question is likely to be whether 
governments can legitimately assert that partisan advantage or protection of incumbents provides 
a compelling end under strict scrutiny to justify extremely contorted election districts. For dis-
cussion, see infra text accompany notes 254-69. 
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this rather remarkable option is the one the Court chose in remanding 
the case for strict scrutiny assessment. Before dismissing this choice 
as confused or unworkable, we ought to consider whether social per-
ceptions should be excluded from the proper concerns of constitu-
tional law. For many purposes social perceptions are no less "real" 
than actual facts; these perceptions play a critical role in defining and 
shaping the prevailing political culture. Perhaps constitutional law is 
properly concerned with the character of this public culture. Indeed a 
surprising number of constitutional doctrines or Supreme Court deci-
sions are difficult to rationalize in functional terms; for example, some 
decisions preclude legislatures from using certain means to achieve a 
particular end but permit other means to achieve exactly the same 
end. 123 The best justification for these doctrines and decisions is that 
they are geared toward cultivating certain collective understandings in 
the political culture, rather than toward prohibiting certain end states 
from being achieved. That is, these doctrines require public officials to 
understand the relationship between certain values in a particular way. 
Shaw rests precisely on this kind of concern for appropriate public 
understandings regarding the relationship of race to redistricting. 
Thus, on the strong view of the facts, Shaw must stand for the view 
that extremely contorted minority districts convey the social impres-
sion that race has dominated public decisionmaking - that the ap-
pearance that race has played such a role violates the Fourteenth 
Amendment. More concisely, appearance is part of the reality the 
Constitution addresses. 
b. The weak view of the facts. If this interpretation of Shaw is 
incorrect, it must be because a different set of facts lies behind the 
North Carolina districting scheme. The alternative, "weaker" view of 
the facts would be that North Carolina could not have created a signif-
123. This article is not the place to provide a lengthy catalogue of such doctrines or deci-
sions, but, as one example, consider the recent decision in New York v. United States, 112 S. Ct. 
2408 (1992). There Congress had ratified a state-led effort to develop a comprehensive mecha-
nism for fairly distributing the burdens of low-level nuclear waste disposal. The Court held that 
Congress could enforce this scheme constitutionally through monetary and other incentives, but 
it could not do so by requiring states to assume ownership of nuclear waste if they failed in their 
other obligations. 112 S. Ct. at 2412. In functional terms, the decision is easy to criticize, for 
Congress can enforce the statute through other, perhaps equally effective means - means just as 
"coercive" in effect as mandatory ownership. Yet the Court might be understood as concluding 
that Congress expresses a distinct - and constitutionally impermissible - attitude toward the 
states when it directly mandates their action. Even if vulnerable on functional or doctrinal 
grounds, the decision might be thought to assert the principle that Congress cannot understand 
its relationship to states in this way. Interestingly, Justice O'Connor is the author of New York. 
Thus, we might see a general theme emerging in Justice O'Connor's conception of constitutional 
law and the Court's role: a general attentiveness to the expressive dimensions of public action. 
For further examples of decisions that might be difficult to rationalize on functional grounds, but 
are best understood in more expressive terms, see the provocative account in PHILIP Bonmrr, 
CONSTITUTIONAL FATE 196-223 (1982). 
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icantly more compact second minority district than CD12. On this 
view, the Justice Department erred in concluding that the state could 
have created such a district. In light of the difficulty of reaching firm 
conclusions from the record, 124 this possibility cannot be dismissed. If 
the Justice Department were mistaken, then the "bizarre" shape of 
CD12 would reflect good-faith efforts of the North Carolina General 
Assembly to comply, not self-serving political ends. Perhaps when the 
General Assembly attempted to design a second minority-controlled 
district, the only possibilities turned out to be districts as odd in shape 
as the one the Assembly eventually chose. 125 
If this account is accurate, the reasons behind the design of CD 12 
would be more purely race-conscious ones. No manipulation of the 
VRA or racial symbolism for narrow partisan advantage or protection 
of incumbents would have been involved. Instead, the state was pri-
marily motivated by the goal of creating a second minority-controlled 
district; this motivation, not others, would account for the peculiar 
shape of CD12. To some, this version of the facts might make the 
design of the district less troubling. On this view, it is far worse for 
politicians to manipulate social perceptions and pursue political agen-
das under the guise of complying with federal law and ensuring fair 
minority representation. When the only means of ensuring fair and 
effective minority representation is through oddly shaped districts, the 
direct and exclusive pursuit of this goal should, on this view, be ac-
cepted. To others, the weaker interpretation of the facts would make 
the case even more troubling, for race would then be the dominant 
purpose behind CD12. Now the actual facts (not the social percep-
tions) would be that concerns for race had dominated all other redis-
tricting values. 
The judicial opinions in Shaw and the record evidence we have 
reviewed do not permit us to make a convincing choice between the 
"strong" and "weak" views of the facts. 126 Certainly the Court comes 
124. See infra note 126. 
125. If this were so, the state perhaps could have submitted its second districting plan for 
preclearance and tried to demonstrate to the Justice Department that a reasonably compact sec-
ond minority district could not have been created. Of course, the state might have faced consid-
erable costs, financial and political, from further delaying implementation of the post-1990 
congressional redistricting. 
126. Trying to resolve which version of the facts - the "strong" or the "weak" version - is 
more accurate brings to the surface the complexities of current VRA theory and practice. First, 
when the North Carolina General Assembly came up with its first redistricting plan, which in-
cluded only one black-dominated district, the General Assembly expressly concluded that "[i]t is 
apparent that it is only possible to create one majority black district that is reasonably compact, 
and that is what Chapter 601 does." Lacy Thornburg, Attorney General of North Carolina, 
Other Material Concerning the Purpose of the Plan, in Section 5 Submission for North Carolina 
Congressional Redistricting, Chapter 601 (Aug. 28, 1991) (unpublished document submitted to 
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closest to having assumed the strong version. 127 Moreover, the very 
terms in which the Court chose to confront the formal legal question 
to be decided assumes this strong version of the facts. Thus, the appel-
lants initially filed a broad jurisdictional statement that directly chal-
lenged the state's power to draw majority-black districts. 128 But in 
noting probable jurisdiction of the case, the Court directed the parties 
to brief a different and narrower question: 
Whether a state legislature's intent to comply with the Voting Rights 
Act and the Attorney General's interpretation thereof precludes a find-
ing that the legislature's congressional redistricting plan was adopted 
with invidious discriminatory intent where the legislature did not accede 
to the plan suggested by the Attorney General but instead developed its 
the Civil Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice, copy on file with authors). In reaching 
this conclusion, the General Assembly, which Democrats controlled, rejected at least two Repub· 
Hean-sponsored alternatives that would have arguably created two minority-dominated districts 
(as well as, presumably, having Republican-favored partisan effects). The stated reasons for 
these rejections were that, in one plan, the second district was "so sprawling that it was most 
often described as 'ludicrous' or 'absurd,' " id. at 1, and that, in the other alternative, the second 
district 
sprawled all over eastern North Carolina and looked like a river with many tributaries run-
ning from Virginia in the north to Wilmington in the south. It would be exceedingly hard to 
campaign effectively in this area, or to represent it well, since in many areas it is only one 
precinct wide. 
Id. at 2. Thus, Republicans in North Carolina were no less willing to design highly contorted 
districts than the General Assembly was when the Assembly created District 12. Moreover, if 
these reasons are taken at face value, they suggest that the General Assembly sought to avoid 
extremely distorted districts and ended up with one only after the Department of Justice's denial 
of preclearance; these comments also suggest that designing a reasonably compact second minor-
ity district was considerably more difficult than the "strong" version of the facts assumes. Of 
course, whether the reasons the General Assembly offered should be taken at face value is a 
question that would require more detailed factual inquiry. 
Second, it is difficult to judge (from the record material we have seen) the basis on which the 
Justice Department concluded that a second, reasonably compact minority district could have 
been created in southeastern North Carolina. The only map proposing such a district we have 
been able to discover in the record is that which the NAACP submitted to the Justice Depart-
ment with a memorandum dated Oct. 29, 1991. This memorandum stated "[t]here are many 
ways that the population in the Southeast area of North Carolina can be configured to create 
another minority district. Our proposal is created to show that there is the possibility of the 
district." Memorandum from Samuel L. Walters, Assistant General Counsel, NAACP to 
George Harrison, Voting Rights Division, U.S. Department of Justice 1 (Oct. 29, 1991) (on file 
with authors). Yet this memorandum itself acknowledged that "(t]he map shows the district is 
not the most compact one ever created," id., and the proposed district would have had a popula-
tion (not voting-age population, as far as we can tell) that would have been 51.2% Black and 
8.4% American Indian. Id. at 2. Thus, even the district the NAACP proposed apparently de-
pended on aggregating minority populations to create a second minority-controlled district. 
Whether the VRA permits or requires such aggregation of minority groups, and under what 
circumstances, remains a major unresolved question. The Justice Department did not specify the 
particular location of the second district it had in mind and generally refrains from proposing 
detailed district designs that local governments must follow. While the Court understandably 
seems to have accepted the Justice Department's assertion that a reasonably compact second 
district could have been created - the "strong" version of the facts - the record material we 
have been able to review does not convincingly establish this conclusion. 
127. See supra text accompanying note 118. 
128. Shaw v. Barr, 808 F. Supp. 461 (E.D.N.C. 1992), appeal docketed, No. 92-357 (U.S. 
Aug. 25, 1992). 
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own.129 
This way of framing the issue assumes the state could have complied, 
but deliberately chose its own alternative. 
The factual ambiguity behind Shaw v. Reno suggests two quite dif-
ferent interpretations of the decision's reach. Because the Court seem-
ingly decided the case after assuming the strong version of the facts, 
Shaw might be read as addressing only similar factual contexts. That 
is, Shaw might stand for the more narrow proposition that a state 
must justify "highly irregular" minority districts under strict scrutiny 
when - and only when - the state could have created a reasonably 
compact minority district instead. If this reading is right, Shaw would 
tum out to be a case of minimal significance addressing only excep-
tional circumstances; it would have no impact on actual minority rep-
resentation. States would have to choose. more compact districts over 
extreme ones, but the number of minority districts in a state or nation-
wide would not be affected. This interpretation of the decision is con-
sistent with the actual question the Court purported to decide and 
assumes, as the Court seemingly did, the strong view of the facts. 
Alternatively, Shaw might stand for the broader proposition that, 
even when a state has no other way of creating a minority district, it 
cannot resort to "highly irregular" shapes to do so without other com-
pelling justifications. This reading, of course, would have far greater 
effect on minority districts throughout the country; precisely how 
great depends on the meaning courts give to "highly irregular," a 
question on which we offer guidance in Parts III and IV. Conceivably 
this question might be addressed on remand, for the state might seek 
to defend its district on the ground, in part, that no more significantly 
compact minority district could have been created. 
The facts the Court apparently assumed and the precise legal ques-
tion presented provide support for reading Shaw narrowly. But, as a 
predictive matter, we think it more likely the broader reading will pre-
vail. Particular factual contexts often influence the atmosphere in 
which the Court approaches major legal issues, but those precise facts 
are sometimes left behind as courts seize upon the broad legal princi-
ples the Court has seemingly laid down. In City of Richmond v. J.A. 
Croson Co., 130 for example, the atmosphere surrounding the Court's 
review of state affirmative action set-aside programs was certainly in-
fluenced by the fact, which the Court stressed,131 that black officials 
controlled Richmond's city council. Yet the racial composition of the 
129. 61 U.S.L.W. 3418 (Dec. 7, 1992). 
130. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
131. 488 U.S. at 495-96. 
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enacting body has become irrelevant as lower courts have taken 
Croson to establish broad constitutional principles for local set-aside 
programs. 132 
In the redistricting context, it seems unlikely that courts will read 
Shaw to distinguish between "bizarre" minority districts that are the 
only way to enhance minority representation and "bizarre" districts 
created where reapportionment bodies could have designed more com-
pact ones. Shaw emphasizes its own specific facts, but the decision is 
simultaneously written in broad rhetorical and legal terms. To the 
extent the decision is primarily focused on the social perceptions about 
politics and race that the Court views irregular race-conscious districts 
as generating, it seems yet more implausible that courts will distin-
guish necessarily irregular districts from more superfluous ones. 
Thus, we think it most likely courts will emphasize the broad themes 
of Shaw and apply it as a general constraint on "highly irregular" 
race-conscious districts. 
5. Does Shaw Apply to White Districts? 
In order to test this analysis, consider whether Shaw applies to dis-
tricts whose general or voting-age population is overwhelmingly white. 
Formalistically, and doctrinally, this might be viewed as an easy ques-
tion: equal protection cannot apply differently to white-dominated 
and black-dominated districts. Indeed, a defining trait of the current 
Court is its emerging commitment to the principle that the Equal 
Protection Clause cannot apply differently depending on the specific 
racial group that legislation benefits, burdens, or singles out. This vi-
sion informs the strict scrutiny standard adopted in City of Richmond 
v. J.A. Croson Co. 133 
Yet, in the redistricting context, this kind of formal equality seems 
particularly odd as well as inconsistent with any purposive, rather 
than formal, interpretation of Shaw. To begin with, Shaw does not 
recognize a general constitutional barrier to "highly irregular" dis-
tricts.134 Strict scrutiny is not required for districting that is "bizarre 
on its face," but only for districting that is "so bizarre on its face that 
it is 'unexplainable on grounds other than race.' " 135 
If we ask how best to give meaning to these principles when ap-
132. See., e.g., Contractors Assn. v. City of Philadelphia, Nos. 92-1880, 92-1887, 1993 U.S. 
App. LEXIS 25908, at *26-28 (3d Cir. Oct. 7, 1993). 
133. 488 U.S. 469 (1989). 
134. See supra text accompanying notes 51-57. 
135. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2825 (1993) (quoting Village of Arlington Heights v. 
Metropolitan Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 266 (1977)). 
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plied to white-controlled districts, the social and political contexts in 
which such districts are likely to arise suggest that Shaw might rarely, 
if at all, apply. Highly irregular, white-controlled districts might be 
created in three general contexts. First, they might be located in a 
state, like Iowa, that is overwhelmingly white. Conceivably, such a 
district might involve contorted boundaries for a number of reasons, 
including partisan advantage, incumbency protection, or enhancement 
of one local economic interest at the expense of others. Yet, by defini-
tion, the strange appearance of such a district could not be understood 
in racial terms, let alone only in racial terms. Thus, on its own terms, 
Shaw would not apply. 
Next, consider a similar district in a state with a significant black 
population, but where the oddly shaped white district is located in a 
region of the state far removed from where most black residents live. 
Congressional District 4, in Tennessee, appears to be such a district; it 
cuts a swath through the middle of the state and, as our quantitative 
analysis will show later, it is one of the most diffused districts in the 
country.136 Tennessee's voting-age population is 14.6% black, but 
largely concentrated in the southwestern part of the state, around 
Memphis. Thus, no plausible basis appears to exist for concluding 
that race explains this "highly irregular" district. Any district that 
might reasonably take its place, no matter how compact, would likely 
include a similar percentage of white voters. Under this scenario, the 
district might be odd, but not because it is "segregating" races. Again, 
on its own terms Shaw presumably would not apply; Tennessee would 
not have to defend this district under strict scrutiny. 
The third, more complicated, scenario would involve a highly ir-
regular district in a state with a significant black population or in a 
region in which such a population lives. If the state designs the dis-
trict with a racially discriminatory intent or if the district results in 
minority-vote dilution, it would be unlawful without regard to Shaw. 
But, if it is not unlawful on those grounds, could such a district plausi-
bly generate the perception that it has been designed for racial rea-
sons? In the absence of illegal minority-vote dilution, this scenario is 
factually unlikely because numerous nonracial reasons might account 
for the district's irregular shape. However base or noble the motiva-
tions of partisan manipulation, incumbency protection, and the like 
might be, they are not racial motivations. Nor are whites likely to 
benefit, as whites, from contorted district shapes that do not have the 
effect of diluting minority votes. In other words, when people see "bi-
136. See infra Table 3. 
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zarrely shaped," white-dominated districts - and no illegal vote dilu-
tion is taking place - are they likely to perceive those districts as 
extremist creations in the name of race, at least as Shaw understands 
that concept?137 
The important general point here is that many reasons might ex-
plain oddly shaped white-dominated districts. Yet similar black-domi-
nated districts are more likely to reflect a single, recurring aim: to 
enhance effective minority representation. This asymmetry is a func-
tion of the social realities of race in this country and of the existence of 
the VRA. Whites do not need to be concentrated into districts to as-
sure their effective political participation; in contrast, as the VRA rec-
ognizes, minorities might need effective control over some "safe" 
districts to avoid their submergence in a hostile majority. 
In terms of applying Shaw, this means that, in principle or in ac-
tual fact, Shaw is unlikely to affect white districts. Only in the third 
scenario is Shaw potentially relevant, and, even there, it seems unlikely 
that courts will find race to be the basis for contorted majority-domi-
nated districts (in the absence of actual vote dilution). This result 
might seem an obvious corollary of the "similarly situated" require-
ment of equal protection: given social realities, black and white dis-
tricts rarely, if ever, arise in similar circumstances. But courts, 
including the Supreme Court, might find it difficult to embrace this 
conclusion directly. To announce that Shaw constrains only the 
choices of policymakers designing minority-controlled districts is, at 
the least, awkward, particularly for a Court committed to formal 
equality. Yet the logic of Shaw itself would seem to dictate such a 
conclusion. 
* * * 
We are now in a position to summarize the purposes and principles 
that underlie Shaw. Government cannot redistrict in a way that con-
veys the social impression that race consciousness has overridden all 
other, traditionally relevant redistricting values. In the Court's view, 
certain districts whose appearance is exceptionally "bizarre" and "ir-
regular" suggest that impression. Plaintiffs need not establish that 
they suffer material harm, in the sense of vote dilution, from such a 
district. Shaw is fundamentally concerned with expressive harms: the 
137. Conceivably, there might be situations in which boundaries were intentionally manipu· 
lated to deny blacks potential influence that would still not amount to illegal vote dilution. If 
there are ever such circumstances that do not violate the VRA itself, Shaw's logic would sensibly 
extend to these contexts. 
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social messages government conveys when race concerns appear to 
submerge all other legitimate redistricting values. 
Identifying these principles is one task; giving meaningful content 
to them is another. The "special harms" which concern the Shaw 
Court arise only when some threshold of distorted district "appear-
ance" has been crossed. But how is that threshold to be recognized? 
If Shaw is fundamentally concerned with social perceptions, can legal 
criteria be developed to discipline the inquiry - of courts and reap-
portionment bodies -into these perceptions? Alternatively, are these 
expressive harms so inarticulable and unquantifiable that courts must 
be left to apply their intuitive judgments in an ad hoc, case-by-case 
fashion? 
In Part II, we describe previous efforts of courts to give content to · 
similar requirements governing election-district shape. The unpromis-
ing history of these efforts suggests the need for an alternative ap-
proach. In Part III, we develop quantitative standards for judging 
district appearance and thereby giving content to Shaw's principles. 
II. COMPACTNESS UNDER STATE LAW AND THE 
VOTING RIGHTS ACT 
Shaw raises the issue of district compactness in an unusual - in-
deed, singular - legal context: the constraints the U.S. Constitution 
imposes on the appearance of legislative districts. As noted earlier, 
Shaw is the first case to suggest such a constraint as a matter of federal 
constitutional law.138 Issues of district compactness139 have arisen in 
138. See supra text accompanying note 6. 
139. Nothing in the Constitution itself requires the states to create congressional districts. 
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2. Indeed, in the first elections after ratification, the majority of new 
states held at-large congressional elections. Only Massachusetts, New York, Maryland, Virginia, 
and South Carolina were organized into representative districts. There is evidence that at least 
some of the Framers expected the states to create districts and intended the Time, Place, and 
Manner Clause of Article I, Section 4 to act as a brake against factional districting by state 
legislatures. ANDREW HACKER, CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTING: THE ISSUE OF EQUAL REPRE-
SENTATION 8-10 (1963). For example, James Madison approvingly asserted in THE FEDERALIST 
No. 56, at 379-80 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961): "Divide the largest state into ten 
or twelve districts, and it will be found that there will be no peculiar local interest ... which will 
not be within the knowledge of the representative of the district." Similarly, Alexander 
Hamilton stated at the New York ratifying convention: "The natural and proper mode of hold-
ing elections will be to divide the state into districts in proportion to the number to be elected." 
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, First Speech of June 21 in the New York Ratifying Convention, in 
SELECTED WRITINGS AND SPEECHES OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON (Morton J. Frisch ed., 1985), 
quoted in CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERL y INC., JIGSA w POLITICS: SHAPING THE HOUSE AFTER 
THE 1990 CENSUS 6 (1990) (alteration in original). 
As of 1840, nine of the 31 states continued to elect representatives at large. In response to the 
frequent occurrence of a majority party's sweeping an entire state delegation in at-large states, 
Congress invoked the Time, Place, and Manner Clause to pass the Reapportionment Act of 1842, 
ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491. That Act required, for the first time, that representatives "shall be elected by 
districts composed of contiguous territory equal in number to the number of Representatives" for 
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two other legal contexts, however, and judicial experience from these 
other settings provides a starting point for considering the ways courts 
might implement Shaw. 
First, twenty-five states, through state constitutions or statutes, re-
quire compact legislative districts. 140 In practice, these requirements 
have been largely ineffective. 141 Second, the VRA itself, as interpreted 
in Thornburg v. Gingles, 142 requires proof that a reasonably compact 
minority district could be created in order to establish substantive lia-
bility.143 Although only a few decisions have addressed this aspect of 
Gingles, the VRA cases provide useful additional information concern-
ing judicial implementation of compactness standards. This experi-
ence also suggests that, absent quantitative guidelines, judicial efforts 
to give content to compactness requirements are likely to be inconsis-
tent, ad hoc, and unpredictable. 
Neither of these experiences suggests that easy solutions will be 
forthcoming to Justice White's concern that Shaw is unworkable. 144 
Recent developments in both technology and the social sciences, how-
ever, offer a principled and judicially administrable way out of this 
new redistricting "thicket."145 That path involves embracing quanti-
each state. Reapportionment Act of 1842, ch. 47, 5 Stat. 491. Despite the Act, New Hampshire, 
Georgia, Mississippi, and Missouri conducted their 1842 elections under at·large systems; over 
protests, Congress seated all the members of these states. CONGRESSIONAL QUARTERLY INC., 
supra, at 18. 
In 1901, Congress added a compactness requirement to the Act, Reapportionment Act of 
1911, ch. 5, § 3, 37 Stat. 13, 14; Reapportionment Act of 1901, ch. 93, § 3, 31 Stat. 733, 734, but 
this requirement was soon dropped. Reapportionment Act of 1929, ch. 28, § 2a, 46 Stat. 21, 26. 
See generally Steve Bickerstaff, Reapportionment by State Legislatures: A Guide for the 1980s, 34 
Sw. L.J. 607, 610-11 (1980) (describing Congress's failure to pass a reapportionment act after the 
1920 Census, thus delaying reapportionment until passage of the federal Reapportionment Act of 
1929). The compactness requirement has never been revived. See Wood v. Broom, 287 U.S. I 
(1932) (interpreting the federal Reapportionment Act of 1929 to repeal compactness require-
ment); cf. Franklin v. Massachusetts, 112 S. Ct. 2767, 2771 (1992) (discussing the passage of the 
Reapportionment Act of 1929). Today, only the seven states that are entitled to a single repre-
sentative-Alaska, Delaware, Montana, North Dakota, South Dakota, Vermont, am: Wyoming 
- hold at-large congressional elections. For a good overview of congressional reapportionment 
acts, see Emanuel Celler, Congressional Apportionment - Past, Present, and Future, 17 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 268 (1952). 
140. Grofman, Criteria for Districting, supra note 7, at 85. In Hawaii, Iowa, Missouri, 
Montana, Virginia, West Virginia, and Wyoming, state compactness requirements apply to con-
gressional redistricting. See LARRY M. EIG & MICHAEL v. SEITZINGER, CONGRESSIONAL RE· 
SEARCH SERVICE, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS CONCERNING 
CONGRESSIONAL AND STATE LEGISLATIVE REDISTRICTING, CRS Rep. No. 81-143A (June 7, 
1981) (citing statutes and constitutions from Hawaii, Iowa, Missouri, Montana, Virginia, West 
Virginia, and Wyoming); see, e.g .• Shayer v. Kirkpatrick, 541 F. Supp. 922, 931-32 (W.D. Mo.), 
affd., 456 U.S. 966 (1982). 
141. See infra text accompanying notes 149-55. 
142. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
143. See supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
144. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2842 (1993) (White, J., dissenting). 
145. Justice Frankfurter coined the phrase "political thicket" in Colegrove v. Green, 328 
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tative measures of "district appearance" that social scientists and stat-
isticians have developed in recent years. 
A. State Compactness Requirements 
Nearly all of the twenty-five states that require compact districts 
express this requirement in qualitative terms. Many provisions simply 
require that districts be "compact," often in a ritualistic trilogy like 
the following from the Illinois Constitution: districts must be "com-
pact, contiguous and substantially equal in population."146 In other 
states, this language is modified by provisions requiring that districts 
be as "compact as possible," as "compact as practicable," or "reason-
ably compact."147 Just two states, Iowa and Colorado, express com-
pactness requirements in specific quantitative formulas. 148 
With respect to both reapportionment practice and judicial deci-
sionmaking, these requirements have been ineffective. The require-
ments seem to be infrequently litigated; when they are, state courts 
have been reluctant to enforce them, expressing extreme deference to 
political bodies. To be sure, a few courts have overturned redistricting 
plans on state law compactness grounds. 149 Not surprisingly, perhaps, 
U.S. 549, 556 (1946), and it has continued to accompany virtually all judicial entries into new 
issues surrounding redistricting. See generally Peter H. Schuck, The Thickest Thicket: Partisan 
Gerrymandering and Judicial Regulation of Politics, 87 CoLUM. L. REV. 1325 (1987). 
146. ILL. CONST. art. IV, § 3(a). 
147. See, e.g., MICH. CONST. art. IV,§ 2 (requiring state senatorial districts to be drawn "as 
rectangular in shape as possible"); Mo. CONST. art. III, § 5 (mandating that state senate districts 
be "of contiguous territory, as compact and nearly equal in population as may be"); N.Y. CONST. 
art. III, § 5 (requiring assembly districts to be drawn "in as compact form as practicable"). For 
a full survey of state compactness requirements, see Grofman, Criteria for Districting, supra note 
7, at 177 tbl. 3. 
148. One of the two compactness standards that the Iowa legislature adopted in 1980 is 
expressed as "the ratio of the dispersion of population about the population center of the district 
to the dispersion of population about the geographic center of the district." IOWA CODE ANN. 
§ 42.4(1)(c) (West 1991). Colorado's Constitution provides a compactness measure based on the 
sum of the perimeters of district boundaries. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 47. 
149. The leading recent state case is probably Schrage v. State Bd. of Elections, 430 N.E.2d 
483 (Ill. 1981 ). The case is particularly significant because the court found a compactness viola-
tion with respect to the design of a single state district. More commonly, state courts that strike 
down redistricting plans do so on the ground that the plan as a whole, rather than an isolated 
district, violates state law requirements. Schrage was the first case in Illinois history to strike 
down a districting plan for violating the state constitution's compactness requirement. A year 
later, the court in Martin v. Soucie, 441 N.E.2d 131 (Ill. App. Ct. 1982), relied upon Schrage to 
defeat an apportionment plan for county board elections. 
For other state cases finding violations of state law compactness requirements, see Preisler v. 
Doherty, 284 S.W.2d 427 (Mo. 1955) (invalidating state senatorial redistricting of the City of St. 
Louis); State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock, 146 S.W. 40 (Mo. 1912) (invalidating entire Missouri 
state senatorial apportionment on constitutional compactness and population equality failings); 
In re Sherill, 81 N.E. 124 (N.Y. 1907) (invalidating entire 51-district New York state senatorial 
apportionment on grounds that two districts failed to meet constitutional compactness and popu-
lation equality requirements); In re Livingston, 160 N.Y.S. 462 (Sup. Ct. 1916) (voiding appor-
tionment of assembly districts within a senate district). 
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the state courts in the two states, Iowa and Colorado, that embody 
compactness standards quantitatively are among the few courts to 
have found compactness violations.1so Generally, however, state 
courts purport to enforce these requirements while signaling that they 
will seriously scrutinize only dramatic departures from the require-
ments. Often, courts will not invalidate individually noncompact dis-
tricts unless they find the entire districting plan to be insufficiently 
compact.1s1 In addition, when state courts do confront challenges to 
district compactness, they typically rely on their own intuitive visual 
assessments - even when the parties have presented expert testimony 
analyzing districts through quantitative measures.1s2 
This article provides quantitative information that bolsters the 
sense one gets from reading the caselaw that qualitative compactness 
standards have little practical effect. Using social-scientific methods 
that we describe and justify later in this article, we have compared the 
compactness of U.S. House of Representatives districts in the 1980s 
and 1990s in those states that legally require compact congressional 
districts with those that do not. Table 1 presents these results. 
150. See Acker v. Love, 496 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1972); In re Legislative Districting of Gen. 
Assembly, 193 N.W.2d 784, 791 (Iowa 1972). 
151. See, e.g .. Preisler v. Kirkpatrick, 528 S.W.2d 422, 426-27 (Mo. 1975) (finding all but 
two districts to be within compactness requirements and holding that "considering the overall, 
state-wide plan developed ... the districts established substantially comply with the compactness 
requirement" of the Missouri Constitution); Opinion to the Governor, 221 A.2d 799 (R.I. 1966) 
(finding districting plan valid absent "a complete departure from the requirement for compact· 
ness") (advisory opinion). See generally Grofman, Criteria for Districting, supra note 7, at 86. 
152. A typical example is the recent decision of the Virginia Supreme Court in Jamerson v. 
Womack, 423 S.E.2d 180 (Va. 1992). There the plaintiffs challenged, on compactness grounds, 
two state senate districts, at least one of which was designed to be a majority-black district. The 
court acknowledged that one of the districts was longer than any other in the state and that the 
enacted plan split more counties than other plans the legislature had considered. At trial, each 
side offered expert testimony on the compactness of the districts and plan. On appeal, the 
Virginia Supreme Court did not evaluate this testimony or engage in any analysis of the quantita· 
tive measures presented. Instead, the court found it sufficient that the expert testimony was in 
conflict and that the trier of fact had accepted one side's testimony. 423 S.E.2d at 186. 
Similarly, in Schrage v. State Bd. of Elections, 430 N.E.2d 483 (Ill. 1981), the Illinois 
Supreme Court chose to "rely on a visual examination of the questioned district as other courts 
have done,'' finding that "a more precise measurement is unnecessary." 430 N.E.2d at 487; cf. /11 
re Legislative Districting of the State, 475 A.2d 428, 437 (Md. 1984) ("With the possible excep· 
tion of Colorado ... no jurisdiction has defined or applied the compactness requirement in 
geometric terms. On the contrary, most jurisdictions have concluded that the constitutional 
compactness requirement, in a state legislative redistricting context, is a relative rather than an 
absolute standard.") (citation omitted). 
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TABLE 1 
COMPACTNESS OF U.S. HOUSE DISTRICTS IN 1980s AND 1990s BY 























Note: States with only one congressional representative are excluded. Hawaii, Iowa, Missouri, 
Montana, Virginia, West Virginia and Wyoming require compactness for congressional districts. 
Montana in the 1990s and Wyoming in both decades are excluded as single-district states. 
For present purposes, it is sufficient to know that the quantitative 
measures of district compactness in Table 1 vary from 0.0 to 1.0, with 
more compact districts scoring higher on this scale. As Table 1 
reveals, there appears to be no meaningful difference, either in the 
1980s or the 1990s, between the compactness of congressional districts 
in states that legally require it and those that do not.154 This result 
suggests that redistricting bodies do not take compactness into ac-
count any more when it is legally required, and that courts have not 
been willing to enforce such requirements in ways that affect 
outcomes. 
The number of states that require compactness of congressional 
districts is small; hence, conclusions based on these data must be ten-
tative.155 Nevertheless, the best inference from the available informa-
tion is that, as presently enforced, qualitative state compactness 
requirements do little to stimulate greater regularity in congressional 
district shapes. 
153. Information provided by Election Data Services, Inc. 
154. Only the perimeter measure in the 1980s shows enough of a difference to be possibly 
meaningful. We discuss this measure infra at text accompanying notes 202-04. 
155. With so few states requiring compactness, individual cases could greatly influence the 
results. Hawaii's ·districts are relatively noncompact because they are artifacts of the unusual 
geography (island composition); balancing this extreme, perhaps, are Iowa's relatively compact 
districts based, in part, on its rather square shape. 
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B. Compactness Requirements Under the Voting Rights Act 
Legal requirements that districts be compact also arise under the 
VRA. 156 The Court has yet to give this requirement much specific 
content. Last Term, however, in another significant voting-rights 
case, Grawe v. Emison, 157 the Court intimated that state and local ju-
risdictions, as well as lower courts, were paying insufficient attention 
to compactness. Grawe might suggest that the Court is likely to return 
soon to the requirement of compactness under the VRA.158 
Even before the Supreme Court's focus on compactness last Term, 
questions of appropriate district shape were becoming increasingly im-
portant in the lower courts. 159 Under the VRA, compactness arises 
both as an element of plaintiffs' claims and as a defense put forward by 
jurisdictions. Compactness concerns can also arise at both the liability 
and remedial stages of litigation. To date, only a handful of federal 
courts have addressed these issues; like the state courts, those that 
have done so have relied on intuitive, eyeball assessments rather than 
quantitative standards. The decisions display considerable 
inconsistency.160 
At one pole, some courts have viewed the governmental interest in 
enhancing minority representation as sufficient in and of itself to jus-
tify contorted district shapes. The leading example is Dillard v. 
156. See Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 50-51 (1986). 
157. 113 S. Ct. 1075 (1993). 
158. In Grawe, a federal district court, after having appointed a special master, had crafted a 
redistricting plan for Minnesota's state senate. In overturning that decision, the Supreme Court 
described the one state senate district, which the district court had believed the VRA required, as 
an "oddly shaped creation." The Court also characterized as "dubious" the district court's as· 
sumption that this district was "geographically compact" under Gingles. 113 S. Ct. at 1085. The 
Court described this district, Senate District 59, as "stretching from south Minneapolis, around 
the downtown area, and then into the northern part of the city in order to link minority popula· 
tions." 113 S. Ct. at 1083. In total population figures, the district was 43% black and 60% 
minority. 113 S. Ct. at 1083. Because the Court overturned the district court's judgment on 
other grounds, these comments are dicta, but they might nonetheless be suggestive. 
159. See generally Pamela S. Karlan, Maps and Misreadings: The Role of Geographic 
Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 173, 199 (1989) 
("Geographic concerns played only a minor role in the legislative history of amended Section 2. 
In the past two years, however, geographic compactness has moved to the forefront of vote 
dilution litigation .... ") (footnote omitted). 
160. In these cases, the courts sometimes discuss compactness in isolation and sometimes in 
terms of the appropriate trade-offs between it and other values. When courts treat compactness 
as the sole variable, they frame the judicial inquiry as whether districts are "sufficiently com-
pact." When courts consider the appropriate trade-offs between shape and other relevant redis-
tricting values - for example, avoidance of vote dilution, compactness, preservation of 
communities of interest - the question is what degree of compactness is consistent with other 
legitimate redistricting policies. 
Although the way the question is framed initially may have some effect on shifting burdens of 
evidentiary production, ultimately these two approaches amount to the same inquiry. Whether a 
district is "sufficiently" compact, for example, is largely a function of how one weighs the value 
of compactness against competing districting values. 
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Baldwin County Board of Education, 161 in which the court rejected the 
county's argument that a proposed majority-minority school board 
district would be "too elongated and curvaceous."162 The court ex-
plained that compactness "does not mean that a proposed district 
must meet, or attempt to achieve, some aesthetic absolute, such as 
symmetry or attractiveness."163 Thus, the court accepted plaintiffs' 
proposed districting plan for the county board of education, even 
though it included this narrow, elongated district. 164 Other courts 
have taken a comparative approach. They hold minority-controlled 
districts that "look rather strange" to be nonetheless sufficiently com-
pact when they "are not materially stranger in shape than at least 
some of the districts contained" in a jurisdiction's current districting 
plan.16s 
At the other extreme, some courts decline to find substantive VRA 
liability when the only possible minority-controlled districts are, in the 
court's view, insufficiently compact. Thus, one federal court recently 
rejected a proposed district as "an odd contortion" that "reaches 
down to get a pocket of white voters in the south-east-central part of 
the county and then curves around to the west and then back to the 
north-east comer of the county .... " 166 Rhetorically asking, "does a 
legislative body have to draw lines in a distorted way?" the court an-
swered "no."167 Similarly, another federal court recently rejected a 
VRA challenge to a county supervisory district in which the plaintiffs' 
proposed plan joined black residents from three distinct municipalities 
into a single district. The court concluded that "[t]his exercise results 
in extreme gerrymandering," with the district being "drawn in an unu-
sual or illogical manner."16s 
Courts also merge the definition of compactness into other relevant 
districting criteria, such as whether the district preserves a "commu-
161. 686 F. Supp. 1459 (M.D. Ala. 1988). 
162. 686 F. Supp. at 1466. 
163. 686 F. Supp. at 1465. Not anticipating Shaw, the court went on to add that "[a]n 
aesthetic norm" would be "an unworkable concept, resulting in arbitrary and capricious results, 
because it offers no guidance as to when it is met." 686 F. Supp. at 1465-66. 
164. The court also noted that the county's proposed plan contained a similarly shaped dis-
trict, and that the board's superintendent had testified that the district posed no administrative or 
other problems. 686 F. Supp. at 1466. 
165. Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196, 207 (E.D. Ark. 1989); see also Neal v. Coleburn, 
689 F. Supp. 1426, 1437 (E.D. Va. 1988) (stating that asymmetrical districts are acceptable when 
"in line with the configurations of electoral districts that have been approved in other cases"). 
166. Bryant v. Lawrence County, 814 F. Supp. 1346, 1350 (S.D. Miss. 1993). The court also 
concluded that the plaintiffs drew the proposed districts "without regard to natural geographic 
boundaries, [or] splitting of precincts." 814 F. Supp. at 1350. 
167. 814 F. Supp. at 1351. 
168. Clark v. Calhoun County, 813 F. Supp. 1189, 1198 (N.D. Miss. 1993). 
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nity of interest" or enables "effective representation." Yet, even when 
courts merge these inquiries, the decisions continue to conflict. For 
example, the Dillard court said "a district would not be sufficiently 
compact if it [were] so spread out that there was no sense of commu-
nity"169 and then went on to accept a narrow district that stretched 
most of a county's length. In contrast, the court in East Jefferson 
Coalition for Leadership and Development v. Jefferson Parish 170 
adopted a similar "recognizable community" definition of compact-
ness, 171 but, in applying the standard, it held that a thirty-five-sided 
district that crossed the Mississippi River failed to meet the standard. 
The failure to create this district, therefore, did not constitute a VRA 
violation. 112 
Different federal courts have also interpreted compactness require-
ments inconsistently with respect to the same geographic features. A 
recurring issue is whether minority areas in different regions can be 
joined through corridorlike connections. One court rejected a district-
ing plan that connected two black populations by a "long, narrow cor-
ridor." The court labeled this "unacceptable 'gerrymandering' " that 
"arbitrarily cuts diagonally through the center of the county." 173 But 
another court explicitly approved a "corridor" between black popula-
tions, concluding that it was "not unreasonably irregular in shape, 
169. Dillard v. Baldwin County Bd. of Educ., 686 F. Supp. 1459, 1466 (M.D. Ala. 1988) 
(noting that a district would have "no sense of community ... if its members and its representa· 
tives could not effectively and efficiently stay in touch with each other; or •.. if its members and 
its representatives could not easily tell who actually lived within the district"). 
170. 691 F. Supp. 991 (E.D. La. 1988). 
171. "A proposed district is sufficiently compact if it retains a natural sense of community. 
To retain that sense of community, a district should not be so convoluted that its representative 
could not easily tell who actually lives in the district." 691 F. Supp. at 1007. 
This principle appears similar to one that Bernard Grofman has recently advanced under the 
label of "cognizability": 
I wish to argue that districts can be so far from cognizable that they violate what we might 
think of as a due process component of equal protection by damaging the potential for "fair 
and effective representation." By "cognizability," I mean the ability to characterize the 
district boundaries in a manner that can be readily communicated to ordinary citizens of the 
district in commonsense terms based on geographical referents .... 
Egregious violations of the cognizability principle can be identified by making use of 
standard criteria of districting, such as violation of natural geographic boundaries, grossly 
unnecessary splittings of local subunit boundaries (such as city and county lines), and sun· 
derings of proximate and contiguous natural communities of interests. 
Grofman, Vince Lombardi, supra note 7, at 1262-63 (footnotes omitted). Grofman acknowledges 
that he does not yet have a clear operational test for noncognizability, which he recognizes is 
especially problematic because cognizability is best thought of as a continuum. Id. at 1262. 
172. 691 F. Supp. at 1007. The court nonetheless did invalidate Jefferson Parish's unusual 
council-election scheme, which was not used anywhere else in Louisiana, on other grounds. 691 
F. Supp. at 994 n.2, 1008. 
173. Potter v. Washington County, 653 F. Supp. 121, 130 (N.D. Fla. 1986). 
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given the population dispersal within the County."174 
Whether any of these federal court decisions merely appear to be 
in tension with each other, or directly conflict, cannot be determined 
without an intensely local appraisal of each geographic context. At 
the least, however, these decisions, and others like them, 175 reveal con-
siderable uncertainty as to how courts and other bodies interpret and 
weigh compactness against other relevant redistricting values. This is 
not surprising: compactness is the conceptual point at which the ten-
sion between the traditional American commitment to territorial dis-
tricting and the VRA concern for fair representation of group interests 
must be resolved.176 
The appropriate trade-off between enhancing minority representa-
tion and respecting the interests reflected in a territorial-based district-
ing system is both elusive and an issue of considerable political and 
174. Neal v. Coleburn, 689 F. Supp. 1426, 1437 (E.D. Va. 1988). 
175. See. e.g., Magnolia Bar Assn. v. Lee, 793 F. Supp. 1386 (S.D. Miss. 1992) (finding no 
§ 2 violation in Mississippi judicial redistricting, partially on grounds that majority-minority dis-
tricts could not be drawn without splitting counties), ajfd., 994 F.2d 1143 (5th Cir. 1993); Wesch 
v. Hunt, 785 F. Supp. 1491, 1499 (S.D. Ala.) (adopting a court-decreed plan that creates a major-
ity-African-American congressional district for Alabama without "extensive gerrymandering"), 
ajfd. sub nom. Camp v. Wesch, 112 S. Ct. 1926 (1992), and ajfd. sub nom. Figures v. Hunt, 113 
S. Ct. 1233 (1993); Burton v. Sheheen, 793 F. Supp. 1329, 1356 (D.S.C. 1992) ("[I)n light of§ 2's 
strong national mandate ... a district is sufficiently geographically compact if it allows for effec-
tive representation."); Gunn v. Chickasaw County, 705 F. Supp. 315, 322-23 (N.D. Miss. 1989) 
(rejecting proposed remedial plan partially on grounds that it did not give proper consideration 
to existing political subdivisions and cohesive neighborhoods); Carstens v. Lamm, 543 F. Supp. 
68 (D. Colo. 1982) (fashioning a court-decreed congressional redistricting plan for Colorado); 
Rybicki v. State Bd. of Elections, 574 F. Supp. 1082, 1097 (N.D. Ill. 1982) (refusing to invalidate 
the Illinois General Assembly's districting plan as "noncompact" partially on grounds that plain-
tiffs' proposed plan contained similarly noncompact districts). 
176. This tension is also apparent in the district court cases. Some courts tend to treat the 
VRA as creating an affirmative duty to draw majority-minority districts when reasonably possi-
ble. See, e.g., DeGrandy v. Wetherell, 794 F. Supp. 1076, 1085 (N.D. Fla. 1992) ("[W)e con-
clude that 'the law supports the drawing of a minority district where, in light of minority 
concentrations and community of interests, such a district can reasonably be drawn.' ") (quoting 
Report of the Special Master at 14 (May 18, 1992)), cert. granted sub nom. Johnson v. De 
Grandy, 113 S. Ct. 2437 (1993); Jeffers v. Clinton, 730 F. Supp. 196, 205 (E.D. Ark. 1989) ("If 
•.. reasonably compact and contiguous majority-black districts could have been drawn, and if 
racial cohesiveness in voting is so great that ... black voters' preferences for black candidates are 
frustrated ... the outlines of a Section 2 theory are made out."), ajfd., 498 U.S. 1019 (1991). 
Several recent decisions, however, have emphatically denied any duty on the part of the legis-
lature to maximize minority political representation. See, e.g., Teague v. Attala County, 807 F. 
Supp. 392, 404 (N.D. Miss. 1992) ("The Voting Rights Act never was intended as a vehicle for 
creating 'safe' black or other minority seats."); Nash v. Blunt, 797 F. Supp. 1488, 1496 (W.D. 
Mo. 1992) ("[W)e do not believe Congress intended the Act to require maximum representa-
tion."), ajfd. sub nom. African Am. Voting Rights Legal Defense Fund, Inc. v. Plunt, 113 S. Ct. 
1809 (1993); Turner v. Arkansas, 784 F. Supp. 553, 573 (E.D. Ark. 1991) (Section 2 of the VRA 
"is not violated ... simply because [a) legislature does not enact a districting plan that maximizes 
black political power or influence."), ajfd., 112 S. Ct. 2296 (1992). 
According to a former Assistant Attorney General, Civil Rights Division, "[t)here is one 
thing the Civil Rights Division does not do: It does not require, because the law does not re-
quire, the maximization of minority representation.'' Dunne, supra note 38, at 1128. 
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philosophical conflict. In the absence of some guidelines for making 
this trade-off, the likely result will be increasingly inconsistent judicial 
decisions and manipulative uses of the VRA by districting bodies. 
One alternative is to develop quantitative approaches for evaluating 
district appearance. In Part III, we turn to that task. 
III. DEFINING DISTRICT APPEARANCE CONSISTENTLY 
Recent developments in both theory and technology now make it 
possible to evaluate district "appearances" in a systematic and consis-
tent way. Quantitative information can now be generated concerning 
different aspects of an election district's shape, including how much its 
borders meander and how much the area it covers is concentrated or 
diffused. In this Part, we show how such quantitative measures pro-
vide a better alternative to judging district "compactness" than the 
intuitive approaches courts used before Shaw. In addition, Shaw ele-
vates the stakes considerably in the search for a workable means of 
defining "irregular" districts, for, with a constraint of this sort consti-
tutionally enshrined, judicial power over the politics of redistricting is 
potentially expansive, undisciplined, and explosive. Quantitative 
measures for assessing election-district shapes provide perhaps the 
most promising approach to turning Shaw into a set of relatively clear 
and principled guidelines. 
The theory of Shaw makes social perceptions about district appear-
ance central. This might suggest that these social perceptions are 
what we should seek to quantify. Nonetheless, for several reasons, we 
focus instead on district appearance itself. Although we believe the 
impulse behind Shaw ultimately rests on judicial concerns for social 
perceptions, we believe those concerns must necessarily operate at a 
general level, rather than forming the basis for concrete decisions re-
garding particular districts. That is, Shaw is not_ likely to become a 
transmission belt through which social perceptions are directly re-
layed, case by case, into constitutional doctrine. The spectre of legal 
decisions turning on public opinion surveys is no more appealing here 
than in other areas in which legal doctrine is nonetheless responsive, in 
a general sense, to social perceptions. The problem is not just the 
unadministrability of any legal standard grounded on such vaporous 
foundations. More importantly, the relevant social perceptions would 
have to be ones the legal system could legitimately credit; only percep-
tions that are properly informed, for example, and generated under 
normatively appropriate conditions could plausibly be relevant. Thus, 
the relevant social perceptions would have to reflect acceptance of gov-
erning law, such as the VRA itself, as well as awareness of relevant 
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general facts, such as, perhaps, the way in which redistricting rou-
tinely operates. 
As a result, courts implementing Shaw cannot treat social percep-
tions as a brute fact on which to ground decisions, even if we could 
measure those perceptions accurately. Courts must inevitably play the 
more active role of attributing normativity to certain perceptions; in 
the mediating legal language typically used in such contexts, courts 
must decide which social perceptions to deem "reasonable." Ordinary 
observers, for example, might recoil at the shape of many or most con-
gressional districts today, but Shaw does not penetrate this deeply into 
the foundations of current politics. Shaw is designed to deal with ab-
errational contexts, not routine ones - with "highly irregular" and 
"bizarre" districts, not common ones. Courts will have to determine 
legitimately and consistently when this line can be said to have been 
crossed. 
Shaw thus sets into motion constitutional doctrine ultimately con-
cerned with social perceptions and collective understandings, but a 
doctrine that courts must necessarily implement with some critical 
perspective on these perceptions. At the moment, there appear to be 
two alternative methods by which courts might take on this role. The 
first is for courts to evolve, on a case-by-case basis, a series of qualita-
tive judgments concerning when districts are sufficiently "irregular" to 
trigger strict scrutiny. In the context of redistricting, this common 
law evolutive approach poses multiple dangers. Individual judges do 
not confront enough redistricting cases to be likely to develop suffi-
ciently informed intuitions about the broader pattern of district 
shapes. If left to their untutored qualitative assessments, judges are 
likely to render inconsistent and unpredictable decisions, as has oc-
curred with previous efforts to enforce compactness standards. Yet 
the costs of uncertainty in this area are particularly high. Redistrict-
ing forces on ,all sides will struggle to exploit any uncertainties for 
political gain. Fomenting yet more litigation and further delaying the 
time at which plans become effective create additional costs. 
The second alternative for implementing Shaw - the quantitative 
approach we develop here - is more promising, not just for imple-
menting Shaw, but for other, related purposes. First, Shaw requires 
that values associated with district appearance be judicially separated 
from other relevant redistricting concerns; district appearance triggers 
strict scrutiny, after which jurisdictions must offer sufficient justifica-
tions to account for "highly irregular" shapes. To implement this 
framework, district appearances must therefore be separated, at least 
initially, from other districting values. Before Shaw, many commenta-
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tors had resisted treating appearance or compactness as of any intrin-
sic value; compactness might be associated with relevant substantive 
districting values, like preserving communities that shared common 
political interests, but commentators viewed compactness as a poor 
proxy for those values. 177 Similarly, commentators disagreed as to 
whether a requirement of compactness is an important instrumental 
prophylactic against partisan and other forms of gerrymandering. 178 
177. Commentators have generally argued that compact districting directly advances three 
principal values: enhanced communication between representatives and constituents; greater 
voter knowledge of their representatives and of their political "neighbors"; and greater trust in 
the legitimacy of a political system in which districts appear "fairly" shaped - or, at least, not 
obviously unfairly shaped. 
With respect to the first value, some have argued that technological changes - such as tele-
phones, modem highway systems, fax machines, and the like - considerably undermine the 
relationship between compactness and effective communication. See, e.g., CAIN, supra note 7, at 
32-33. At the same time, communication still often takes place in group contexts, with legisla-
tors meeting all manner of boards, committees, organizations, governmental bodies, and so on. 
Compact districts might facilitate communication because they are likely to hold in check the 
number of such groups. Empirical evidence on this question is slim. "Community-based" dis-
tricts make it more likely that constituents can identify their congressmen, though this result 
does not necessarily mean that such districts encourage better communication. Richard G. 
Niemi et al., The Effects of Congruity Between Community and District Congruity on Salience of 
U.S. House Candidates, 11 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 187 (1986). There is, of course, no guarantee that 
compact districts enhance communication, but the question is whether there is any meaningful 
tendency in this direction. 
With respect to voter knowledge, the above study suggests, not surprisingly, that constituents 
are more likely to know the names of their congressmen when the lines of districts and "natural" 
communities coincide. See id. at 187-88 (citing studies). At the same time, "meaningful" and 
compact districts are not necessarily the same. When cities or other political subdivisions are 
themselves noncompact, requiring compact districting would be at odds with this very concern. 
Sea Grofman, Vince Lombardi, supra note 7, at 1263 (advocating a "cognizability," rather than a 
compactness, standard). 
Finally, with regard to the claimed relationship between compactness and political legiti-
macy, critics have argued the public knows so little about districting that any such effect can be 
safely ignored. See CAIN, supra note 7, at 188-91. Shaw, however, with its evident concern about 
social perceptions, appears to reject this argument. 
Of course, to the extent that departures from compactness are necessary to promote other 
values, such as enhancing fair and effective minority representation, a complete assessment of 
compactness must weigh the costs of departing from it against whatever values it might intrinsi-
cally serve. Cain writes: 
Those who argue for the importance of compactness must be willing to accept limitations on 
the achievement of equity for minorities .... From the perspective of the white, median 
voter in this country, compactness is desirable, since it enhances the strength of the major-
ity. From the perspective of the nonwhite population, compactness deprives them of equita-
ble representation for the same reason. 
Id. at 51. 
178. For a strong argument that compact districting does tend to minimize impermissible 
gerrymandering, see Justice Stevens's separate opinion in Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 755-
58 (1983) (Stevens, J., concurring). Nevertheless, compactness certainly is not sufficient to guar-
antee fair distribution of power among competing groups - assuming, for the moment, that 
fairness is to be measured through some degree of proportionality between groups in the electo-
rate and in the representative body. An equitable distribution of power depends on the geo-
graphical distribution of the relevant groups. In addition, computer programs now allow the 
creation of large numbers of potential districts, all of them compact, but differing in their parti-
san, racial, and other characteristics. Thus, the ability of compactness to serve as a partial con-
straint on gerrymandering is lesser now than previously. Sea generally CAIN, supra note 7, at 35-
38. 
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For Fourteenth Amendment purposes, however, the terms of the de-
bate have shifted. Shaw isolates district appearance and turns it into a 
threshold factor for setting strict scrutiny into motion. Thus, district 
appearance must now be constitutionally assessed, in and of itself, re-
gardless of whether commentators might value it intrinsically, instru-
mentally, or not at all. 
Second, outside of constitutional law, Shaw will also likely pres-
sure courts to focus more attention on what compactness ought to 
mean under the VRA. Statutory requirements of compactness will be 
implicated in numerous voting-rights cases, particularly for dispersed 
minority populations, thus generating the need for clear guidelines im-
plementing this element of the VRA. Quantitative measures of com-
pactness are a way of providing clear and consistent standards for 
courts and reapportionment bodies to follow. 
Third, such measures can be used to shift the focus of courts and 
others from individual districts, examined in isolation, to the pattern 
of districting within a state, as well as nationwide. We can also com-
pare the shapes of districts historically, enabling examination of the 
response of district shapes to various forces over time. This kind of 
information can make judicial inquiry into district "appearances" 
meaningful by establishing the baselines against which individual dis-
tricts can be evaluated. Absent such baselines, different judges are 
likely to find quite different districts failing their intuitive conception 
of "bizarre." This information is also crucial for general public discus-
sion of where we are and ought to be in the legal regulation of the 
redistricting process. Thus, in Part IV, we are able to rank all the 
current U.S. congressional districts, compare North Carolina District 
12 to other districts, indicate how many majority and minority dis-
tricts are designed in ways that might trigger the strict scrutiny of 
Shaw, and compare U.S. congressional districts over time. 
The information we provide here should be used carefully, and we 
must note several caveats at the outset. As in most legal areas, quanti-
tative measures for redistricting are not a panacea. With respect to the 
question in Shaw, quantitative measures cannot be used mechanically 
to determine whether a district is "bizarre." Even after district shapes 
are catalogued in absolute terms, the significance of the results will 
continue to depend on the specific contexts in which particular dis-
tricts exist. Maryland, for example, is a convoluted state, and any "ir-
regular" district there is presumptively less troubling than a similar 
district in the square state of Colorado. The results of our quantitative 
studies enable meaningful threshold comparisons. The ultimate signif-
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icance of any quantitative assessment of district "appearance," how-
ever, necessitates analysis of the specific political and geographic 
context in which particular districts originated. 
In addition, we do not suggest that there is some ideal level of 
compactness that every district ought to meet. Nor do we suggest that 
there is some objective level of "highly irregular" that every district 
ought to avoid. Neither Shaw nor the VRA entail any requirement 
that districts meet some Platonic ideal of shape. Similarly, at what 
point irregular districts become "too irregular" is a political and legal 
judgment about the appropriate trade-off between competing values; 
quantitative measures can provide absolute and comparative informa-
tion about districts, but they cannot resolve this question of judgment. 
Once such judgments are made, however, quantitative measures can 
assist in ensuring that they are carried out consistently. 
Redistricting is an area in which quantitative standards have 
demonstrated their appeal in the past. Once Baker v. Carr 179 declared 
malapportionment claims justiciable, legal principles gravitated 
quickly, indeed almost ineluctably, to the one-person-one-vote quanti-
tative formula. Although there is disagreement over the extreme 
mathematical exactitude the Court has given this principle, 180 there is 
little disagreement that one person, one vote is the appropriate ideal. 
Quantitative measures of compactness cannot function in precisely the 
same way as the one-person-one-vote measure, because no obviously 
analogous ideal exists toward which all district shapes should con-
verge. Yet, after Shaw, similar forces may impel courts toward using 
quantitative approaches to define, at least, the outer-boundary con-
straints the Constitution now imposes on the conjunction of race-con-
scious districting and district shape. Given that no approach to 
redistricting is politically neutral, public confidence in both courts and 
redistricting bodies is likely to be enhanced through quantitative stan-
dards capable of being applied in consistent ways. 
A. The Nature of the Problem 
Shaw suggests that North Carolina District 12 is self-evidently so 
extreme in design that it stands out at a glance. Thus, while Justice 
O'Connor acknowledges the possible "difficulty of determining from 
the face of a single-member districting plan that it purposefully distin-
guishes between voters on the basis of race," she emphasizes that 
179. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
180. See Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983). 
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"proof sometimes will not be difficult at all." 181 As another example, 
she points to the obviously "tortured"182 municipal boundaries in 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot. 183 
The task of determining when district appearances are so "highly 
irregular" as to require strict scrutiny, however, will be more difficult 
than these comments suggest. First, the language of "appearance" ob-
scures the fact that districts might be oddly shaped along several dif-
ferent dimensions. In the absence of a clear conceptual understanding 
of what dimensions of district appearance are relevant, the basis for 
judging districts will be unclear. Different observers will find different 
aspects of districts to be troubling. Second, district shapes vary along 
a continuum; they do not come marked in two clearly distinct catego-
ries of the reasonably regular and the bizarre. Third, one cannot ade-
quately distinguish the relevant variations among districts through 
intuitive, eyeball assessments. 
To begin to understand the nature of the problems, consider 
Figures 2 and 3, which show thirteen current congressional districts 
drawn after the 1990 Census. 
181. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2826 (1993). As the Court puts it, in some cases, a 
district is "so highly irregular that, on its face, it rationally cannot be understood as anything 
other than an effort to 'segregat[e] ... voters' on the basis of race." 113 S. Ct. at 2826 (quoting 
Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960)). 
182. 113 S. Ct. at 2826-27 (discussing Gomillion). 
183. 364 u.s 339 (1960). 
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FIGURE 2(A): MICHIGAN - CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 7 
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FIGURE 2(B): MISSISSIPPI - CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 5 
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FIGURE 2(c): CALIFORNIA - CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 22 
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FIGURE 2(D ): WISCONSIN - CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 9 
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FIGURE 2(E): TEXAS - CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 14 
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FIGURE 2(F): NORTH CAROLINA - CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 7 
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FIGURE 2(G): TEXAS - CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 18 
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FIGURE 3(B): MINNESOTA - CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 7 
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FIGURE 3(C): MARYLAND - CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 3 
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FIGURE 3(D): OHIO - CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 19 
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FIGURE 3(E): FLORIDA - CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 3 
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FIGURE 3(F): FLORIDA - CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICT 22 
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Most observers would probably agree that Michigan CD7 (Figure 
2(a)) is considerably more compact than Texas CD18 (Figure 2(g)), 
and that Michigan CD9 (Figure 3(a)) is more compact than Florida 
CD22 (Figure 3(t)). Beyond these observations, it becomes more diffi-
cult to make such assessments; but the districts in Figures 2(a) and 
3(a) might also generally seem reasonably compact. Perhaps there 
would even be agreement that the districts in Figures 2(g) and 3(t) are 
irregular, maybe extremely so. Line-drawing problems, however, 
quickly become substantial. If the districts in Figures 2(g) and 3(t) 
were minority-dominated districts, would their design be so irregular 
as to be presumptive evidence of districting processes in which race 
had exerted too dominant an influence over other values? What about 
districts "close to" the most distorted ones in the country - such as 
districts "in between" Figures 2(t) and 2(g) or in between Figures 3(e) 
and 3(t)? 
Keep in mind that there are 428 congressional districts in states 
with more than one representative. Given this large number, the 
range of shapes illustrated in Figures 2 and 3 is not surprising. In-
deed, one would expect an almost continuous gradation from very reg-
ular to very irregular. Of course, a single court would not have to 
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consider all 428 districts simultaneously. Litigation involving a single 
state would typically involve only five to twenty districts. Neverthe-
less, consistent standards are needed to guide and constrain policy-
makers. Left to intuitive judgments, policymakers will find the task of 
ordering districts by appearance unlikely to yield consensus.184 
Part of the difficulty involved in creating standards stems from the 
fact that "the" appearance of a district could mean one of several 
things. District shape can be measured along several seemingly rele-
vant dimensions. We will define these different dimensions in techni-
cal detail shortly, but we first describe them in more intuitive terms. 
First, we might ask how dispersed, or spread out, a district is. This 
question is commonly taken to mean how efficiently the district covers 
the territory it includes: in common terms, the question is how 
"round" or "square" the district is, or how "long" it is versus how 
"wide."185 From this perspective, the crucial issue is the degree to 
which a district has a central core and the extent to which all points in 
the district are relatively close to that core. If we judge districts in 
terms of how dispersed they are, circular or square districts will be the 
most compact. Extremely long and narrow ones are much more dis-
persed and hence would be judged as less compact, as would districts 
that tie together two or more core areas with narrow corridors. Dis-
persion is also worse if "fingers," or other protrusions, stick out from 
the main body of a district. 
Second, one might judge districts by the regularity or length of 
their perimeters. The important concern in this assessment ought not 
to be the number of sides, but how similar and regular the sides are. 
From this perspective, what matters is how much a district's borders 
wander around in contorted ways. Legislative districts with smooth 
borders, especially ones of equal length, are most regular or compact. 
When borders are not straight or when they repeatedly twist and turn, 
perimeter measures will be accordingly low. 
Third, we might judge districts in terms of how regularly they dis-
tribute the population in and around the district. We are less accus-
tomed to judging shapes this way; it does not play a role in elementary 
geometry. In the context of legislative districting, however, such a 
measure makes some sense. Legislators represent people, not land. 
184. Shaw presumably also applies to state legislative districts. In upper houses of state legis-
latures, the number of districts is often 30-50, and in lower houses the number is often 100 or 
more. HAROLD W. STANLEY & RICHARD G. NIEMI, VITAL STATISTICS ON AMERICAN 
POLITICS 153 tbl. 4-6 (4th ed. 1994). 
185. One should not confuse these questions with how big a district is in absolute size. Dis-
tricts in sparsely populated areas of a state are necessarily larger in overall size than those in 
large urban areas; given one-person-one-vote requirements, this disparity cannot be avoided. 
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Moreover, the way in which district lines move through or around 
population concentrations is at the heart of concerns regarding such 
devices as "cracking" or "packing" minority populations. One way to 
systematize these concerns is to examine the size of the population in 
the district and compare it to the population outside but near the dis-
trict. From this perspective, a district that encapsulates most of the 
population in some well-defined area would be highly regular. Exclu-
sion of large numbers of people who live within such an area makes a 
district fare much worse on this dimension. 
Choosing among these different dimensions makes a significant dif-
ference in judgments about the "appearance" of legislative districts. A 
district can be "highly irregular" in one dimension but not in others. 
Consider the contrast between "dispersion" and "perimeter" in, for 
example, Texas CD18 (Figure 2(g)). This district includes most of the 
city of Houston, is by far the most Democratic in Texas, and was 
designed to yield a fifty-one percent black population (forty-nine per-
cent black voting-age population). The adjoining Texas CD29 was 
designed in 1991 as a new Hispanic district, thought to be required 
under the VRA, and has a Hispanic population of sixty percent (vot-
ing-age population of fifty-four percent). To achieve these dual objec-
tives, the redistricters carved heavily Hispanic blocks out of Texas 
CD18 and moved them next door into Texas CD29.186 
Texas CD18 is not spread over a large area, hence it does not en-
close a highly dispersed population. Despite being part of a large met-
ropolitan area, its bands of streets and neighborhoods do not stretch 
out excessively. Although it contains extremely narrow corridors, it 
does not, like North Carolina CD12, stretch between cities many miles 
apart. Consequently, in terms of the first dimension described above 
- dispersion - Texas CD18 is not highly irregular. Yet, to some 
observers, the shape of this district is likely to be as troubling as that of 
North Carolina CD12. Its borders, especially on the west, meander in 
and out in an almost continual dance. In the second sense described 
above - perimeter regularity - this district is certainly extreme. 
Next, consider Florida CD22 (Figure 3(f)). This district contains 
the barrier islands and lucrative beachfront properties of Florida's 
Gold Coast and has the highest percentage of over-sixty-five residents 
of any U.S. congressional district. This district is not a minority one, 
though its shape resulted in part from efforts to maximize the black 
186. The facts concerning these districts are drawn from MICHAEL BARONE & GRANT 
UJIFUSA, THE ALMANAC OF AMERICAN POLITICS 1994, at 1250-51, 1275-76 (Eleanor Evans 
ed., 1993) (describing the creation and composition of Texas CD18 and Texas CD29, respec-
tively). In the first election in Texas CD29, a Hispanic did not win the seat. Id. at 1276. 
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percentage in the adjoining 23d and 17th districts. 187 The borders of 
Florida CD22 are relatively smooth.188 With few exceptions, the dis-
trict does not snake into and out of the neighborhoods of cities. While 
in some places it moves farther inland than in others, this pattern is 
obviously necessary to include a sufficiently large population. In terms 
of perimeter, this district is fairly regular. 189 Yet in length and width, 
the district stretches nearly 100 miles from north to south and is never 
more than about five and a half miles wide. This shape makes it look 
more like a flagpole than any other district in the country. In the 
sense of dispersion - in terms of its territory not being close together 
- this district is certainly extreme. 
Intuitive assessments based on visual appearance alone are thus 
likely to produce tremendous uncertainty. Indeed, if we now return to 
what is frequently considered the most egregious and self-evident ex-
ample of the manipulation of district boundaries, the classic Gomillion 
case, the difficulties become even more obvious. Consider Figure 4, 
the Tuskegee municipal boundaries before and after the city council 
redrew them. 
187. Id. at 320. 
188. In part, this apparent smoothness is a function of the scale of the map. If each city were 
shown in detail, one would see more border irregularities. 
189. It turns out, as we shall see, that this district is so extremely long and narrow that, 
together with the lengthened western border, it is relatively noncompact with respect to its pe-
rimeter. Nonetheless, at first glance, its border characteristics do not appear troubling. 
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FIGURE 4: MAP OF TUSKEGEE, ALABAMA, BEFORE AND AFTER 
ACT 140190 
(The entire area of the square comprised the City prior to Act 140. The irregular black-
bordered figure within the square represents the post-enactment city.) 
Justice O'Connor suggests that this example is extreme on immediate 
inspection. Yet, in terms of visual appearance alone, the twenty-eight-
sided figure hardly looks more irregular than a number of the districts 
in Figures 2 and 3.191 If the Tuskegee boundaries are extreme simply 
because of the way they look, the majority of congressional districts 
would be equally extreme. 192 What actually makes Gomillion easy 
and exceptional is that, in the context of Tuskegee, this particular pat-
tern of line drawing had such a racially differential effect that it could 
only be a blatant example of a racist design to exclude black residents 
190. The source of this map is Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 348 (1960). 
191. To be sure, one projection sticks out incongruously from the side of the main body of 
the new boundaries. Yet even Wisconsin CD9 (Figure 2{d)), which appears by comparison to be 
fairly regular, has an appendage on the north side that sticks out some miles from the main 
portion of the district. 
192. Two hundred thirty-nine of the 1990s congressional districts are less compact than the 
reconfigured Tuskegee district on both of the quantitative measures introduced below. 
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from the political boundaries of the town. 193 Any intuition that the 
appearance of this twenty-eight-sided figure, standing alone, is an ex-
ample of extreme manipulation of district appearance would be con-
siderably misguided. 
Thus, both abstract considerations of the different ways one can 
judge appearance and the current array of congressional districts ar-
gue for a more systematic, consistent way of comparing district ap-
pearances. Fortunately, in recent years, quantitative methods for 
assessing district appearance have been developed. The results are ex-
pressed in terms of a district's compactness. While measures of com-
pactness are only now being introduced into redistricting procedures 
and their use is not yet settled, Shaw makes certain quantitative meas-
ures more meaningful and relevant than others. 
B. Three Quantitative Measures of Compactness 
Compactness has been part of the redistricting lexicon· for over a 
century, but only recently has it been rigorously and quantitatively 
defined. Even with the development of appropriate, theoretical defini-
tions, the technology for measuring compactness was not effectively 
available until the 1990s. The recent digitization of U.S. geography 
carried out by the U.S. Census Bureau has made it possible to apply 
the new quantitative approaches with considerable accuracy. 194 
Compactness can be measured along several dimensions and in dif-
ferent ways. In a systematic review of proposed conceptions of com-
pactness, which one of the authors of this article led, 195 three distinct 
dimensions emerged as most relevant. 196 These dimensions are the 
traits we have described colloquially above: dispersion, perimeter, and 
population. We now provide more technical definitions of each and 
then employ the two of them to rank and analyze congressional dis-
tricts throughout the country. 
193. The Tuskegee case was so extreme because the effect was "to remove from the city all 
save only four or five of its 400 Negro voters while not removing a single white voter or resi-
dent." Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339, 341 (1960). 
194. The cost of calculating district compactness scores does not seem to have stopped states 
and even some local jurisdictions from making them. The entire cost of redistricting has in-
creased dramatically in recent years, but, given requirements for strict population equality, for 
example, the marginal additional burden of calculating district compactness should not be 
prohibitive. 
195. Richard G. Niemi et al., Measuring Compactness and the Role of a Compactness Stan-
dard in a Test for Partisan and Racial Gerrymandering, 52 J. POL 1155 (1990). 
196. These characteristics also turn out to be the basis for most operationalizations of the 
term. 
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1. Dispersion 
The term dispersion captures "how tightly packed or spread out 
the geography of a district is."197 Underlying all dispersion measures 
is the notion that a perfect district is a regular, simple shape, usually a 
circle. Different quantitative measures exist because different ideal 
shapes can be taken as a starting point198 and because there are multi-
ple ways of measuring deviations from the ideal shape. 199 
During the 1990s round of districting litigation, one approach be-
came common. This technique measures the ratio of the district area 
to the area of the minimum circumscribing circle.200 Such a test is 
intuitively meaningful and has useful technical features. Operation-
ally, it involves taking the areas of the district and of the smallest cir-
cle that completely encloses the district. The ratio of the former to the 
latter yields the dispersion compactness score.201 Hence, a circular 
district is perfectly compact. A square district is relatively compact 
because, when one draws a circle around the district, there is little area 
inside the circle that is not also in the district. A long, narrow district, 
or one with "fingers" or other extensions, is less compact because it 
takes a large circle to enclose the entire district, yet much of that circle 
is empty. 
We arranged the congressional districts in Figure 3 in descending 
order of dispersion, measured in this way. Districts do not come 
much more square than Michigan CD9. Minnesota CD7 is too rec-
tangular to be perfectly compact, but it still ranks high. Maryland 
CD3 circles around Baltimore and includes no area west of the city, 
which lowers its compactness. Ohio CD19 is stretched out, relatively 
long and narrow, and is consequently even less compact. Florida CD3 
197. Niemi et al., supra note 195, at 1160. 
198. Some might suggest that hexagons provide a better base than circles because hexagons 
can fill an entire space, in principle, with no "in·between" area left over. Given the irregular 
shapes of states and other jurisdictions, however, it is unlikely that any real area could be divided 
into a set of perfect hexagons, even if equal population were not a consideration. Perfection in 
the real world of districting is impossible regardless of the theoretical standard one uses. 
199. Because squares - which have equal length and width - are considered relatively 
compact, some have suggested that length and width should be the basis of quantitative meas· 
ures. See, e.g., Curtis C. Harris, Jr., A Scientific Method of Districting. 9 BEHAVIORAL Ser. 219, 
221 (1964). The difficulty is that no unique method exists of measuring the length and width of 
irregular shapes. Length might well be the distance between the two points farthest apart in the 
district. Yet what is the width? How would one judge it in congressional districts such as those 
shown in Figures 2(t) or 3(c)? 
200. Earnest C. Reock, Jr., originally defined this measure, Earnest C. Reock, Jr., Note, 
Measuring Compactness as a Requirement of Legislative Reapportionment, 5 MIDWEST J. POL. 
Ser. 70, 71 (1961), which Niemi and others catalogued as Dispersion 7. Niemi et al., supra note 
195, at 1161. 
201. In a practical sense, it is not always easy to measure areas of complex shapes, though 
computer programs are now available for this purpose. 
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essentially has no central core; not surprisingly, it has a very low com-
pactness score. The extreme fiagpolelike district discussed above, 
Florida CD22, has the lowest dispersion score of any district in the 
country. 
Dispersion scores theoretically range from 1.0, which is perfectly 
compact - a circle - to 0.0 - a straight line. For the districts in 
Figures 3(a) to 3(f), the scores are .50, .40, .30, .20, .11, and .03, re-
spectively. With an appropriate technical measure of how dispersed 
districts are, we are thus able to rank order congressional districts as 
well as to provide a more precise sense of the magnitude of the differ-
ences between the "appearance" of various congressional districts. 
This analysis can provide guidance to reapportionment bodies and dis-
cipline the judicial assessments Shaw now requires. 
2. Perimeter 
Instead of focusing on the dispersion of a district, we can examine 
the extent to which district borders wander in irregular ways. We do 
this through a perimeter measure; the most effective technical measure 
of perimeter relates length of the district perimeter to the area the dis-
trict includes. 202 The intuitive justification for this measure is that a 
given perimeter length will enclose the most area if the shape it sur-
rounds is a circle. Once again, then, a circle is the baseline against 
which districts are compared. A precise definition of the measure we 
use here is the ratio of the district area to the area of a circle with the 
same perimeter.203 
202. Intuitively, one might think the most obvious measure of perimeter is overall perimeter 
length, measured in distance units, such as miles or kilometers. The Colorado State Constitution 
incorporates this approach for its state legislative districts. COLO. CONST. art. V, § 47. While 
easy to grasp, this measure has certain undesirable properties, especially when comparing con-
gressional districts across the nation. First, because overall length is very sensitive to the abso-
lute size of a district, one can only sensibly apply it to districting plans taken as a whole. That is, 
as noted above, it makes little sense to compare the overall lengths of the boundaries of rural and 
urban districts. See supra note 185. Rural districts, no matter how smooth and regular their 
borders, will register longer boundaries than urban ones, no matter how convoluted the bounda-
ries of the latter. 
Comparing alternative districting plans on the basis of the overall boundary lengths for all 
the districts in the state does make sense. Nevertheless, given regional variations between urban 
and rural areas, one cannot reasonably compare individual districts, even within one state. In 
addition, comparisons of aggregate boundary lengths across states are inappropriate because the 
shapes of the states will greatly affect such measurements. For these reasons, we do not use this 
measure here. 
203. In equation form, this definition is expressed as 4orA/P1, where A is the area and Pis the 
perimeter of the district. One can easily confirm that a circle has a perimeter score of 1, as 
follows. If the perimeter of a circle is P, by definition, P = 2orr, where r is the radius of the 
circle. In addition, A, the area of the circle, is orr1• Then, perimeter score = 4or(orr1}/(2orr)1 = 1. 
This measure is called the Schwartzberg measure in Daniel D. Polsby & Robert D. Popper, The 
Third Criterion: Com11actness as a Procedural Safeguard Against Partisan Gerrymandering, 9 
YALE L. & POLY. REV. 301, 348-49 (1991). In fact, as Polsby and Popper point out, it is a slight 
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In general, districts that have smooth borders and relatively regu-
lar shapes will have shorter boundaries and enclose considerable area 
given the boundary length. They therefore score high on this perime-
ter measure. Convoluted district borders substantially lengthen the 
boundary without enclosing more area and hence score low. 
We arranged the congressional districts in Figure 2 in descending 
order of perimeter scores. Michigan CD7 has nearly straight borders 
and is relatively square-shaped. Mississippi CDS is regularly shaped 
and has mostly smooth borders, except along the Mississippi River 
and Gulf Coast. 204 California CD22 has a stair-step border on the 
northeast. This feature, in addition to the coastline and two small is-
lands, lowers its perimeter score, but the district remains sufficiently 
regular for its score to fall in the middle of the district scores shown. 
Wisconsin CD9, Texas CD14, and North Carolina CD7 have increas-
ing boundary twists and turns, and they therefore score progressively 
lower. Finally, the border of Texas CD18 is extraordinarily long for 
the area it encloses as a result of the many narrow corridors, wings, or 
fingers that reach out to enclose black voters, while excluding nearby 
Hispanic residents. 
Perimeter scores, like dispersion scores, theoretically range from 
1.0 to 0.0. The perimeter scores for the districts in Figures 2(a) to 2(g) 
are .50, .40, .30, .21, .10, .05, and .01, respectively. Using this mea-
sure, we can rank all congressional districts in terms of the regularity 
of their borders, as well as suggest the magnitude of differences be-
tween districts. If courts applying Shaw focus on district perimeter, 
this quantitative approach can yield a far more systematic and clear 
set of norms than intuitive judicial assessments. 
3. Population 
A third focal point for concerns of district "appearance" is some-
times taken to be the way in which a district distributes voters. We 
can translate this concern into a population measure, which focuses 
not on shape alone, but on the distribution of population between a 
district and its surrounding territory. Developing a quantitative mea-
sure requires some way of comparing the district's population with the 
"nearby" excluded population. Commentators have suggested two 
variation (and improvement) of the measure originally proposed by Schwartzberg. Id. at 349 
n.204; see also Joseph E. Schwartzberg, Reapportionment, Gerrymanders and the Notion of 
"Compactness," 50 MINN. L. REV. 443 (1966). 
204. These observations illustrate the point that natural features will affect compactness 
scores - dispersion as well as perimeter. The effects of natural features are a reason that one 
cannot use such scores in a mechanical fashion to eliminate districts that fall below some prede· 
termined level. For more discussion, see infra text accompanying notes 231-32. 
December 1993] Election-District Appearances 557 
similar measures; both are ratios in which the numerator is the dis-
trict's population. 205 In the most common measure, the denominator 
is the population in what is called the "rubber-band" area around the 
district - the area that would be inside a rubber band stretched 
tightly around the district.206 In the alternative measure, the denomi-
nator is the population in the minimum circumscribing circle - it 
excludes populations that would fall outside the state. Both measures 
vary from 1.0 to 0.0.207 For reasons we describe in Section III.C, pop-
ulation measures do not seem to reflect the concerns Shaw expresses. 
Thus, we do not provide quantitative assessments of the districts in 
Figures 2 and 3 in terms of population measures. 
C. The Relevant Measures Under Shaw 
Of the three potentially relevant measures of compactness - dis-
persion, perimeter, and population - the first two best capture the 
concerns Shaw expresses. Although the decision offers little in the 
way of specific criteria for judging "bizarre" appearances, it invokes 
many synonyms for widely dispersed districts and for those whose 
borders are severely distorted. Indicating concern for perimeter ma-
nipulation, Shaw refers to Gomillion as employing "a tortured munici-
pal boundary line,"208 and Shaw similarly takes note of the way in 
which North Carolina CD12 "winds in snake-like fashion" through 
various areas. 209 
At the same time, Shaw also refers to the concentration of a "dis-
persed" minority population and to individuals "widely separated by 
geographical and political boundaries."210 In describing District 12, 
the Court notes that it is "approximately 160 miles long and, for much 
of its length, no wider than the I-85 corridor."211 These comments 
refer not to twists and turns of district boundaries, but to how spread 
out the district is, both geographically and with respect to the types of 
areas - rural versus urban, farming versus manufacturing - it en-
compasses. Similarly, the proposed state senate district, about which 
205. Niemi et al., supra note 195, at 1162 tbl. 1. 
206. In technical terms, this measure is described as the minimum convex figure that com-
pletely contains the district. 
207. For the "rubber-band" definition, a perfect district would be one in which the border 
had only "convex" angles - that is, a rubber band stretched around it would have no areas that 
are outside the district but inside the rubber band. For the alternative definition, a circle would 
receive a score of 1.0. 
208. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2826-27 (1993). 
209. 113 S. Ct. at 2821. 
210. 113 S. Ct. at 2827. 
21 I. 113 S. Ct. at 2820-21. 
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the Court intimated doubts in Growe v. Emison, 212 has a relatively 
smooth, but elongated, border.213 These comments point to concerns 
about a district's dispersion. 
For these reasons, we believe that if courts and reapportionment 
bodies look to quantitative approaches to implement Shaw, the disper-
sion and perimeter measures are the most appropriate. Population 
measures do capture certain manifestations of partisan or racial gerry-
mandering, but they do not measure "shape" in the usual sense and 
therefore do not necessarily reflect the problems Shaw identifies.214 In 
our quantitative assessment of congressional districts throughout the 
country, we will therefore rely on only the dispersion and perimeter 
measures. 
In interpreting the results that follow in Part IV, one must keep in 
mind at least three complexities, to which we have alluded above.215 
First, compactness, as quantified, varies on a continuum from zero to 
one. The point when the compact becomes the noncompact requires 
judgments about social perceptions that Shaw barely begins to 
articulate. 216 
Second, although both dispersion and perimeter appear relevant 
under Shaw, they measure different dimensions. Recall the contrast 
between the tight core and wandering boundaries of Texas CD18 (Fig-
ure 2(g)) and the highly dispersed, but smooth bordered, Florida 
CD22 (Figure 3(f)).217 Different quantitative measures will not al-
212. 113 S. Ct. 1075 (1993); see supra notes 157-58 and accompanying text. 
213. 113 S. Ct. at 1085. 
214. Having for the first time been able to calculate and assess fully a population measure, we 
are able to see that it measures, in part, the type of population the districts include and exclude, 
and not simply the degree to which the districts retain nearby populations. In particular, largely 
rural or suburban districts may tend to circle around an urban area rather than incorporate a 
portion of the city itself. This pattern often leaves a large population in the "rubber-band" or 
circle area, lowering the population score. Favoring higher scores would thus give preference to 
districts that mixed urban and suburban-or rural areas. For example, Colorado CD4, near 
Denver, and Ohio CD13, near Cleveland, are outlying districts that have relatively low scores on 
the population measure because they abut large urban areas. A largely rural or suburban district 
that circles around an urban area also lowers the dispersion measure. The effect, however, is 
especially strong for population measures; the excluded land area may not be great, but the 
excluded population will often be large. For these reasons, we will refrain from further use of 
population measures. 
215. See supra text accompanying notes 177-80. 
216. Lest this statement seem to render the concept meaningless, consider the analogy of 
outdoor temperature. There is no bright line dividing hot from warm or warm from cold. 
Although there are some meaningful points on the temperature scale, such as the point at which 
water freezes, those points do not provide an objective division between hot and cold. Tempera-
ture is relative. Yet we all make use of temperature information daily. 
217. Can one simply combine dispersion and perimeter scores by averaging them? The prob-
lem with averaging the two scores is that it can mask situations in which one score is high and 
the other low. In principle, one might have a district with a dispersion score of .80 and a perime-
ter score of .02. The average - .41 - appears fairly reasonable; indeed, it is greater than the 
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ways rank individual districts, and even districting plans, in identical 
order.218 For many districts, the two measures will yield similar re-
sults, but, when they conflict, questions will remain as to which mea-
sure, or what combination of the two measures, should be the focus. 
Third, one must take care in comparing compactness scores across 
states and between different types of jurisdictions. The more compact 
a state as a whole, the more one might expect its individual districts to 
be compact.219 Similarly, as a general rule, we might expect state leg-
islative and local districts to be more compact than congressional dis-
tricts. 22° Contextual differences of these sorts must be considered 
before drawing ultimate conclusions concerning comparisons across 
districts. At the same time, Shaw seems to discuss district appearance 
in absolute terms or as a generic concept; before requiring strict scru-
tiny for District 12, the Court did not compare it to other congres-
sional districts in North Carolina or anywhere else. With the 
quantitative measures defined and these caveats in mind, Part IV ana-
lyzes the compactness of congressional districts throughout the 
country. 
IV. THE COMPACTNESS OF CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS IN THE 
1980s AND 1990s 
In this Part, we apply our quantitative methods to answer three 
questions that Shaw raises. First, we compare North Carolina District 
12 to other districts in the state to determine the extent to which 
mean score for the congressional districts in many states. Nevertheless, it hides the extremely 
low perimeter score. Such extreme situations are not likely to occur in practice, but the data we 
present below, see infra Table 3, reveal a number of situations in which the average does not 
convey an extremely low score on one - usually the perimeter - measure. See supra text 
accompanying note 186 for the discussion of Texas CD18. 
218. Niemi et al., supra note 195, at 1167-76, demonstrate this point with respect to entire 
plans. 
219. Note that some states with water boundaries define the perimeters of the district as 
extending into the water - for example, a relatively straight line in the middle of a river dividing 
two states. Consequently, one cannot always equate the apparent shape of the state with the 
compactness levels possible. 
220. Federal constitutional requirements of one person, one vote are more stringent for con-
gressional districts. For state legislative districts, the Court has declared population deviations of 
up to 10% to be presumptively valid and has upheld deviations up to 16.4% while noting that 
the latter "approach tolerable limits." Brown v. Thompson, 462 U.S. 835, 842 (1983); Mahan v. 
Howell, 410 U.S. 315, 319, 329 (1973). In contrast, the standard for a congressional district 
remains that the district be "as mathematically equal as reasonably possible." White v. Weiser, 
412 U.S. 783, 790 (1973); see also Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725 (1983) (finding unconstitu-
tional for congressional districts an average deviation from absolutely perfect equipopulation of 
0.1384% when the maximum deviation of any one district was only 0.6984%.). The stricter the 
requirement of population equality, the more districts are likely to deviate from compactness. 
Note, though, that some state constitutions require nearly absolute equality of state legislative 
districts. 
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District 12 is aberrational. Second, we examine post-1990 congres-
sional districts throughout the country to determine which districts, 
and how many, have dispersion or perimeter scores comparable to 
District 12. Specifically, we determine how many African-American-
dominated, Hispanic-dominated, and white-dominated districts have 
shapes that appear, at least initially, to be as irregular as District 12. 
As a related point, we also show how many congressional districts 
would be affected if courts translated Shaw into an absolute require-
ment that districts not exceed some specific measure of compactness. 
Finally, we compare the shape of congressional districts in the 1990s 
with those in the 1980s to determine whether districts have become 
less compact in recent years. If they have not, Shaw would constitute 
a sudden change in the legal rules governing districting. If they have, 
Shaw would not change the rules in the middle of the game, but rather 
would be a response to the changed context of districting. 
A. North Carolina District 12 in the Context of the 1990 North 
Carolina Redistricting Plan 
After the Justice Department's denial of preclearance for its first 
effort at redistricting, the North Carolina General Assembly eventu-
ally designed the twelve-seat congressional districting plan that took 
effect in time for the 1992 congressional elections. As a map of this 
plan shows,221 it included several districts, in addition to CD12, that 
many observers might consider irregularly shaped. 
221. See infra Figure 5. 
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FIGURE 5: NORTH CAROLINA 1990 CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS 
© Election Data Services, Inc. 
Note: The shaded districts, Districts 1 and 12, are minority-dominated 
ones. In the 1992 congressional elections, District 1 elected Eva 
Clayton and District 12 elected Melvin Watt, North Carolina's first 
two black congressional representatives since Reconstruction. 
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Several facts immediately stand out. First, in a certain obvious sense, 
District 12 is unlike any other district in that it wanders through the 
middle of the state as a long, thin line. On the other hand, it might be 
less distinct than many readers would expect. Shaw emphasizes the 
extreme length of District 12, but the northwestern-most district, 
District 5, covers more miles east to west and a similar number of 
miles north to south. Indeed, many readers may be surprised by how 
many districts in North Carolina fall considerably short of being 
square or rectangular. We wonder whether even two districts satisfy 
many readers' intuitive view of how districts should be drawn. In gen-
eral, this map confirms the fact that district shapes vary along a con-
tinuum and that separating them through an eyeball assessment is 
extremely difficult. Is District 1, 2, 3, 7, or 10 considerably more com-
pact than District 12? How can one meaningfully compare the ap-
pearance of these other districts with District 12 and with each other? 
In Table 2, we provide the dispersion and perimeter scores for the 
1990s North Carolina congressional districts: 
TABLE 2 
COMPACTNESS OF NORTH CAROLINA CONGRESSIONAL 














































With these quantitative assessments, we can reach one confident con-
clusion. District 12 is certainly the least compact of North Carolina's 
districts; measured either in terms of dispersion or perimeter, District 
12 ranks lowest in the state. Whether it is so unique as to be consid-
222. Information provided by Election Data Services, Inc. 
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ered an aberration, however, becomes a matter of judgment. In terms 
of the dispersion measure, District 12 falls far below any other dis-
trict, 223 even when compared to its nearest competitor, District 5. 
Along this dimension, most other districts are considerably more com-
pact. This comparison means that District 12 has less of a central core 
than all other districts or, conversely, that it is relatively longer and 
narrower than other districts. It incorporates a significantly more geo-
graphically dispersed population. With respect to district perimeters, 
however, District 12 is far less unusual. While it remains the least 
compact when judged this way, the perimeter scores for nine of the 
twelve districts are less than 0.10. These scores are quite low com-
pared to districts throughout the country.224 Indeed, almost all the 
districts in North Carolina have perimeters that could be classified as 
quite, if not extremely, irregular.225 To observers who focus on CD12 
in isolation, this result might come as a surprise. It might also raise 
questions as to whether the "appearance" of any congressional district 
ought to be evaluated on its own or only in the context of the other 
districts in the same redistricting plan. Perhaps irregular minority dis-
tricts are, or should be, less troubling when contained within a redis-
tricting plan that employs similarly contorted majority-dominated 
districts.226 In Shaw, the Court's first entry into this arena, however, 
the Court assessed CD12 in isolation from other districts in the same 
plan. 
B. The Compactness of 1990s Congressional Districts Throughout 
the Country 
With the quantitative measure we have described above and re-
cently developed technology, we are able to rank congressional dis-
223. Just as there is no bright line between compact and noncompact districts, there is no one 
number that determines whether the difference between compactness scores is significant. 
Clearly, a small difference - for example, .01 - is not meaningful, and certainly the larger the 
difference, the more likely it is that the scores are meaningfully different. A given difference has 
to be evaluated at least in the context of: (a) whether the difference is due to geographical or 
other obvious factors - for example, a case in which adjoining districts are "reoriented" so that 
the common border is now along a meandering river, or a case in which one district follows 
noncompact subjurisdiction boundaries while another is made compact by crossing those bound-
aries; (b) the size of the difference in both dispersion and perimeter score - it can even happen 
that differences in dispersion and perimeter scores are contradictory; and (c) whether the com-
parison is of the average scores for entire plans or of the scores of specific districts - a plan 
average may be based on scores of a large number of districts, so even if a few districts in the plan 
are made substantially more (or less) compact, the average across all districts may not change 
much. 
224. Nationwide, 13% of congressional districts have perimeter scores below 0.10. See infra 
Table 3. 
225. Note that only Districts 1 and 12 are majority-minority districts. 
226. See supra text accompanying note 165. 
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tricts throughout the country in terms of their dispersion and 
perimeter. 227 In Table 3, we provide an abbreviated version of this 
information by listing the congressional districts whose dispersion or 
perimeter score (or both) is relatively low. In choosing the cutoff 
points used in Table 3, we do not imply that all districts below those 
points, or only those districts, are vulnerable after Shaw. Later in this 
section, in Table 4, we show how many districts, majority and minor-
ity, are affected when a range of different cutoff levels are used to de-
fine "low" dispersion and perimeter scores.228 The cutoff points in 
Table 3 are somewhat arbitrary,229 and on each dimension they are 
higher than the scores of North Carolina District 12. Nonetheless, 
because they identify the districts that are objectively least compact, 
these are the most important tables we present for the purpose of 
Shaw's future application. 
227. We have also ranked them in terms of the population measure, but for reasons discussed 
above, see supra text accompanying notes 208-14, we do not provide that information here. 
228. See infra Table 4. 
229. A historical comparison may be of interest: as suggested above, the "uncouth twenty-
eight-sided" figure in Gomillion is not particularly noncompact by the standards of the 1990s. 
See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text. We estimate its dispersion score to be in the 
neighborhood of .41, and its perimeter score to be approximately .34. The dispersion score puts 
the district above the average 1990s congressional districts in all but seven states; the perimeter 
score is above the average in all but eight states. 
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TABLE 3 
1990s CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS WITH Low 
DISPERSION OR PERIMETER 
COMPACTNESS SCORES230 
Dispersion Perimeter Largest Population 
District Score Score Group 
CA36 .04 .10 White 69% 
FL3 .11 .01 Black 55 
FL17 .08 .06 Black 56 
FL18 .14 .03 Hispanic 67 
FL22 .03 .05 White 83 
HI2 .05 .11 Asian 53 
IL4 .19 .03 Hispanic 65 
LA4 .13 .01 Black 66 
LA6 .29 .05 White 82 
MA3 .14 .11 White 78 
MAIO .15 .06 White 94 
NJ13 .11 .07 White 42* 
NY5 .19 .05 White 79 
NY7 .22 .05 White 58 
NY8 .06 .03 White 74 
NY9 .27 .04 White 82 
NY12 .12 .02 Hispanic 58 
NCl .25 .03 Black 57 
NC5 .14 .08 White 83 
NC7 .29 .05 White 70 
NC12 .05 .01 Black 56 
TN4 .12 .08 White 95 
TX3 .29 .05 White 86 
TX6 .21 .02 White 88 
TX18 .36 .01 Black 50 
TX25 .20 .02 White 53 
TX29 .19 .01 Hispanic 61 
TX30 .24 .02 Black 49* 
Note: Districts shown here are all those with a dispersion score of .:S. 0.15 or a perimeter score of 
.:S. 0.05. For the purpose of this table, "White" means non-Hispanic white; "Black" means non-
Hispanic black; and "Asian" means Asian or Pacific Islander. "Hispanics" may be of any race, 
and "population" refers to total population. 
• Please also note that blacks and Hispanics constitute a majority in NJ13 and TX30. 
One must make comparisons carefully because of the effects of 
state shapes. 231 Twenty-eight congressional districts fall below the 
230. Information provided by Election Data Services, Inc. 
231. One of the authors previously wrote that we should "almost always" limit comparisons 
to one state or jurisdiction. Niemi et al., supra note 195, at 1176. Professor Niemi now regards 
nationwide comparisons as more useful than that statement would suggest, as long as one makes 
them with sensitivity to the shapes of states and to other complicating factors such as islands and 
coast or shorelines. 
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compactness levels we have selected. In two cases, however, the low 
scores are clearly artifacts of their unusual geography; they can be 
quickly dismissed because geography, not legislative politics, immedi-
ately accounts for their apparently low compactness. Hawaii CD2 is 
composed of islands, and California CD36 includes two islands as well 
as part of the coast in the greater Los Angeles area. 232 
With respect to the remaining districts, one result is immediately 
striking. If we rather crudely consider dispersion and perimeter simul-
taneously, by simply adding the two scores, North Carolina CD12 
turns out to be the worst district in the nation. In this specific sense, 
this district is truly exceptional. Thus, if a district must be at least as 
"bizarre" as District 12 to trigger strict scrutiny, and if bizarreness is 
measured by adding dispersion and perimeter scores, District 12 
stands alone. This result is potentially of considerable significance: if 
Shaw is applied by adding the quantitative and perimeter measures 
used here, no other current congressional district is as extreme as that 
in Shaw. 
At the same time, District 12 is not a statistical outlier under this 
combined approach, for other districts are not far behind. New York 
CD8 and Florida CD22 are nearly at the level of North Carolina 
CD12 on both measures, followed closely by Florida CD3 and CD17, 
Louisiana CD4, New York CD12, and then by Florida CD18 and 
New Jersey CD13. 
While combining the two measures in this way is revealing, it poses 
several theoretical and conceptual problems. Most significantly, Shaw 
provides no guidance as to whether a district should be considered 
"highly irregular" if it is extreme on either dimension - dispersion or 
perimeter - alone or only when these two dimensions are combined. 
This point is especially relevant for districts like the previously dis-
cussed Texas CD18, which is not spread over a large area but does 
have a very irregular border.233 
Ifwe focus on dispersion scores alone, North Carolina CD12 turns 
out to be the second worst in the nation,234 with the long, narrow 
district we described earlier, Florida CD22, at the bottom.235 Other 
232. In both cases, the islands are well spread out, thus greatly lowering the dispersion score. 
The perimeter score is also reduced because the perimeter is calculated around each island - as 
well as mainland area - separately. 
233. If one averages the dispersion and perimeter scores for Texas CDJS (Figure 2(g)), the 
resulting score is .185, which does not place it among the 25 least compact congressional districts 
in the nation. 
234. We leave aside the cases of California CD36 and Hawaii CD2 because they are artifacts 
of the unusual geography of the two states. 
235. Political observers describe this oddly shaped district as a result of the way in which the 
Voting Rights Act was interpreted in Florida. The beach towns were apparently isolated when 
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districts, however, follow close behind. If Shaw requires that CD12 be 
deemed noncompact, the question of how to treat districts that are 
similarly, but not quite as badly, dispersed- such as New York CDS 
(majority white) or Florida CD17 (majority black) - remains open. 
Ifwe focus on perimeter irregularities alone, North Carolina CD12 
remains extreme, but several other districts are equally extreme. Even 
more clearly than with dispersion, compactness falls along a contin-
uum when we focus on the shape of boundary lines. Distinguishing 
the "unusual" from the "highly irregular" or "bizarre" inevitably re-
quires seemingly arbitrary cutoffs. 
Note that over half the districts in Table 3 are majority white. In 
part, this distribution occurs because majority-white districts that bor-
der on irregular minority-majority districts necessarily incorporate 
those irregularities into their own boundaries. 236 In absolute terms, a 
greater number of extremely noncompact districts - as defined in 
Table 3 - are white-controlled districts. In relative terms, however, 
minority districts would currently suffer more from any rule that 
barred districts with scores below the levels of dispersion and perime-
ter in Table 3. The fifteen majority-white districts listed constitute 
only four percent of the 370 majority-white districts in the country. 
But the six majority-black districts are nineteen percent of the thirty-
one majority-black districts nationwide, and the four majority-His-
panic districts are twenty percent of the country's twenty majority-
Hispanic districts.237 In addition, given our earlier analysis,238 Shaw 
might have little or no effect on any of the extremely irregular white-
dominated districts. 
Table 3 further reveals that a few states have the most at stake in 
the way Shaw is applied. More than three-quarters of the districts in 
Table 3 are concentrated in only five states: Florida, Louisiana, New 
York, North Carolina, and Texas. In at least some of these states, 
Shaw has already influenced litigation. 239 That so many irregular dis-
the adjoining 23d and 17th districts, just inland from the coast, were designed as minority-domi-
nated districts. From this perspective, the oddly shaped coastal district is the residue of an effort 
to create minority-dominated districts. See generally BARONE & UJIFUSA, supra note 186, at 
320-21 (describing Florida CD22 and the redistricting process). 
236. In addition to Florida CD22, Louisiana CD6, New York CDs 5, 7-9, and North 
Carolina CD7 are each majority-white districts that share parts of borders with a minority 
district. 
237. All these figures exclude districts in which no one racial or ethnic group is a majority. 
The exact numbers, but not the conclusion, would change if we counted those districts. STAN-
LEY & NIEMI, supra note 184, at 43-44 tbl. 1-17, lists congressional districts with a majority-
minority population, based in part on Election Data Services data. 
238. See supra text accompanying notes 181-220. 
239. See, e.g., League of United Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en 
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tricts are concentrated in a few states will exacerbate the problem of 
choosing the relevant baseline for assessing districts. As noted earlier, 
judges might evaluate an individual district against the mean compact-
ness scores of other districts in that state. Alternatively, judges might 
examine an individual district in isolation or, perhaps more meaning-
fully, by comparing it to the kind of nationwide districting standards 
we make available in this article. 
As noted, the cutoffs in Table 3 are somewhat arbitrary. In Table 
4, we shift these threshold levels, while keeping them at the low end of 
the spectrum, and show how many minority and majority districts are 
affected as the "appearance" threshold changes. 
TABLE 4 
NUMBER OF 1990s CONGRESSIONAL DISTRICTS FALLING 
BELOW v ARIOUS LEVELS OF COMPACTNESS240 
Dispersion Score Perimeter Score 
..s..15 
Number of Districts 15 
Number of 
Minority Districts* 07 
Cumulative Number 
of Districts 15 
Cumulative Number 
of Minority Districts 07 
Number of Districts with 






Perimeter Score ..S..12 41 
Number of Minority Districts with 
Dispersion Score ..S..24 and 












The results further illustrate our argument that congressional districts 
lie along a compactness continuum. As cutoff levels are raised, even 
by small amounts, more and more districts fall below them. The levels 
in Table 4 also give a more concrete idea of the degree of compactness 
of districts at the low end of the spectrum. For example, one out of 
every twenty congressional districts currently in use has a perimeter 
score no higher than that of North Carolina CD7 (Figure 2(f)), and 
bane); Hines v. Mayor of Ahaskie, 998 F.2d 1266 (4th Cir. 1993); Kimble v. County of Niagara, 
826 F. Supp. 664 (W.D.N.Y. 1993). 
240. Information provided by Election Data Services, Inc. 
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more than one in ten has a score less than that of Texas CD14 (Figure 
2(e)). 
The number of minority districts below various cutoffs goes up 
more slowly. Nonetheless, the results in Table 4 show in stark fashion 
the tension between the goals of more minority districts and high 
levels of compactness, at least as congressional districts were drawn 
before Shaw. If courts were to define "highly irregular" as districts 
that violated the strictest standards of both dispersion and perimeter 
that Table 4 uses, seventeen of the current fifty-one single-minority 
districts in the country would be subject to strict scrutiny. 
C. Compactness of Congressional Districts over Time 
In response to Shaw, some might argue that the Court's sudden 
concern with district appearances arose only when states began to use 
unusual boundaries to create minority-dominated districts. Those 
who take this view necessarily assume that districts have always been 
as contorted as they are presently. If this premise is right, Shaw might 
be taken to reveal a cynical or even invidious concern with district 
shapes only when they benefit minorities. 
To test this premise, we compared the compactness of congres-
sional districts in the 1980s and the 1990s.241 We first focus on North 
Carolina, which had eleven districts in the 1980s. Table 2 contains the 
dispersion and perimeter scores for the 1990s districts;242 Table 5, be-
low, provides these scores for the 1980s districts. 
241. As noted earlier, the ability to calculate compactness scores has been developed only 
recently. See supra text accompanying note 194. 
242. See supra Table 2. 
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TABLE 5 
COMPACTNESS OF NORTH CAROLINA CONGRESSIONAL 











































As these tables reveal, districts became significantly less compact, 
at least in North Carolina, after the 1990 round of redistricting. In 
terms of dispersion, all but one district had a score of .30 or above in 
the 1980s while, today, only five of the twelve districts are that com-
pact. The perimeter measure, however, reveals even more striking re-
sults. Every current district, with the exception of CD4, has a 
considerably more distorted perimeter than the worst North Carolina 
district in the 1980s. Average perimeter compactness has plummeted. 
Although most North Carolina districts are still built around a core 
area - though less so than in the 1980s - they meander in and 
around that area to a far greater extent than previously. Compared to 
the 1980s districts, especially on the perimeter measure, almost all the 
current districts are significantly more irregularly designed. 
For the most part, the pattern in North Carolina turns out to be a 
general one. Table 6 provides a state-by-state comparison of district 
compactness, measured in terms of dispersion and perimeter, for the 
1980s and for the 1990s. We also show the numbers of districts falling 
below various levels of compactness. 
243. Information provided by Election Data Services, Inc. 
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TABLE 6 
COMPACTNESS OF 1980s AND 1990s CONGRESSIONAL 
DISTRICTS, BY STATE244 
Dispersion Scores Perimeter Scores 
State Range Mean #~.20 Range Mean #~.08 
Alabama 
1980s .28-.71 .44 .23-.46 .33 
1990s .26-.48 .39 .11-.26 .18 
Arizona 
1980s .30-.47 .42 .23-.44 .33 
1990s .30-.57 .41 .15-.47 .25 
Arkansas 
1980s .37-.54 .44 .21-.34 .28 
1990s .35-.52 .44 .18-.35 .27 
California 
1980s .09-.54 .33 4 .06-.39 .20 5 
1990s .04-.57 .39 2 .10-.45 .29 0 
Colorado 
1980s .31-.52 .43 .18-.44 .33 
1990s .25-.56 .40 .15-.38 .26 
Connecticut 
1980s .27-.54 .40 .12-.37 .26 
1990s .27-.55 .41 .20-.39 .32 
Florida 
1980s .16-.63 .40 1 .13-.56 .36 0 
1990s .03-.56 .31 7 .01-.50 .20 6 
Georgia 
1980s .19-.48 .34 .16-.48 .28 0 
1990s .17-.47 .34 .07-.32 .18 2 
Hawaii 
1980s .05-.30 .18 .11-.41 .26 
1990s .05-.34 .19 .11-.38 .24 
Idaho 
1980s .21-.54 .38 .21-.36 .28 
1990s .21-.56 .38 .20-.34 .27 
Illinois 
1980s .15-.53 .38 .14-.55 .30 0 
1990s .19-.56 .34 .03-.52 .27 1 
Indiana 
1980s .28-.53 .39 .16-.57 .33 
1990s .25-.53 .39 .14-.57 .27 
Iowa 
1980s .31-.56 .42 .33-.46 .38 
1990s .32-.54 .43 .30-.54 .41 
Kansas 
1980s .34-.54 .45 .33-.67 .50 
1990s .35-.50 .44 .24-.51 .39 
Kentucky 
1980s .26-.51 .41 .22-.42 .29 
1990s .21-.64 .38 .16-.36 .24 
Louisiana 
1980s .26-.60 .37 0 .09-.31 .24 0 
1990s .13-.48 .31 2 .01-.23 .09 4 
244. Information provided by Election Data Services, Inc. 
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Maine 
1980s .31-.45 .38 .12-.21 .17 
1990s .31-.45 .38 .13-.21 .17 
Maryland 
1980s .18-.57 .39 .08-.40 .22 
1990s .16-.51 .32 .08-.37 .18 
Massachusetts 
1980s .17-.51 .32 3 .02-.54 .23 1 
1990s .14-.43 .28 2 .06-.28 .15 3 
Michigan 
1980s .20-.48 .35 .07-.51 .29 
1990s .20-.63 .43 .07-.61 .38 
Minnesota 
1980s .35-.54 .40 .26-.56 .37 
1990s .36-.56 .45 .22-.47 .35 
Mississippi 
1980s .29-.57 .46 .14-.41 .31 0 
1990s .30-.52 .43 .08-.40 .21 1 
Missouri 
1980s .37-.59 .45 .24-.57 .39 
1990s .34-.58 .44 .18-.53 .32 
Nebraska 
1980s .27-.46 .34 .28-.56 .38 
1990s .33-.45 .40 .26-.49 .39 
Nevada 
1980s .28-.54 .41 .25-.72 .49 
1990s .43-.44 .43 .27-.56 .41 
New Hampshire 
1980s .22-.32 .27 .18-.26 .22 
1990s .23-.30 .26 .18-.23 .20 
New Jersey 
1980s .20-.58 .37 1 .10-.39 .21 0 
1990s .11-.51 .33 2 .07-.37 .19 2 
New Mexico 
1980s .25-.48 .35 .26-.40 .34 
1990s .36-.52 .44 .32-.37 .33 
New York 
1980s .06-.56 .30 6 .03-.39 .20 7 
1990s .06-.55 .30 8 .02-.45 .20 8 
North Carolina 
1980s .26-.57 .36 0 .22-.46 .30 0 
1990s .05-.44 .28 2 .01-.32 .09 8 
Ohio 
1980s .25-.53 .39 0 .09-.49 .31 
1990s .20-.61 .38 1 .11-.58 .27 
Oklahoma 
1980s .23-.52 .37 .18-.27 .23 
1990s .24-.59 .38 .16-.32 .22 
Oregon 
1980s .20-.45 .36 1 .23-.43 .30 
1990s .22-.46 .37 0 .15-.44 .27 
Pennsylvania 
1980s .25-.55 .40 0 .10-.50 .27 
1990s .16-.62 .39 1 .11-.45 .26 
Rhode Island 
1980s .18-.28 .23 1 .06-.21 .14 1 
1990s .22-.46 .34 0 .22-.52 .37 0 
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South Carolina 
1980s .23-.50 .40 .22-.39 .31 0 
1990s .22-.39 .31 .08-.29 .16 1 
Tennessee 
1980s .15-.43 .28 2 .13-.38 .26 0 
1990s .12-.42 .30 1 .08-.26 .17 1 
Texas 
1980s .23-.57 .39 0 .12-.52 .26 0 
1990s .19-.54 .31 5 .01-.38 .13 9 
Utah 
1980s .43-.51 .46 .27-.35 .31 
1990s .32-.55 .46 .33-.40 .36 
Virginia 
1980s .20-.55 .37 1 .12-.44 .30 0 
1990s .22-.52 .31 0 .06-.29 .17 2 
Washington 
1980s .26-.56 .38 0 .11-.42 .24 
1990s .20-.53 .38 1 .12-.43 .25 
West Virginia 
1980s .26-.44 .32 0 .15-.31 .23 
1990s .20-.39 .28 1 .11-.19 .15 
Wisconsin 
1980s .24-.51 .38 .19-.45 .30 
1990s .25-.63 .39 .18-.72 .33 
Nationwide 
1980s .05-.71 .37 25 .02-.72 .28 16 
1990s .03-.64 .36 40 .01-.72 .24 50 
Note: States with only one congressional representative are excluded. Slightly higher thresholds 
are used here than in Table 3 to show the large number of quite, if not extremely, low scores in 
the two decades. 
The nationwide figures make it clear, of course, that low compact-
ness is not an invention of the 1990s. A few districts in the 1980s were 
extremely noncompact, nearly as much so as the least compact dis-
tricts of the 1990s. In addition, a few states had significantly less com-
pact districts in the 1980s than in the 1990s. California is the prime 
example. Under the Burton districting plan, considered one of the 
most notoriously partisan gerrymanders in recent years, several ex-
tremely contorted districts were created, making overall compactness 
scores lower than in the l 970s245 and lower than those in most other 
states. 
In general, however, there is no denying that the present congres-
sional districts are less compact than those they replaced. 246 Between 
245. See Niemi et al., supra note 195, at 1175. 
246. That extremely noncompact districts are not evident, in general, in the 1970s and 1980s 
does not, of course, mean they were not prevalent in earlier periods. Southern Redeemers used 
gerrymanders, involving extremely noncompact election districts, as a central technique to reest-
ablish political control after the national retreat from Reconstruction began in 1877. Thus, in 
Mississippi, Redeemers in 1877 concentrated "the bulk of the black population in a 'shoestring' 
Congressional district running the length of the Mississippi River, leaving five others with white 
majorities. Alabama parceled out portions of its black belt into six separate districts to dilute the 
black vote." ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION, 1863-
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the 1980s and 1990s, average compactness levels dropped, precip-
itously in the case of district perimeters. More importantly, at ex-
tremely low levels of compactness, the number of districts increased 
sharply. Overall, the number of districts with very low scores rose 
substantially, with the decline in perimeter scores the most noticeable. 
Nationwide, the number of districts with scores at or below .08 more 
than tripled, as seen in Table 6. 
State-by-state comparisons indicate that the number of states in 
which average compactness declined is greater than the number in 
which average compactness increased (by a margin of thirty-two to 
nine for perimeter scores). However, the results in Table 6 also reveal 
that low compactness is particularly prominent in a small number of 
states. The chronological comparison in those states indicates the 
depth of the change the 1990s districting created. In Florida, 
Louisiana, North Carolina, and Texas, only one district in the 1980s 
was below the dispersion or perimeter cutoffs shown in Table 6. In 
these same states in the 1990s, sixteen districts fall below the disper-
sion cutoff, and twenty-seven fall below the perimeter cutoff. 
Three factors best explain this dramatic decline. First, since 
Karcher v. Daggett, 247 congressional districts must have virtually iden-
tical populations. 248 In pursuit of the mathematic exactitude the 
Court has demanded, jurisdictions necessarily have had to compro-
mise other values, like compactness. This is a trade-off legal doctrine 
itself has imposed on political bodies. Second, the increasing sophisti-
cation of redistricting technology enables constant manipulation and 
recalibration of district boundaries to achieve that equalization, or 
other goals. The new computer programs facilitate twists and turns in 
perimeters that add or subtract small numbers of people until some 
desired level of equality is achieved - or until more partisan and per-
sonal agendas are realized. Third, the interpretation of the VRA in 
Thornburg v. Gingles 249 has played a major role. Gingles had the ef-
1877, at 590 (1988). In South Carolina, Democrats constructed the "bizarre" South Carolina 
Seventh District in 1885, which "contained the homes of two Republican incumbents and sliced 
across county lines in order to pack in every possible black voter." Kousser, The Voti11g Rights 
Act, supra note 21, at 144. After these gerrymanders, the Seventh District in South Carolina was 
81.7% black and the Sixth District in Mississippi was 77.5% black. Id. at 148. (There are small 
discrepancies between Foner's and Kousser's figures regarding the postgerrymander populations 
in the Mississippi congressional districts.). 
247. 462 U.S. 725 (1983). 
248. In 1983, the Court upheld the invalidation of a New Jersey districting plan in which the 
maximum deviation from exact equality was 0.6984%. The Court based its holding on the exist-
ence of a plan with a smaller deviation and the fact that the state had not justified its adoption of 
a less accurate plan. Karcher, 462 U.S. at 725. 
249. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
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feet of requiring jurisdictions to put greater emphasis on fair and effec-
tive representation of minority interests. Because the emphasis on 
interest representation often conflicts with the traditional role of geog-
raphy in constructing districts - particularly when minority popula-
tions are dispersed - Gingles has led to further deviations from 
compactness. These explanations are consistent with the greater de-
cline in perimeter measures compared to dispersion measures and with 
the strong correlation between states with large minority populations 
and those whose perimeter scores declined in the 1990s.250 
Whether rightly or wrongly decided, Shaw therefore cannot be 
seen as the Court's sudden awakening to a phenomenon of long-stand-
ing existence. Contorted appearances are not a new invention, but 
shifts in legal doctrine and technological developments have combined 
to produce generally less compact congressional districts and a 
number of extremely noncompact individual districts. In this sense, 
Shaw should be seen as an outgrowth of the changes occurring in the 
1980s, including those the Court itself set into motion through 
changes in legal doctrine. 
V. THRESHOLDS VERSUS JUSTIFICATIONS: THE LEGAL 
ROLE OF COMPACTNESS 
District "appearance" is a threshold, not an ultimate, issue under 
Shaw. It is important to be clear about the precise way in which Shaw 
makes compactness relevant. "Bizarre" districts that appear to be 
drawn for racial reasons are not per se unconstitutional. Instead, ju-
risdictions must offer specific, legitimate, and compelling purposes 
that account for the location and design of these districts. Under 
Shaw, noncompactness functions as a trigger for strict scrutiny; once a 
district crosses a threshold of noncompactness, special burdens of jus-
tification apply. Nonetheless, even extremely noncompact districts 
can survive strict scrutiny if sufficiently justified. 
The process of justification involves two steps. First, the odd shape 
of a district must result from a state's pursuit of aims that are legiti-
mate and constitutionally compelling. Second, the means the state 
chooses must be narrowly tailored to achieving those legitimate aims 
and no others. The issue of justification, therefore, is as crucial as that 
of appearance. Shaw, however, touches on that issue only briefly. In 
this last section, we can sketch a few considerations relevant to the 
justification inquiry. 
250. Of the states with combined black and Hispanic populations above 20%, between 10% 
and 20%, and less than 10%, 13 of 15 (87%), 7 of 9 (78%), and 12 of 19 (63%), respectively, 
saw a decline in their perimeter scores. 
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Potentially acceptable justifications can be divided into three types: 
those that are obviously legitimate; those that pose more difficult ques-
tions; and those that trace directly to the VRA. With respect to each, 
we both describe the general form of justification and suggest some of 
the difficulties courts will face in applying it. We then turn to the 
more pervasive and general problem posed by Shaw's demand that in-
tensely political and partisan districting decisions be justified in terms 
of rational, articulable principles. This conflict between the political 
and the legal poses daunting obstacles to judicial application of Shaw. 
A. Justifications: Ends 
1. Conventionally Sufficient Ends 
Certain traditional districting ends are, in theory, precisely the 
kind that will provide sufficient justification under Shaw for even 
"highly irregular" districts. They include respecting existing political 
boundary lines when they are oddly shaped, following natural geo-
graphic features of a landscape, and preserving "communities of inter-
est." At the least, when a court finds these ends to be the dominant 
purpose behind a district's design, Shaw ought to be satisfied.251 For 
mixed-motive cases, however, in which these purposes are present 
alongside race-conscious districting aims, Shaw provides no direct gui-
dance. With respect to "highly irregular" minority districts, these 
cases are likely to be common. Whether in such situations the en-
hancement of minority representation must be a motivating factor, the 
dominant motivating factor, or the exclusive motivating factor re-
mains an open question. 
Even after courts determine the appropriate causation standard, 
the evidentiary and administrative difficulties they will face in seeking 
to untangle mixed motives will remain formidable. The underlying 
purposes and principles that animate Shaw should govern the choice 
of standard. If we are right that Shaw fundamentally concerns social 
perceptions that race has subordinated all other traditionally relevant 
values in redistricting - but that race-conscious districting is not per 
se a constitutional problem - the proper causation standard in mixed-
motive contexts ought to track this concern. This interpretation might 
suggest that the enhancement of minority representation must be more 
than merely a motivating factor behind a "highly irregular" district; it 
251. See, e.g., Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816 (1993) ("[W]hen members of a racial group live 
together in one community, a reapportionment plan that concentrates members of the group in 
one district and excludes them from others may reflect wholly legitimate purposes. The district 
lines may be drawn, for example, to provide for compact districts of contiguous territory, or to 
maintain the integrity of political subdivisions."); Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 578 (1964). 
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must be either the exclusive explanation for that district or, at the 
least, the dominant purpose behind it. Deciding on which standard is 
most consistent with Shaw, however, requires a more detailed analysis 
of the likely effects of these different scenarios on social perceptions. 
Apart from the problem of mixed motives, these theoretically suffi-
cient justifications will pose additional conceptual difficulties in prac-
tice. With respect to "community of interest" justifications, 
reapportionment bodies often give some weight to defining districts in 
terms of attributed common interests. The list of potential interests, 
all reflected in actual districting plans, includes urban interests, rural 
interests, coastal interests, agricultural interests, mountain interests, 
beachfront property ownership, ethnic interests, and many more. The 
intersection between race-conscious districting and the acknowledged 
legitimacy of preserving communities of interest generates at least 
three interrelated questions that courts applying Shaw must confront. 
First, what kinds of interests can policymakers legitimately treat as 
the basis for attributing a community identity to some group? This 
question is normative, not descriptive. The issue is which of the many 
dimensions that might describe some group's common interest may be 
acted on by legislators. If living on the coast defines a legitimately 
distinct political interest, does being wealthy? If so, does being poor? 
Once inroads into territorial districting can be made in the name of 
preserving communities of interest, the second question is whether 
policymakers can treat race itself as constituting such an interest. The 
argument for doing so is particularly strong when two of the predi-
cates to a section 2 claim under Gingles are present: that is, when 
majorities engage in racial-bloc voting against minority interests that 
are themselves politically cohesive. Under these circumstances, there 
might be strong reasons for permitting, if not requiring, policymakers 
to define communities of interest in racial terms. If urban residents or 
rural residents can be assumed to have cohesive political interests, per-
haps racial groups can as wel1252 - particularly when this cohesive-
ness is not assumed, but demonstrated in fact. 
With respect to "bizarrely" shaped race-conscious districts, how-
ever, Shaw seems to reject this kind of justification. If a "bizarre" 
district that appears to be a racial gerrymander cannot stand absent 
sufficient justification, the fact that the district was designed to be a 
racial gerrymander cannot provide that justification. This different 
252. These assumptions are always subject to constitutional and VRA constraints, of course, 
that prohibit minority-vote dilution. 
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treatment of race and other interests may be a basis for criticizing 
Shaw, but it is the sine qua non of the decision. 
Third, as the Court has recognized in other contexts, race fre-
quently correlates with other socioeconomic factors.253 In evaluating 
oddly shaped districts, this correlation will require courts to attempt 
to untangle legitimate communities of interest from the now-illegiti-
mate one of race. If blacks as blacks cannot be grouped into a "highly 
irregular" district, but urban residents or the poor can, how will 
courts distinguish these contexts, and under what mixed-motive 
standard? 
In short, even the justifications most readily acceptable in theory 
- acknowledgement of existing political boundary lines, recognition 
of natural geographic features, preservation of communities of interest 
- will pose considerable difficulty in application. 
2. More Complex Ends 
Redistricting necessarily distributes political power between par-
ties and specific politicians, particularly incumbent officeholders. In 
general, the Supreme Court has embraced political realism and, at 
least to some extent, tolerated these facts as inevitable or even desira-
ble. As Justice White, perhaps the leading judicial realist in this area, 
wrote for the Court in Gaffney v. Cummings: 254 "Politics and political 
considerations are inseparable from districting and apportionment. ... 
[I]t requires no special genius to recognize the political consequences 
of drawing a district line along one street rather than another .... The 
reality is that districting inevitably has and is intended to have sub-
stantial political consequences."255 After Shaw, the extent to which 
partisan objectives and protection of incumbent officeholders will be 
permitted to justify "highly irregular'' race-conscious districts, if at all, 
becomes a critical question. 
Currently, the Justice Department is taking the litigation position 
that these ends - partisan advantage or incumbent protection - do 
suffice to justify districts that Shaw requires to pass strict scrutiny. 
Thus, in post-Shaw litigation challenging certain black-dominated 
congressional districts in Louisiana, the Justice Department has filed a 
brief arguing that "where a compact majority-minority district could 
be drawn, but the state chooses to draw the district in a different, less 
253. See. e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 248 n.14 (1976). 
254. 412 U.S. 735 (1973). 
255. 412 U.S. at 753; see also White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 795-96 (1973) ("Districting 
inevitably has sharp political impact and inevitably political decisions must be made by those 
charged with the task."). 
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compact way to protect an incumbent or to give partisan advantage to 
one political party, the state will be able to explain the odd shape of 
the district on considerations other than race."256 As a descriptive or 
analytic statement, this assertion is certainly accurate, as we argued 
earlier,257 but whether these explanations will satisfy Shaw is more 
uncertain. 
The pattern of judicial response to these motivations in other redis-
tricting contexts forms an intricate mosaic. With respect to protecting 
incumbents, federal courts accept this as legitimate state policy in 
some contexts; moreover, federal courts are actually required to defer 
to state aims of this sort in some circumstances when those courts are 
called upon to redistrict. For example, in interpreting the cause of 
action Davis v. Bandemer258 creates, which makes extreme partisan 
gerrymandering unconstitutional, courts increasingly focus on 
whether the plan treats incumbents of both parties "fairly." If a plan 
pairs too many incumbents from the same party against each other in 
a new district, this becomes significant evidence of impermissibly par-
tisan redistricting.259 In effect, this approach not only tolerates state 
efforts to protect incumbents, but comes dangerously close to ensuring 
fair districting by making public office a personal sinecure.26° Federal 
courts have labeled protecting incumbents an "important state 
goal"261 and a "legitimate" justification when special justifications for 
district design are required.262 Similarly, the Supreme Court has held 
that, when federal courts are forced to choose among state redistrict-
ing plans, those courts must respect state policy preferences for pre-
256. Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae at 14, Hays v. Louisiana 
(W.D. La. filed Aug. 9, 1993) (No. 92-1522S). 
257. See supra text accompanying notes 90-96. 
258. 478 U.S. 109 (1986). 
259. For example, after the Wisconsin legislature failed to reapportion itself following the 
1990 Census, the court adopted its own plan and construed Bandemer to require that the small-
est number of incumbents be paired. The critical feature of the plan chosen was that it "pair[ed] 
only 16 incumbents in both houses of the legislature, and only 6 of the same party." Prosser v. 
Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 871 (W.D. Wis. 1992). 
The Supreme Court has acknowledged the legitimacy of state efforts to protect incumbents on 
several occasions. See, e.g., Karcher v. Daggett, 462 U.S. 725, 740-41 (1983); Burns v. 
Richardson, 384 U.S. 73, 89 n.16 (1966) (minimizing competition between incumbents does not 
necessarily establish invidiousness). 
260. For a critique of the courts' protection of incumbents as a way of ensuring against 
extreme partisan gerrymandering, see Samuel Issacharolf, Judging Politics: The Elusive Quest for 
Judicial Review of Political Fairness, 71 TEXAS L. REV. 1643, 1672 (1993) ("Courts have repeat-
edly invoked Bandemer for the proposition that it is impermissible to place incumbents in head-
to-head contests with each other in redrawn districts."). 
261. Burton v. Sheheen, 793 F. Supp. 1329, 1342 (D.S.C. 1992) {describing the avoidance of 
incumbent contests as "an important state goal"). 
262. Gonzalez v. Monterey County, 808 F. Supp. 727, 735 (N.D. Cal. 1992). 
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serving "the constituencies of congressional incumbents."263 
Yet, in other redistricting contexts, federal courts have refused to 
acknowledge state interests in protecting incumbents. For example, 
when jurisdictions fail in repeated efforts to draw legally valid redis-
tricting plans, federal courts assume that role. In these circumstances, 
some courts explicitly refuse to permit partisan or incumbency con-
cerns to influence redistricting policy.264 In the recent court-man-
dated reapportionment of the Minnesota legislature, the court 
evaluated the plan in terms of independent, nonpartisan fairness crite-
ria, explicitly assuming a veil of ignorance concerning effects on in-
cumbents. 265 In other cases, court-appointed expert witnesses have 
specifically requested that they not be provided with data concerning 
partisan or incumbent effects of various plans.266 Arguably, an affirm-
ative judicial role in redistricting might implicate different concerns 
than a more passive review of policymakers' reapportionment plans, 
but these cases reflect some judicial discomfort with legitimating too 
strongly state efforts to protect existing officeholders. 
As for the legitimacy of partisan political aims, the argument that 
they justify "bizarre" race-conscious districts can be pressed in two 
forms. In the most compelling form, states might argue that oddly 
shaped districts are necessary to create a legislature that fairly reflects 
the distribution of partisan power in a state. In the least attractive but 
often more realistic form, states might argue that the political forces in 
control of redistricting ought to be permitted to exploit their advan-
tage as far as possible. The argument would continue that, as long as 
this pursuit of political advantage is not carried to the unconstitutional 
263. White v. Weiser, 412 U.S. 783, 797 (1973). Note, though, that the Court explicitly 
reserved the different question of whether a state can justify a deviation from population equality 
among districts that is a prima facie violation of equal protection on the ground that it is neces-
sary to protect incumbents. 412 U.S. at 791-92. Justice Marshall rejected the Court's willingness 
to defer to state desires to protect incumbents, even when the question arises only in the context 
of federal courts' choosing between reapportionment plans after a constitutional violation has 
been established. 412 U.S. at 799 (Marshall, J., concurring in part). 
264. See, e.g., Prosser v. Elections Bd., 793 F. Supp. 859, 867 (W.D. Wis. 1992) (three-judge 
court; per curiam) ("Judges should not select a plan that seeks partisan advantage - that seeks 
to change the ground rules so that one party can do better than it would do under a plan drawn 
up by persons having no political agenda - even if they would not be entitled to invalidate an 
enacted plan that did so."); Terrazas v. Slagle, 789 F. Supp. 828, 844 (W.D. Tex. 1991) 
("[E]nsuring free and equal access to the ballot, not partisan considerations or the protection of 
incumbents, is the sole focus of federal law in the area of redistricting and reapportioning seats to 
legislative bodies."), ajfd., 112 S. Ct. 3019 (1992) (mem.). 
265. "The plan developed by the court was developed without regard ta the residence of 
incumbents. Adherence to principles of compactness and population equality, and respect for 
governmental boundaries insures that partisan gerrymandering is reduced or eliminated." 
Emison v. Growe, 782 F. Supp. 427, 445-46 (D. Minn. 1992) (footnote omitted), revd., 113 S. Ct. 
1075 (1993). 
266. See, e.g., Issacharoff, supra note 260, at 1694. 
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extremes that Bandemer condemns, state political forces should be 
permitted to battle for control, even through the means of contorted, 
race-conscious districts. The Court has acknowledged the inevitable 
role of political aims in redistricting and has held that the pursuit of 
"political fairness," in the form of districts designed to bring about 
proportional representation of Democrats and Republicans in the state 
legislature, is not unconstitutional. 267 Beyond that context, however, 
the Court has not suggested how much weight partisan aims will be 
given under the Fourteenth Amendment. 
This wavering and uncertain pattern of decisions suggests a limit 
on the willingness of courts to accept state partisan and incumbency-
protection interests as compelling ones. Shaw offers no direct gui-
dance on the question, but it seems unlikely that courts will view these 
interests as sufficient to justify "highly irregular" race-conscious dis-
tricts. Both the tenor of Shaw and its formal legal requirement of 
strict scrutiny suggest the Court believes it has identified a value of 
profound constitutional importance that certain oddly shaped districts 
threaten. Although a state's partisan agenda might be a legitimate aim 
that courts will defer to in some contexts, it will be awkward for courts 
to declare it compelling enough to override the constitutional values 
Shaw identifies. 
In addition, Shaw itself suggests that partisan motivations are a 
further reason to condemn, rather than to salvage, "bizarre" race-con-
scious districts. No veil obscured the possible role of incumbency pro-
tection behind the creation of District 12; the dissents raised it several 
times as a reason justifying the district, 268 while amicus curiae 
squarely presented it as a reason to find North Carolina's plan uncon-
stitutional. 269 With partisan "defenses" so obviously available, Shaw 
would be a strange exercise in formality if the Court believes that, on 
remand, these defenses should be sufficient to justify contorted dis-
tricts. Moreover, if Shaw rests on concern for social perceptions in-
volving the role of race in politics, this concern suggests invalidating 
"highly irregular" districts when these perceptions are likely. Shaw 
resists permitting politicians to manipulate these social perceptions in 
pursuit of their own self-interest and partisan advantage. For these 
reasons, we consider it unlikely courts will find protection of incum-
267. See supra notes 254-55 and accompanying text. 
268. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2841 (1993) (White, J., dissenting), 113 S. Ct. at 2843 
(Stevens, J., dissenting). 
269. See, e.g., Brief Amicus Curiae of the Republican National Committee in Support of 
Appellants at 12-13, 19-21, 25, Shaw. 
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bents or pursuit of partisan gain to be a sufficiently compelling justifi-
cation for "highly irregular" race-conscious districts. 
3. VRA Compliance as an End 
Race-conscious districting most often occurs in the context of ef-
forts to comply with the VRA's ban on minority-vote dilution.270 But 
compliance with the VRA is not a unitary phenomenon. Claims of 
compliance can arise in purely remedial contexts, they can arise when 
jurisdictions claim to be preventing future violations, or they can arise 
when jurisdictions affirmatively use race to comply with the general 
aim of enhancing minority representation. 
As in other areas involving race and the Constitution, the purely 
remedial context is the easiest one. When a minority district is re-
quired for a jurisdiction to comply with either section 2 or 5, that man-
date should provide sufficient justification under Shaw. 271 With 
respect to district shapes, the difficult question will not be whether 
required compliance satisfies strict scrutiny, but what kinds of districts 
the VRA will be interpreted to require. We have described the con-
flicting ways in which federal courts have approached that statutory 
question.272 Shaw directly bears on this question only when an inter-
pretation of the VRA would be unconstitutional - that is, when the 
district it requires would be unconstitutionally contorted. But, Shaw 
will cast a larger shadow, for it will likely change the background as-
sumptions courts bring to interpreting the Act. Courts might become 
more likely to find that the Act does not require extremely noncom-
pact districts, particularly at the stage of determining substantive lia-
bility under the Act. 273 The difficult question will not be the formal 
270. Many years ago, John Ely observed that legal standards treating ex post racially dispa· 
rate impact as racial discrimination would necessarily require policymakers ex ante to engage in 
race-conscious policymaking. He noted: 
[So] long as the Court remains unwilling to order states to take race into account ••. judicial 
review must await proof of racial motivation and cannot be triggered by disproportion per 
se. To undertake automatically to invalidate [state actions] because of racial disproportion 
would obviously be to order that balance be intentionally achieved. 
John H. Ely, Legislative and Administrative Motivation in Constitutional Law. 79 YALE L.J. 
1205, 1260 (1970). Because the VRA prohibits electoral arrangements that discriminate in intent 
as well as result, policymakers must be aware of - rather than indifferent to - the racial distri· 
bution of political power that different electoral structures will produce. 
271. See, e.g., Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2830 ("The States certainly have a very strong interest in 
complying with federal antidiscrimination laws that are constitutionally valid as interpreted and 
as applied."). There is some circularity, inevitably, to this analysis. If only "highly irregular" 
districts trigger strict scrutiny, then only those districts require special justification. But as a 
statutory matter, courts are unlikely to interpret the Act to require highly irregular districts after 
Shaw. 
272. See supra text accompanying notes 160-76. 
273. Even if courts become more strict in the way they interpret the first prong of Gingles, 
thus finding no liability when no reasonably compact minority district can be created, they might 
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one of whether VRA compliance is sufficiently compelling, but how 
broadly the courts will construe this compliance. We examine this 
question shortly. 
Apart from the pure remedial context, jurisdictions might use race 
to forestall potential VRA violations. With respect to oddly shaped 
minority districts, the crucial question is whether Shaw will lead to 
Croson-like constraints on racial redistricting.274 Must jurisdictions 
first establish a factual predicate for the position that race-conscious 
districting is a necessary preventative? What evidence would be re-
quired and what level of proof must be met? For example, must juris-
dictions engage in the costly and complex process of establishing 
racially polarized voting patterns, a task plaintiffs must undertake to 
establish a section 2 violation? Because we are focused here on 
"highly irregular" districts, it is unlikely jurisdictions will be able to 
establish that such districts are necessary to avoid substantive VRA 
liability.275 
Finally, jurisdictions might seek to justify oddly shaped minority 
districts not in remedial terms, but prospectively. If forced to put this 
in terms of compliance with the VRA, jurisdictions might argue that 
such districting is consistent with the general purposes and spirit of 
the Act, even if not technically required. Jurisdictions might assert, 
for example, that these districts are a means of enhancing the legiti-
macy, fairness, and responsiveness of democratic institutions. Under 
Voinovich v. Quilter, 276 nothing in the VRA prohibits race-conscious 
districting justified in these terms. But, whatever the constitutional 
status of such justifications for race-conscious districts that are reason-
ably compact, Shaw seemingly requires that these justifications be 
found insufficient for "highly irregular" districts. Shaw requires strict 
scrutiny for irregular districts, and, again, it is difficult to see the point 
still permit "highly irregular" districts as a remedy after liability has otherwise been found. 
Thus, once § 2 requires a jurisdiction to create a minority district, the jurisdiction might prefer 
an irregular to a compact district. In this context, however, the jurisdiction could not defend 
itself on the ground that the VRA required the irregular district. The legal question would then 
be whether the creation of this irregular district was "narrowly tailored" to remedy the violation, 
a question we address infra at text accompanying notes 278-80. 
274. We focus here only on oddly shaped districts, rather than race-conscious districts in 
general, because of our view that Shaw applies only to the former. See supra text accompanying 
notes 57-74. 
275. If the Justice Department denied § 5 preclearance on the ground that the failure to 
create a particular, "highly irregular" district would amount to a potential § 2 violation, a juris-
diction that complied by drawing such a district would likely have sufficient justification. Of 
course, an aggressive interpretation of Croson could further require that the Justice Department's 
conclusion of potential § 2 liability itself rest on a sufficient factual foundation, such as proof of 
racially polarized voting in the relevant area. 
276. 113 S. Ct. 1149 (1993). 
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in that requirement if jurisdictions can successfully defend with 
the argument that they were seeking to enhance minority 
representation. 277 
B. Means: The Requirement of Narrow Tailoring 
In addition to sufficiently compelling ends, Shaw requires "nar-
rowly tailored" means that advance those ends with precision.278 This 
will be a complex undertaking, again raising, among other difficulties, 
the problems of mixed motives. 
Consider VRA compliance. When the Justice Department under 
section 5 or the courts under section 2 find that a jurisdiction is re-
quired to create an additional minority district, neither typically speci-
fies precisely where that district must be located and how it must be 
designed. This policy of self-abnegation rests both on the recognition 
that districting implicates multiple, diverse values, and on policy rea-
sons for deferring to state recommendations of those values. As long 
as the jurisdiction gets to the required end state and creates the addi-
tional district, federal concerns are satisfied. 
In this context, the meaning of "narrowly tailored" is obscure. 
Absent direct specification from either the courts or the Justice 
Department as to how a district is to be designed, no obvious baseline 
exists against which to measure "narrowly tailored." 
One solution is to construe this language to suggest that the minor-
ity districts the VRA requires must be drawn in the most compact way 
possible. Yet this would confuse the purpose of Shaw's strict scrutiny 
standard and require jurisdictions, for no obvious purpose, to compro-
mise significant redistricting values. The purpose of demanding close 
connections between means and ends is to ensure that the state is not 
covertly pursuing forbidden ends. But compactness is not constitu-
tionally required;279 Shaw does not forbid noncompact districts per se. 
Instead, the suspect districts are those so noncompact as to create the 
social perception that the single value of race-conscious districting has 
subordinated all other districting values. 
As a result, "narrowly tailored" in this context should mean no 
277. As we argued earlier, see supra text accompanying notes 126-32, Shaw can be read 
broadly and narrowly; if Shaw applies only when a more compact minority district could have 
been created, then the inability to do so would provide a sufficient defense under strict scrutiny. 
278. Shaw v. Reno, 113 S. Ct. 2816, 2819 (1993). This statement is made in the specific 
context of remedying violations under§ S's nonretrogression standard. 113 S. Ct. at 2819. The 
Court does not make a similarly explicit statement regarding narrow tailoring with respect to § 2. 
Nonetheless, nothing the Court says about § 5 would appear to distinguish it from § 2 in this 
respect. 
279. Shaw, 113 S. Ct. at 2827 (citing Gaffney v. Cummings, 412 U.S. 735, 752 n.18 (1973)), 
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more than avoiding "highly irregular" district shapes. This view may 
make the means test appear redundant, given that Shaw requires strict 
scrutiny for precisely such districts. Interpreted this way, however, 
the narrow tailoring requirement would still be an element in Shaw's 
logic because it would clarify that vague assertions of compliance with 
the VRA will not suffice. At the same time, as long as jurisdictions are 
complying with their VRA obligations, while still accommodating 
traditional redistricting goals, Shaw implies that they will retain poli-
cymaking discretion to make trade-offs among these goals. Shaw re-
quires that jurisdictions respect value pluralism and avoid value 
reductionism. The requirement of "narrow tailoring" should be con-
strued with this principle in mind. 
C. Justifications: The General Problem 
Easily lost in this technical legal analysis is the essential nature of 
the districting process. Districting implicates an array of values, some 
relatively neutral, some intensely partisan. For the most part, one 
cannot rank these values in any lexical order; no decision rule specifies 
the precise trade-offs to be made among these values when they con-
flict. 280 Moreover, the design of even a single district reflects not one 
decision, but the cumulation of hundreds of small decisions -
whether to include this or that section of adjacent towns, whether to 
extend the district to the north or to the west, even whether to include 
this or that street. In addition, district plans draw from a virtually 
unlimited range of potential alternatives. There is no ideal districting 
plan that forms a baseline against which to measure individual dis-
tricts or a district plan. 
Shaw attempts to pull one thread out of this tapestry; it demands 
specific, articulable justifications in one particular districting situation. 
It is not clear, however, whether this aim can be achieved without 
unraveling the fabric of the districting process. Districting plans are 
integrated bundles of compromises, deals, and principles. To ask 
about the reason behind the design of any one particular district is 
typically to implicate the entire pattern of purposes and trade-offs be-
hind a districting plan as a whole.281 Searching for "the reason" or 
280. It is generally recognized that equal population and avoidance of minority-vote dilution 
are goals that must be achieved. Beyond that, there is widespread disagreement on the priority 
ranking of other goals. 
281. See, e.g., Robert G. Dixon, Jr., Fair Criteria and Procedures for Establishing Legislative 
Districts, 9 POLY. STUD. J. 839, 844 (1981) (noting that districting is not an exercise in logic but 
in compromise and accommodation); Issacharoff, supra note 260, at 1650 (noting that states are 
hard pressed to articulate coherent policies for districting plans "in light of the political horse-
trading and compromises that typically - and perhaps inevitably - underlie such plans"). The 
difficulties here are analogous to those that underlie the judicial resistance to engage in substan-
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"the dominant reason" behind a particular district's shape is often like 
asking why one year's federal budget is at one level rather than an-
other. Moreover, to require a coherent explanation for the specific 
shape of even one district is to impose a model of legalistic decision-
making on the one political process that least resembles that model. 
These general pressures may lead Shaw in another direction. 
Rather than providing a doctrine for recovering the reasons behind an 
irregular district, Shaw might eventually become an external con-
straint on the districting process. That is, Shaw might come to define 
an outer constraint on extreme noncompactness. As long as redistrict-
ing bodies stay within that constraint, however, they will retain the 
discretion to make arbitrary, politically laden policy trade-offs be-
tween competing districting values. In this way, Shaw would not de-
mand ex post what does not take place ex ante: reasoned articulation 
of specific purposes for drawing district boundaries in particular ways. 
Rather than seeking the reasons an irregular district was drawn, 
courts might implement Shaw as a constraint on the extent to which 
districts can become extremely noncompact. With a clearly an-
nounced constraint on extreme noncompactness, political bodies will 
understand the domains in which they cannot act and those within 
which they retain policymaking discretion. As long as policymakers 
stay within this specified constraint, courts will not have to inquire 
into the reasons behind district designs. Many of the issues discussed 
above can then be bypassed. When policymakers continue to believe 
they have sufficient reasons for violating this constraint, courts will 
still have to evaluate those justifications. Yet such contexts are likely 
to be rare once a clear constraint is specified. 
CONCLUSION 
In some respects, Shaw might function as the Baker v. Carr282 of 
the Voting Rights Act era. In Shaw, the Court found justiciable an 
entirely new kind of equal protection claim that constrains the design 
of election districts. Like Baker, the decision will be controversial, in 
part because it is bereft of virtually any guidance as to how the elusive 
principles that underlie its holding are to be turned into an adminis-
trable set of standards. In an area as explosive as race and redistrict-
tive rationality review of economic legislation; just as individual economic regulations are tied to 
each other through an ongoing process of compromise and logrolling, individual district lines 
cannot be rationalized apart from the compromises and trade·offs they embody. See generally 
Frank Michelman, Politics and Values or What's Really Wrong with Rationality Review, 13 
CREIGHTON L. REV. 487 (1977) (analyzing rationality review of economic regulation). 
282. 369 U.S. 186 (1962). 
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ing, the political, legal, and social costs of this uncertainty are 
potentially vast. 
We have argued that Shaw ultimately must be understood in terms 
of judicial concern for "expressive harms." American conceptions of 
political representation are riven right now by competing ideals. Tra-
ditionally, the fundamental template has been that of the territorially 
based single-member districting system, in which geographically de-
fined interests are the foundation on which political representation is 
built. Working within this mold, the VRA stresses instead direct rep-
resentation of group interests, seeking to ensure the fair and effective 
representation of minority groups. In Shaw, the Court effectively held 
that the tension between these alternative visions had reached the 
breaking point. When jurisdictions create "bizarre" territorial dis-
tricts, in single-minded pursuit of enhancing minority representation, 
they compromise the perceived legitimacy of political institutions. 
The harm is a generalized one, for it lies not in specific burdens on 
particular individuals, but in government's expression of disrespect for 
significant public values. Right or wrong, this is the theory on which 
Shaw is decided. 
Expressive harms are notoriously difficult to translate into legal 
rules. We have argued that quantitative measures of compactness pro-
vide the most secure starting points for defining "bizarre" districts in 
principled and administrable terms. Using these measures, we have 
shown that North Carolina District 12 can legitimately be considered 
the least compact congressional district in the country. At the same 
time, other districts - majority and minority - are not far behind. 
The precise effect of Shaw will depend on how "irregular" a district 
must be to trigger strict scrutiny, but quantitative measures of com-
pactness promise the most useful guidance for making that choice. 
Baker became meaningful once Reynolds v. Sims 283 translated it into 
the one-person-one-vote standard. If Shaw is to have its Reynolds, it 
will be through the quantitative measures of compactness we offer 
here. 
283. 377 U.S. 533 (1964); see also Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964) (requiring one 
person, one vote for congressional districts). Professors Aleinikoffand Issacharoffmake a similar 
observation. See Aleinikoff & Issacharoff, supra note 59, at 622 ("Shaw would then be the Baker 
of compactness standards, with its own Reynolds presumably to follow."). 
